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ABSTRACT
The method of phenomenology has been applied successfully in many 
research fields, but not in the case of the investigation of religion. The 
application in this field has been inconsistent and inconclusive. This 
dissertation investigates the reason for this and seeks to discover how the 
method might be more fruitfully applied.
Chapter One deals with the principles of phenomenology through an 
exposition of the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. In the early stages, differences emerge in their approaches 
to phenomenology, but there is a fundamental agreement amongst them on 
the need to establish the ground in knowledge which is certain. It is here that 
the phenomenon appears without prejudice. Phenomenology aims to describe 
this phenomenon which appears prior to its being clouded by our natural 
standpoint and prejudices. For Husserl, this phenomenon is a state of pure 
consciousness, which is arrived at by the process of transcendental epoche. 
Heidegger however, sees phenomenology as a method whose usefulness lies 
in our way of getting access to the phenomenon. The point of departure of 
this access to the phenomenon is in the interpretation of man in his historical 
existence. Merleau-Ponty on the other hand, sees perceptual consciousness 
as the starting point of phenomenology.
Chapter two deals with what is hitherto known as the phenomenology of 
religion to discover the way it has appropriated the method of 
phenomenology as advocated by Husserl or as understood by his 
successors. Critical expositions of the works of Rudolf Otto, Brede Kristensen, 
Gerardus van de Leeuw, and Mircea Eliade are undertaken. It emerges that 
the phenomenology of religion has completely ignored the method of 
phenomenology. The excursus is a prolepsis of the reason behind the failure 
of the phenomenology of religion to appropriate the phenomenological 
method.
Chapter Three leaves the field of the general history of religion to examine 
other fields that will suggest a better understanding of the nature of religion. 
Here the works of Ludwig Feuerbach, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger 
are examined. Though the investigation is suggestive, it does not pinpoint the 
phenomenon of religion nor is it able to describe it. Having failed to discover 
the nature of religion, chapter Four takes us back to the field of the general 
history of religion in which the works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith are examined. 
What emerges from this is that religion has been misconceived. The history 
of the word ’religion’ reveals a misconception which could be said to be 
responsible for the apparent inconsistency in the study of religion. Smith 
begins to address the way in which religion can be understood if the
phenomenological method is to be applied. The misconception of religion is 
corrected and redirected ready for the phenomenology of religion.
Chapter Five examines the works of Karl Jaspers for an understanding of 
transcendence and its relationship to man. Here the way transcendence which 
is not objectifiable is made real is discussed with the aim of assisting the 
phenomenology of religion.
Chapter Six examines the modifications that are necessary in order to apply 
the phenomenological method to the phenomenology of religion. A 
modification is suggested from Husserl’s understanding of the 
phenomenological method to that of his successors in the persons of 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
A further modification is suggested by relating the concept of Dasein in 
Heidegger and the ’Encompassing we are’ in Karl Jaspers. What emerges is 
the fact that religion seen correctly is similar to Jaspers’ cipher of 
transcendence. The conclusion is that for the phenomenology of religion that 
applies the Husserlian method to be, it is necessary that these modifications 
are made. That taken care of the phenomenology of religion will be the 
phenomenology of a community’s cipher of transcendence.
INTRODUCTION
Phenomenology as a method of research has been successful in many fields. 
In the field of religion, however, the application has been inconsistent and 
inconclusive. This dissertation aims to investigate the reasons behind the 
apparent failure of the phenomenological method when it comes to religion, 
and to suggest some modifications both in the understanding of religion and 
the phenomenological method to enable the phenomenology of religion to 
take its place among other disciplines.
At first, the dissertation sets out to understand the terms phenomenology and 
religion. In phenomenology, the works of Edmund Husserl, who brought 
phenomenology to prominence, are examined for an understanding of the 
phenomenological method. Following that, the works of two of his successors, 
Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, are discussed. Opinions vary 
as to whether these phenomenologists represent a true development of the 
works of Husserl. Though they all aim to get to the phenomenon without 
prejudice, it soon becomes clear from the early stages that there are 
differences among the phenomenologists as to the way to get to the 
phenomenon. That not withstanding, it must be taken for granted that any 
field wishing to appropriate the phenomenological method as an instrument 
of research must either hold to the phenomenological method as seen by
Husserl or as modified by his successors. The first chapter sets out what is 
expected of phenomenology in any field. This in chapter two leads to our 
investigation of the field that is hitherto known as the phenomenology of 
religion to see in what way the discipline has been true to the 
phenomenological method. The works of Rudolf Otto, Brede Kristensen,
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Geradus van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade are critically examined. Though 
Otto does not regard himself as a phenomenologist, our reason for including 
him in the list is that Husserl indicated that his work is the beginning of the 
phenomenology of religion. Though he did not remain faithful to the 
phenomenological principle, the indication of Husserl to that fact is enough 
justification for including him among the phenomenologists. Even if Otto is 
excused because he did not set out to work on the phenomenology of 
religion, there are others however, who set out to do the phenomenology of 
religion. The phenomenology of religion as known can be said to be divided 
into two main branches with different emphasis which in a way overlap. One 
distinguishes itself by its focus on the classification of various types and 
structures that arise from the examination of the data, and the other by an 
attempt to bring to light the essence of the meaning residing tacitly within the 
situation of the phenomenon. The former is termed morphological 
phenomenology and the latter hermeneutical phenomenology of religion. 
Brede Kristensen can be seen as the clearest example of the morphological 
branch. In the introduction to The Meaning of Religion he suggest that the
phenomenological "task is to classify and group the numerous and widely 
divergent data in such a way that an overall view can be obtained of their 
religious content and the religious values they contain".1. For him the 
phenomenology of religion clearly distinguishes itself by the attitude towards 
the data and not by the method of the organization employed. This attitude 
is open and self-reflective, consequently placing t he interpreter in a position 
in which the phenomena studied become possibilities for him, possibilities not 
absolute values. Van der Leeuw, on the other hand, speaks of the 
phenomenological attitude as opening methodically and intentionally to the 
experience of what appears. He also speaks of the self-reflective nature of the 
attitude and the fact that by opening to the experience of the ’other’ we 
discover that ’other’ within ourselves. Like Kristensen, van der Leeuw sees 
the attitude of the interpreter as central to the enterprise of phenomenology. 
The phenomenological attitude according to Van der Leeuw, is man’s true 
attitude, his original attitude and a vital activity consisting in losing himself 
neither in things nor in the ego2. Eliade makes the self reflective dimension 
of the attitude of the phenomenologist of religion quite clear when he says 
"What is called the phenomenology and history of religions can be considered 
among the very few humanistic disciplines that are at the same time 
propaedeutic and spiritual techniques"3. He stresses that in the study of 
religious facts, we are dealing with phenomena that do not lend themselves 
to methods of ordinary analysis with its reliance upon the laws of the
verification through logic and non-contradiction. He states that hieraphonies, 
that is the manifestation of the sacred expressed in symbols, myths, 
supernatural beings, are grasped as structures and constitutes a pre- 
reflective language that requires a special interpretation. An interpretation that 
is needed is such that is embodied in an attitude that refuses to demystify the 
religious worlds that present themselves to us in our study. The attitude of 
the phenomenologist then must enable him to take the fact as it is in its own 
world and not as it might be in our understanding. By not demystifying, the 
interpreter accepts the existence of the other world in its own situation and 
allows the mystery of that world to work what transformations it will on him 
and his world. This in effect is nearer to what the phenomenologists say, 
when they allow the phenomenon itself to appear without prejudices. Apart 
from this similarity in Eliade to the philosophical phenomenologists, it soon 
becomes clear that the phenomenologists of religion seem to completely 
ignore the application of the phenomenological method. The excursus 
examines the historical origin of the two phenomenologies and draws the 
conclusion that the phenomenology of religion as hitherto known has nothing 
to do with phenomenology as a method of research. The need to have a 
phenomenology of religion that appropriates the phenomenological method 
leads to the next chapter which raises the question of the nature of religion. 
If a phenomenology of religion in line with the phenomenological method as 
applied to other fields is to succeed, there is need to look for the essence or
the eidos of religion. Having encountered religion in the phenomenology of 
religion, we now step outside the field of the general history of religion to 
seek some indication which will be suggestive of the true nature of religion. 
The works of Ludwig Feuerbach, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger are 
examined. It emerges from these investigations that religion cannot be 
identical with its institutionalized form. The result however, falls short of telling 
us the true nature of religion. There are religious objects, religious actions, 
religious attitudes, but the nature of religion itself remains unclear. On 
account of this, no definition of religion can claim to reveal the nature of 
religion. For a phenomenology of religion to be as successful as in other 
fields, the need to know the nature cannot be overemphasised. It is this 
need that takes us to the works of Wilfred Canwell Smith. What emerges 
from his work is that the word ’religion’ has been misconceived. The history 
of the concept, which he traces from its early use leaves us in no doubt that 
religion has shifted from being a form of consciousness of transcendence to 
being an object of consciousness. This shift in conception perhaps has been 
responsible for the difficulties that has characterized the study of religion. 
Religion seen as an object of consciousness, prompts scholars to look for the 
essence of religion. It is the search for this essence that has stalled the 
phenomenology of religion, for such a study cannot but be limited to yet 
another manifestation of religion. Seen as a form of consciousness of 
transcendence which it is however, the phenomenology of religion can move
further because it now looks beyond the manifestations of religion. Accepting 
religion as a form of consciousness of transcendence implies that our 
phenomenology of religion now becomes the application of the 
phenomenological method in the description of this form of consciousness of 
transcendence.
Having arrived at the idea of religion as a form of consciousness, we examine 
the concept of transcendence to see the direction in which phenomenology 
of religion should go. Already in the works of Thomas Luckmann and Peter 
Berger there is an indication that the root of religion might lie in 
transcendence. To understand transcendence then, we examine the works of 
Karl Jaspers. The reason for examining his work which is elaborately 
explained arises from his interest in phenomenology as a method, 
transcendence and religion. Having dealt with phenomenology religion and 
transcendence, chapter six explores the way in which the phenomenology of 
religion that appropriates the phenomenological principle can proceed. The 
application of the phenomenological method in the description of the form of 
consciousness of transcendence which religion is, implies that either the 
method as understood by Husserl or as understood by his successors is to 
be appropriated. Whichever one decides to apply will count for the application 
of the phenomenological method. Further implications in the acceptance of 
religion as a form of consiousness is that one cannot now be said to search
for the essence for that will be an excercise in futulity. Since this is the case, 
the phenomenological method that will be applied will not go on to look for 
the eidos or to describe the essence-intuition as Husserl will have us do. This 
implies that the method as understood by Husserl alone will be of little use. 
It is here that the first modification takes place. In Heidegger, phenomenology 
is our way of access to the phenomenon and the take off point of this 
phenomenology is Dasein. Since both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are taken 
to offer the natural development of Husserl’s phenomenology, their 
understanding of phenomenology becomes our point of departure. This 
eliminates the need to look for the essence which would have been necessary 
in strictly Husserlian terms. Prior to the application of the method as 
understood by Heidegger, his relationship with Merleau-Ponty is established. 
This completes the link between Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Since 
in Heidegger’s phenomenology Dasein is the point of departure, we now 
examine the relationship between Dasein and the form of consciousness 
which religion is. The relationship establishes a link between Cantwell Smith 
and the phenomenologists. Examining the relationship between Heidegger’s 
Dasein and the form of consciousness of transcendence leads to the 
understanding of the way in which transcendence can relate to this form of 
consciousness and Dasein. This leads to a second modification that is 
necessary for the phenomenology of religion. The modification puts or locates 
Dasein in Karl Jaspers’ ’encompassing that we are’. A relationship between
Dasein and transcendence emerges. The relationship is discussed fully and 
in the last analysis, we come to the conclusion that our form of 
consciousness of transcendence is equivalent to our understanding of ciphers 
as treated by Jaspers. The phenomenology of religion then can be said to fit 
well into the phenomenology of ciphers, whose qualities are explained fully in 
the work.
In conclusion, we can say that the phenomenology of religion that 
appropriates the phenomenological method is possible under the following 
conditions:
1) The concept of religion should be changed from being an object of 
consciousness to the form of consciousness of transcendence. This will 
enable the phenomenologists to go beyond the manifestations of 
religion.
2) Since religion as a form of consciousness does not have any need for 
the essence intuition to be described, a modification is necessary 
whereby the phenomenological method as understood by Heidegger 
and others be applied to religion in place of the purely Husserlian 
understanding.
3) That in the application of the method, a further modification is 
necessary whereby the Dasein of Heidegger relates to the 
"encompassing that we are" of Karl Jaspers which in turn becomes a 
proper ground for the phenomenology of religion.
Seen in this way, the phenomenology of religion will take its place among 
other disciplines in the application of the method of phenomenology.
CHAPTER 1 FO UN D A TIO N S  AND THE M E TH O D  
PHENOMENOLOGY
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Edmund Husserl and the Beginnings of phenomenology.
At the mention of the word phenomenology, what comes to mind immediately 
is the philosophical discipline associated with Edmund Husserl. Not that 
Husserl was the first person to use the word, but he was the one who made 
the term prominent. On this account, any work on phenomenology must 
begin with him.
In this chapter we shall deal with certain questions. How did Husserl come 
to his understanding of phenomenology? What methods did he use to arrive 
at his conclusions about phenomenology? How far did those who came after 
him apply his method? To understand the development of his thoughts, we 
begin with a brief biography.
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl was born in the little Moravian town of 
Prossnitz in April , 1859. He was an Austrian by birth, as Moravia now part 
of Czechoslovakia, was then part of the Austrian empire. His parents, Adolf 
and Julie Husserl were of Jewish descent, and his father, a merchant in 
womens’ dresses (Modewarehandler) died when he was still young.1
At the age of ten, after his elementary education at Prossnitz, he was sent to 
Vienna to begin his secondary education. He spent three separate periods
there. The last period was to be the greatest influence in his career as a 
philosopher.
In 1876 Husserl entered the University of Leipzig and remained there until 
1878. He attended lectures in physics and philosophy as well as in 
mathematics. His philosophy teacher was Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt was elected 
to the chair of philosophy of Leipzig in 1875. A year before his election to the 
chair, 1874, he had published his Principles of Physiological Psychology. The 
lectures in philosophy were of little use to Husserl because, at this time, he 
had not developed an interest in philosophy or psychology. Though he was 
interested in astronomy, mathematics provided to be his strongest subject. 
For this reason, he transferred to Fredrick Wilhelm’s University of Berlin which 
at that time held an enviable reputation in the field of mathematics.
On the faculty of mathematics of the University of Berlin were the three most 
famous mathematicians of the day, Kronecker, Kummer and Weierstrass. 
Weierstrass influenced Husserl profoundly. This led Husserl to abandon his 
interest in astronomy to devote himself wholeheartedly to mathematics. 
Kummer did not seem to appeal to him greatly.
Kronecker on the other hand, was as influential as Weierstrass on Husserl. It 
was Kronecker’s special field of study, the philosophy of mathematics, that
brought Husserl to appreciate the philosophic point of view. In the philosophy 
of mathematics, Husserl found a ready interest which was to prove vital in his 
interest in pure philosophy. It is likely that Husserl got his first interest in 
Descartes through Kronecker. While Kronecker was well read in the field of 
pure philosophy, he was especially fond of reading the works of Descartes2. 
Although Husserl had dropped astronomy, the last part of his study in Berlin 
was not exclusively devoted to mathematics.
While from Kronecker, the first seed of philosophical understanding was being 
sowed in Husserl, another professor, Friedrich Paulsen, was gradually building 
up in the young mathematician an active desire to study philosophy for its 
own sake. Paulsen was greatly influenced by Wundt, Fechner and Spinoza. 
He was a very popular man. This popularity and his forcefulness seemed to 
come from his ability to express himself clearly to the point that his listeners 
would seem to say ’now I understand’. His readiness in a scientific age to link 
up philosophy with the sciences must have appealed to Husserl. Though 
Paulsen turned to biological rather than to mathematical sciences, he 
nevertheless, appealed to Husserl. Though Husserl’s interest was steadily 
growing in philosophy, he decided to put an end to his formal studies. He left 
the University of Berlin in 1881, having decided to work for his doctorate at 
the University of Vienna where, if occasion permitted, he might hope to 
continue as a Privatadozent. On the direction of Konigsberger, he
concentrated on the calculus of variations. This was the topic on which he 
had heard Weierstrass lecture in the summer semester of 1879. He 
completed his doctoral dissertation, Contributions to the Theory of the 
Calculus of Variations (Beitraqe zur Theorie der Variationsrechnuna) in the 
winter semester of 1882/83 and received the degree of doctor of philosophy 
in January, 1883.
During his final mathematical studies in Vienna, Husserl went to hear Franz 
Brentano (a former priest) "Out of mere curiosity to hear for once the man 
about whom everyone in Vienna was talking so much"3. Such was Brentano’s 
power of personality and teaching that before long, Husserl was won over, 
as he recounts. "It was from his lectures that I first derived the conviction that 
gave me the courage to choose philosophy as my life’s vocation, that is, that 
philosophy also is a sphere of serious work, that it can also be treated in the 
spirit of the most exact science, and consequently that it should be so 
treated"4.
When Husserl finished his mathematical work, he served for sometime under 
Weierstrass in Berlin and returned to Vienna. From 1884, he studied in close 
contact with Brentano. As Ronald Bruzina puts it, "By his interest in logic and 
exactness of method of approaching a wide range of philosophical problems, 
Brentano provided an easy path for Husserl to move from the familiar area
of mathematics to the more comprehensive problems of philosophy"5. 
Despite Brentano’s book, Psychology from the Empirical Point of View 6, for 
which he was best known, his interest had been occupied by psychology for 
only a few years before Husserl met him. Apart from Brentano’s doctrine of 
Intentionality which was of major importance to Husserl’s thinking, Husserl’s 
acquaintance with psychology came mainly from Carl Stumpf in Halle, to 
whom Brentano advised Husserl to go for further work. Stumpf himself was 
a former student of Brentano7.
During the year of study at Halle with Stumpf, 1886-1887, Husserl prepared 
his inaugural address delivering it in July 1887. With that first lecture in Halle, 
Husserl’s teaching career began. It continued uninterruptedly at Halle 1887- 
1901. At Gottingen 1901-1916 and at Freiburg in Breisgau 1916-1929. He 
retired in 1929, and died in April, 1938.
Publication
Although a lot of materials resulted from Husserl writing down his thoughts8, 
it is known that Husserl did not publish a lot in his lifetime. Whatever he 
published however, was of great significance. His first book was The 
Philosophy of Arithmetic9, in which he himself adhered to the doctrine of 
psychologism. In the book he discusses the mathematical notions of number,
plurality and unity, and claims that many of the conceptual difficulties involved 
are based on the ’psychological constitution’ of these concepts. Husserl 
however, began to repudiate psychologism in a lecture in summer of 1896 in 
Halle. Four years later in 1900, he published this same material as the 
Prolegomena to Pure Logic. This was the first volume of the Logical 
investigations10. Ideas published in 1913 was a product of intense critical 
reassessment that followed Logical Investigations12. Earlier in 1911, in an 
essay ’Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’, Husserl had outlined his plan and 
scope for phenomenology, showing the part which he was to take. Along with 
the Ideas of 1913 came the second volume of the Logical Investigations. It 
was revised in many places to bring it to the level of maturity achieved in 
Ideas.
As phenomenology developed, different approaches complementing each 
other were taken. He however, did not lose sight of the initial or the original 
line of entry which was through logic. In 1920 Husserl undertook a renewed 
presentation of his original line of entry. This resulted in The Formal and 
Transcendental Logic which was published in 192113. In the same year, 
Husserl delivered a set of lectures in Paris that tried to explain the third 
avenue into phenomenology. This was through a kind of apodeictic Cartesian 
reflection on self. Later this was elaborated fully. The result of this was the 
appearance of a French version under the title Cartesian Meditation14. This
completes the list of books that were published during Husserl’s lifetime. 
There were articles that appeared here and there. Notable among the articles 
was the one that appeared in the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica15. which tried to summarize phenomenology, and also part of a 
series of lectures delivered in Prague in 1936 entitled, The Crises of 
European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology’16. ’The Crises of 
European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology’ was partially 
published before Husserl’s death. This introduced another approach mainly, 
through analysis of the primordial life-world (Lebenswelt) which underlies 
theoretical and technical interpretations of reality. Mention should also be 
made of two other works. These are studies which Husserl asked one or 
another of his assistants to prepare for publication. The introductory lectures 
on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, published in 192817, 
was originally a series of lectures from 1904-1910, on the elements that lie at 
the heart of phenomenology. Edith Stein, who was Husserl’s personal 
research assistant elaborated the original text into a more complete form 
about the year 1918.
In 1927, Husserl entrusted their publication to Martin Heidegger and the 
complete work appeared in the volume IX of Husserl’s year book18. 
Experience and Judgement similarly, was the result of the editing work of 
Ludwig Landgrebe, to whom Husserl in 1928 entrusted the preparation of a
18
series of manuscripts in logic and its sources.19 
Phenomenology in Practice.
The first time the word phenomenology appeared in Husserl’s independent 
writing was in a footnote of the first edition of Proleqonema (1900) where he 
spoke of descriptive phenomenology of inner experience as the basis for both 
empirical psychology and epistemology. In the second edition of the Loaische 
Untersuchunqen however, phenomenology made its appearance as a title for 
a new and important discipline. It is then safe to say that the beginning of 
phenomenology as seen by Husserl can be said to be the Logical - 
Investigations. As the need to go into detail about Husserl’s understanding of 
phenomenology may not be necessary here, we shall point at the two major 
themes from his work which seems to be at the heart of his understanding 
of phenomenology.
They are the idea of pre-suppositionlessness (Voraussetzunqslosiqkeit) and 
the doctrine of intuition of essence (Wesensschau). In undertaking 
phenomenology, Husserl is dealing with knowledge and consciousness. He 
is well aware of the fact that both psychologism and empiricism also deal 
with the problem of knowledge. They however, falter in their not taking a clear 
look at the phenomena they are supposed to account for. They allow a
presupposed view of reality to determine their manner of interpreting what is 
studied. On account of this, Husserl intends to set aside all positions and 
viewpoints that derive from or is embodied in natural science of psychology. 
For him all such viewpoints are generated in consciousness. If they are to 
point to certainty, consciousness as such, then, must be studied in a 
neutrality antecedent to such already accepted or projected positions. 
Husserl’s displeasure with psychologism is based on the thought that our 
thoughts have no guarantee of reaching "the facts themselves"20 unless we 
achieve an absolutely original insight that fulfils two conditions.
Firstly, it must be independent of the fact that ’I’, the knowing subject, is a 
psychological person, involved in social and historical conditions, and 
biologically determined. Secondly, it must not only reach ’facts’ but give 
access to universal truth, which is to say, something that is not only here and 
now but reveals ’necessary’ connections in the world. For him an 
investigation into knowledge and consciousness that intends to be self 
responsible, must adhere to the principles of the absence of pre-suppositions. 
It must not accept any ready-made result of science. No interpretative 
scheme must be allowed to operate beyond what scrupulous attention shows 
to be what is experientially given. One’s investigation must therefore be, 
before all else, that of pure description. By this return to ’the facts themselves’ 
Husserl sees the strict exclusion of any assertions that cannot be accounted
for phenomenologically. As Husserl’s work progresses, pure description of 
the phenomena, a return to what gives itself in pre-suppositionless attention 
to experiences, becomes much clearer. For Husserl, naturalism and 
historicism are two objectionable obstacles to the progress of 
phenomenology. While naturalism regards consciousness as an object in the 
world to be investigated, historicism sees knowledge, or analyses knowledge, 
as a product of human history, as a set of facts of culture. Naturalism is the 
point that Husserl sees as the basis for psychologism and in the - Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science, he attacks it.
In his own book Naturalism and Religion. Sterlin Lamprecht explains that 
"...Naturalism means a philosophical position, empirical in method, that 
regards everything that exists or occurs to be conditioned in its existence or 
occurrence by causal factors within one all-encompassing system of nature, 
however ’spiritual’ or purposeful or rational some of these things and events 
may in their functions and values prove to be"21. The presuppositions, 
standpoint, methods, and categories implied in this position are mainly what 
Husserl wants to neutralize. This is in preparation for his reflective description 
of consciousness. This in the phenomenological literature is known as the 
natural attitude (Naturliche Einstellunq)22.
Another obstacle to getting to ’the facts themselves’ which Husserl sees is
Weltanschauunasphilosophie. which considers philosophy as "an expression 
of personal, social, or historical values, which are valid for a particular period 
or for a particular human community" - 23. For this type of philosophy, 
nothing can be known to stand by itself. The place, the time and place 
stands or falls with the bases. For Husserl, the need to get to the method 
that would justify the claims of knowledge to a validity independent of history, 
persons, society, or biological circumstances leads to the search for the 
phenomenological method. At sometime in this work we shall come to ask 
if there can be a phenomenon of religion that fulfils the needs mentioned 
above.
If philosophy is to achieve this aim, it has to reject the existing body of 
knowledge as a whole. Whatever science presents is mediated through 
theories or is known as a stream of subjective perceptions. Psychology is a 
typical example of this sort of view of science. If one is to get to the root of 
knowledge, philosophy must reject or neglect the evidence of daily life. That 
is to say that it must reject the unquestioned acceptable view of the world.
Intuition of Essence.
Husserl’s aim in phenomenology is the elimination of the pre-suppositions that 
clouds our knowledge. For this he insists contrary to what empiricists or
naturalists believe that one recognizes the descriptively valid status of general 
meanings (essences, universals) as genuine objects of consideration and a 
mode of consciousness that directs itself to this kind of thematic material.
There is an original insight where things reveal themselves to the 
consciousness directly undistorted. This is neither common perception with 
its underlying beliefs, nor analytical knowledge. Phenomenology wants to offer 
us access to such an insight, to investigate essential significant structures, 
that is to say, connections in the world which are not simply empirically 
perceived but are apodictically necessary irrespective of actual experience. 
For Husserl, the achievement of knowledge is simply, the accomplishing of 
a clear and firm grasp of some general meaning in whatever is under 
consideration. The accomplishment can take place in a variety of orders one 
which is logical. This notwithstanding, there are important realms of material 
sense, especially in perceptual order. To bring the matter home, grasp of 
meaning could be said to be essential knowledge. The grasping of meaning 
is knowledge of essence in so far as that meaning is grasped, analyzed, 
clarified and so on, and given some kind of determination on a general level. 
Husserl does not limit intuition only to that of essence. He is aware of the 
confusion that could arise in the analogy but takes his time to explain. It is 
likely that what Husserl tries to bring to the force is that there is in operation 
here, a proper and distinct mode of consciousness that has analogical
similarity to perceptual acts. There are two levels on which comparison 
between the essence intuition and perceptual intuition can be made. Firstly, 
on the act itself, and secondly, the object to which it is directed. The 
differences notwithstanding, a fundamental correspondence still exist and for 
that Husserl says "...we have not a mere superficial analogy, but a radical 
community of nature. Essential insight is still intuition, just as the eidetic 
object is still an object"24. Between them each has a specific type of genuine 
object, which is genuinely given as an object to a specific act of attending 
grasp.
What type of object is this essence? Husserl answers "The essence (eidos) 
is an object of a new type. Just as the datum of individual or empirical 
intuition is an individual object, so the datum of essential intuition is a pure 
essence"25
Object (Geqenstand) should be differentiated from just a thing (Ding), that is 
an object in the world of nature. Object (Geqenstand) means what is 
confronted in cognitive grasp. In both essence intuition and perceptual 
intuition, there is a true object and there is a true grasp of it in each case. 
"Empirical intuition, more specifically sense-experience, is consciousness of an 
individual object, and as an intuition agency ’brings it to giveness’: as 
perception, to primordial giveness, to the consciousness of grasping the
object in ’a primordial way’, in its ’bodily’ selfhood. On quite similar lines, 
essential intuition is consciousness of something, of an ’object’, a something 
towards which its glance is directed, a something ’self-given’ within it; but 
which can then be ’presented’ in other acts, vaguely or distinctly thought, 
made the subject of true and false predication - as is the case indeed with 
every ’object’ in the necessarily extended sense proper to the formal - 
Logic11.26 All said and done, this is not to say that there is no difference in the 
two intuitions mentioned. The difference lies in the fact that in the two 
intuitions mentioned, there is a grasp of individual concrete sensible object. 
The second on the other hand gives the general meaning as the object of 
attentive grasp. Here it is not difficult to see that the validity of the analogy 
does not lie in the visual aspect of the word ’intuition’, but in the character of 
genuine giveness for an object as a genuine object that is implied in the 
notion of visual grasp.
For Husserl, no amount of theories can mislead us from what he calls the 
’principle of principles’ which states "that every primordial dator intuition is a 
source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presented 
itself in ’intuition’ in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply 
to be accepted as it gives itself out to be. though only within the limits in 
which it then presents itself1.27
Apart from the similarity which the analogy conveys, Husserl finds the ground 
for the intuition of essence in the intuition of the individual. This is made clear 
in the following sentences. "At first ’essence’ indicated that which in the 
intimate self-being of an individual discloses to us ’what’ it is. But every such 
what can be ’set out as idea’. Empirical of individual intuition can be 
transformed into essential insight (ideation)... The object of each such insight 
is then the corresponding pure essence of eidos. whether it be the highest 
category of one of its specializations, right down to the fully ’concrete"28-
For Husserl then, essence-intuition is founded on the intuition of the individual. 
"It lies undoubtedly in the intrinsic nature of essential intuition that it should 
rest on what is a chief factor of individual intuition, namely, the striving for this, 
the visible presence of individual fact, though it does not, to be sure, 
presuppose any apprehension of the individual or any recognition of its 
reality. Consequently, it is certain that no essential intuition is possible without 
the free possible of directing one’s glance to an individual counterpart and of 
shaping an illustration; just as contrariwise no individual is possible without the 
free possibility of carrying out an act of ideation and therein directing one’s 
glance upon the corresponding essence which exemplifies itself in something 
individually visible"29. An individual then is not s singularity, a pure this or 
that. It possesses a what, a set of essential predicates that determine its 
density. For a name for this characteristic general structure any object
possesses, Husserl has this to say, "I therefore make use, as a foreign 
expression, of the terminologically unspent Eidos. and as a German 
expression of a term whose equivocations are harmless, though at times 
vexations, the word Wesen (Essence or Essential Being)"30.
Husserl is insisting that the general invariation, or relatively invariant structures 
of an object, its eidos can be a matter for investigation. This arises from the 
fact that objects are grasped in some kind of generality in their ’what’ 
whenever, for it to be understood and known with certainty in spontaneous 
learning. Consequently, deliberate eidetic clarification, the methodical attempt 
at the fullest possible evidentness for the eidos, the essential general 
meaning, is the aim of phenomenology.
The Phenomenological Method
The aim of phenomenology is the clarification of the essential structures or 
what Husserl calls ’eidetic elucidation’. Husserl is not only interested in 
conducting specific investigations in eidetic science. He wants to show the 
ground for such project. If this is true, the method must be dependent on 
the understanding of eidetic consciousness. This is the Programme of 
Logical Investigations. For Husserl pre-suppositionless, descriptive clarification 
of the essential structure of consciousness or the eidetic clarification of 
consciousness in all its forms, leads to the grasp of the eidetic structure
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which is the essence - intuition.
"Every investigation in knowledge theory must be carried out upon a purely 
phenomenological base. The ’theoria’ to which it aspires is nothing other 
than the reflective grasp and reaching of an understanding in the evidentness 
regarding what the act of thinking and knowing in general is, ie. according to 
its generic pure essence; what the modifications and forms are to which its 
essence is bound; what is implied with regard to these structures by such 
ideas as validity, justification, unmediated and mediated evidence and their 
opposites ... If this reflection on the meaning of knowledge is to yield not 
simply an opinion but, as is rigorously demanded here, a knowing insight, it 
must be carried out as a pure essence-intuition on the exemplar base of 
given experiences of thought and knowledge"31.
For this objective to be achieved, recourse has to be made to two terms 
which acquire special meaning in Husserl’s work. They are Besinnunq and 
Erlebnis. The process of making evident, of clarifying and making genuinely 
self-present, is what Husserl calls Besinnunq. This could mean realization. 
The effort to achieve cognitive realization is now directed towards one’s 
experiencing of various acts and modes of consciousness, in the very living 
(erleben) of them. For Husserl "The whole stream of experience with its 
experiences lived after the mode of unreflecting consciousness can be made
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the subject of a scientific study of the nature of the essence which should aim 
at systematic completeness, with reference, moreover, of all the possibilities 
of intentional aspects included in them, with reference also more specifically 
to the experiences of modified consciousness which may be in them and 
their intentional aspects"32. One can then talk of consciousness of Erlebnis. - 
experience in the living of it. Putting the two terms together, phenomenology 
can be said to be Besinnunq der Erlebnis. that is to say, a cognitive 
realization of lived consciousness. Husserl designates the ideal term of 
process in which objects are brought to the point at which they stand as fully 
given as possible. Put in Lauer’s words "If essences are to present 
themselves immediately to consciousness, they can do so only as ideal, since 
immediacy to consciousness and ideality are inseparable"33. The achievement 
of this however, will depend on the application of the phenomenological 
method proper.
Eidetic Reduction
The objective of phenomenology as seen in the work of Husserl is the 
clarification of necessary eidetic structures. As this is the case, certain things 
follow. In the first place, the individual which forms the starting point for 
eidetic search is attended to as an instant of. This allows for the discernment 
of the base of the structure.
While it is true that perceptual intuiting of a real individual holds a privileged 
advantage, it is not by simple staring at some individuals that insight into 
essence comes. For Husserl "free fancies, assume a privileged position over 
and against perceptions, and that, even in the phenomenology of perception 
itself, excepting of course that of the sensory data"34. While perception 
restricts, in fantasy, free imagination has not that restriction. Giving the 
example of a geometer when he is thinking geometrically, Husserl has this to 
say about fancy and actual facts, "But in actual drawing and modelling he is 
restricted; in fancy he has perfect freedom in the arbitrary recasting of figures 
he has imagined, in running over continuous series of possible shapes, in the 
production therefore of an infinite number of new creations; a freedom which 
opens up to him for the first time an entry into the spacious realms of 
essential possibility with their infinite horizons of essential knowledge"35. By 
freely but systematically varying in imagination, the characteristics of the 
object meaning in question, certain necessary elements will become evident, 
owing to the fact that some variations cannot be pursued without radically 
changing that object meaning. Certain structures of meaning will define limits 
for free variation. This enables the object meaning to retain its identity within 
the order of generality. This identity retained so to say becomes the eidos 
that is being sought. As Husserl puts it, "The Eidos, the pure essence can 
be exemplified intuitively in the data of experience, data of perception, 
memory and so forth, but just as readily also in the mere data of fancy
(Phantasie). Hence, with the aim of grasping an essence itself in its 
primordial form, we can set out from corresponding empirical intuition, but we 
can also set out just as well from non-empirical intuitions, intuitions that do 
not apprehend sensory existence, intuitions rather ’of a merely imaginative 
order’"36. It then follows that it is not a matter of facts or any assertion about 
empirical fact as such. It is rather a matter for general meaning. It then 
means that as far as essence is concerned, the individual does not play a 
major role. Pure essence according to Husserl does not in the least 
comprise an assertion concerning the individual. For him its is a question of 
’reduction’ a reduction from particularity and individuality, from any kind of 
empirical condition, existence included to pure essence generality. This is the 
eidetic reduction. This forms the step that makes for an understanding of the 
full area of phenomenology. The field of pure phenomena. The next step for 
getting to pure phenomena is what Husserl calls the phenomenological 
reduction.
Phenomenological Reduction
The method was first presented by Husserl in a series of lectures in 1907. 
Extensive use of it was made in his Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and 
Phenomenological Philosophy of 1913. Generally speaking, this is a means 
of detecting the essential constitutive elements in our relationship with the 
world. It is a way of discovering the basic phenomenological facts that make
knowledge possible. The idea behind Husserl’s phenomenological reduction 
is that we should concentrate on what is immanently given in our own stream 
of experience not as an empirical event in a natural world. It should be seen 
as an intentional structure to be clarified in a phenomenological reflection. It 
is Husserl’s view that we go back to what is essential, basic and irreducible 
in our experiences. The phenomenological reduction is designed to help us 
in this. Its effect according to Husserl is to transform the consciousness into 
a transcendental consciousness. This transcendental consciousness he 
maintains remains as a phenomenological residuum after the reduction and 
according to him, it is here in the region of our transcendental subjectivity that 
a genuine phenomenological constitution of the world must begin. Husserl’s 
concern for the status of ’objectivity’ proper to eide (essences) of any kind 
leads to the necessity of knowing the basis for which it originates. Eidetic 
meaning arises within consciousness. Essences therefore are objects for 
consciousness and it is only in that way they can be. If its origin is to be 
discovered at all, it has to be in consciousness. It can then be said that it 
is in the realm, of our experience of attending to meaning that one can find 
the operations that lead to the setting up of general meanings as specific 
thematic materials for consideration and grasp. For any headway to be made 
here we have to ask what the essential structure of essence-intuition is. How 
do essences come to be objects? If the origin of the essence information is 
in consciousness, how can we come to a clear understanding of
consciousness as a whole, in its various modes of operation? Here the 
tendency is for Husserl to go the way of arriving at essence intuition itself. 
One must disregard any factors that are either contingent and non-essential 
or anything that is detrimental to achieving real or pure giveness. This for 
Husserl means overcoming the tendency to approach consciousness within 
the framework of the ’natural attitude’.
From the following quotation, the limit of the natural attitude can be clear 
"Natural knowledge begins with experience (Erfahrunq) and remains within 
experience. Thus in that theoretical position which we call the ’natural’ 
standpoint, the total field of possible research is indicated by a single word: 
this is , the World. The sciences proper to this original standpoint are 
accordingly in their collective unity sciences of the World, and so long as this 
standpoint is the only dominant one, the concepts ’true Being’ ’real 
(wirkliches) Being’, ie., real empirical (reales) Being, and - since all that is real 
comes to self - concentration in the form of a cosmic unity - ’Being in the 
World’ are meaning s that coincide"37.
The process of reduction to the phenomenologically essential can however 
begin at this natural level that is to say at the level of most ordinary 
experiences. An example could be given with a single chair in front of me. 
For this chair in front of me, I assume that there is something ’out there’, an
object called chair which I can see and touch. I can also use it for certain 
purposes. But suppose I now disregard the transcendental object and 
concentrate on what is immediately given in my experiences of seeing a chair. 
I find myself now at a different level and my attitude changes. I am no longer 
looking at the chair as an objective ’out there’ on which I can sit. I become 
aware of may having something as an object which I recognise as a chair. 
I do not merely have a chair percept. My experience does not consist merely 
of certain sensations. I become aware of what the percept means. I can 
distinguish in my experience between a sense context and a noematic 
content. This distinction remains preserved no matter whether the perceived 
chair is real or imaginary. I am now free to posit the noematic content at 
what I see as an ideal, ideal essence. This is because, by drawing this 
distinction, I am, as it were, stepping out of the immediate existential context 
and entering into
a relationship with the world around me. By the same token, I am now free, 
according to Husserl to posit an ego as an idealized projection of my own 
self. By doing all these, I am only suspending existential consideration about 
objects transcending experience for the time being. This is precisely what 
phenomenological reduction is all about.
From all that has been said, it is clear that Husserl’s insistence on the 
suspension of existential empirical consideration as a first step towards
discovering the essential structures of intentional experiences and making 
clear the presuppositions of knowledge in general, commits him not only to 
a rejection of phenomenalism, it also commits him to a rejection of all theories 
which make assumption of a physical reality independent of ourselves the 
basis of an explanation of meaning and truth.
Transcendental Eooche
Talking about reduction in transcendental sense, Husserl uses the Greek word 
eooche to discuss the positive function of reduction leading us to discover 
the field of pure phenomena, the field of pure consciousness. The 
phenomenological epoche means the suspension of all judgment concerning 
the spatio-temporal existence of things which are assumed to be "out there". 
It involves a suspension or perhaps we should say a radical modification of 
what Husserl calls the ’natural standpoint’. The essence of the ’natural 
standpoint’ is that it takes the world for granted.
For Husserl, the only problems we encounter from the natural standpoint are 
those of finding adequate methods for the establishing causal relationship 
within the world and for organising facts in their various regions. The natural 
sciences do exactly this work. While natural scientists automatically assume 
the existence of an objective world out there, the philosopher asks how such
a world Is possible. The task of philosophy according to Husserl is to try to 
explain what is basically involved in our relationship with the world, how the 
world comes into being as it were. This requires that we should radically alter 
our attitude. For Husserl, the thesis of the natural standpoint must be 
disconnected or to put it in Husserl’s favourite term, it must be put into 
brackets. This is not to say that the existence of the world is denied. What is 
at issue is the fact that no judgement is made about things out there in their 
spatio-temporal existence. On the brackets, Husserl has this to say "If I do 
this, as I am fully free to do, I do not then deny this ’world’, as though I were 
a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use 
the ’phenomenological’, which completely bars me from using any judgement 
that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein)"38*
Husserl’s aim is the clarification of what is involved in our relationship 
with the objective world through the analysis of the noetic-noemata structure 
of experiences. These structures are obscured from our natural standpoint. 
These must be brought out of these obscurities and elucidated. This 
according to him, is possible if we are to understand how we know what we 
know, and how the knowledge of the world is possible at all. For Husserl, 
phenomenological reduction is the key to understanding. It makes it possible 
for us to describe the ’pure facts’ of a meta-empirical level. Husserl wants us 
to get back to the level that is unbiased by any theories of prejudices. Only
at this stage is knowledge possible. Husserl’s concern is the need for "a 
science of true beginnings, or origins, of rizomata panton39.
As universal epoche, the phenomenological reduction takes us back to 
absolute beginning. It takes us into the region of transcendental 
consciousness, the region, that is of transcendentally purified experiences, 
and the transcendental ego as the unity of these experiences.
Similar philosophical experiment was made by Descartes and Husserl draws 
attention to this. He also pointed out the important difference between his and 
Descartes’ position. Descartes’ main concern was to establish what we can 
truly say we know for certain, and he used doubt as a methodical device in 
trying to discover this certainty. If we try to doubt everything, including 
existence of the world ’out there’, we shall, on account of this, discover our 
doubting ego as something whose existence cannot be doubted. This is 
something that indubitably exists. It cannot be eliminated with the function as 
Descartes methodical doubts.
"Epoche does not provisionally ’eliminate’ the world of things as Cartesian 
doubt does; it only changes our viewpoint and makes it possible to regard 
our experiences in a different light. The Cartesian doubt, according to Husserl, 
is ’one attempt at universal denial’; the epoche on the other hand, implies
merely the setting aside of the thesis of the ’natural standpoint’, rendering 
this thesis inoperative, so that we may concentrate on the analysis of what is 
essentially involved in intentional experiences and explain what Husserl calls 
the ’meaning’ of the world by clarifying this world’s ’transcendental origins’"40.
The implications of epoche have far reaching consequences. By rendering this 
thesis of the natural standpoint inoperative or by putting it ’out of action’ so 
to say, it follows that the natural sciences are ruled out in the philosophical 
realm. This is exactly what Husserl has in mind when he says "...all sciences 
which relate to this natural world, though they stand over so firm to me, 
thought they fill me with wondering admiration, though I am far from any 
thought of objecting to them in the least degree, I disconnect them all. I make 
absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate a single one of the 
propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value 
is perfect. I take none of them, no one of them serves me for a foundation - 
so long, that is, as it is understood, in the way these sciences themselves 
understand it, as a truth concerning the realities of this world".41 As it 
stands, Husserl does not doubt the value of the natural sciences, he doubts 
the ability of these sciences, since they are the sciences of the natural 
standpoint, to help us to understand the world philosophically. The task of the 
epoche is to open up a ’new region of being’ which is not empirical but 
transcendental. It can be said that for Husserl, the suspension of the
existential assumptions about the natural world does not only affect the 
natural sciences. It also affects what Husserl calls the ’eidetic sciences’ such 
as logic and pure mathematics. Their deductive method cannot be used in 
our transcendental analysis.
The transcendental epoche or the phenomenological reduction is supposed 
to aid us in the revelation of the essential and irreducible presuppositions of 
knowledge. This it does by providing an access to the essential structures of 
experiences and the basic patterns of interrelationships obtaining between 
these experiences. For Husserl, this is possible only if all empirical existential 
assumptions are put in ’brackets’. As soon as this is done, it is Husserl’s view 
that intentional experiences become describable in their ’eidetic purity’. Within 
the transcendental reduction, everything gets a meaning emanating from 
consciousness, but the difference between act and content (noesis and 
noema), like the difference between the subject and object, is not abrogated. 
On the contrary, an essential property of conscious act is their intentionality.
Intentionalitv
In line with the point of view reached through the phenomenological 
reduction, what has to be clear to us is the intentional structure of 
consciousness. This is what Husserl calls intentionality. For Husserl every
experience in one way or another participates in intentionality. "It is 
intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of the 
term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once 
a stream of consciousness and unity of one consciousness"42. It follows that 
in as much as any phenomenon, any object appears, it appears object for 
subject. It appears as object Meant or ’intended’ by a subject. An object has 
the meaning it has because it is attended to in such-and-such a way, or 
because it is ’intended’ in such-and-such a way. Attending subject, and the 
object attended to, are inseparable correlates. This means that any act of 
attending to, or grasping an object is precisely an act of consciousness of 
object. Its whole identity is that of being an intending of subject, just as the 
object is necessarily an object for subject, just as the object is the object only 
as object-intended by subject43. For Husserl, every experience in one way 
or the other participates in intentionality. It "signifies" according to him "nothing 
else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness to be 
consciousness of something"44. Husserl also uses another formula that is 
reminiscent of Descartes, to indicate the nature of intentionality. This is the 
ego coqito coqnitum. He goes no to say that "The transcendental heading, 
ego coqito. must therefore be broadened by adding one more number. Each 
coqito. each conscious process, we may also say, ’means’ something or 
other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant its particular 
cogitatum. Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion45. This goes to say
that Intentionality is a descriptive characterization of the basic situation in 
consciousness in which there is attentiveness to a meaning on the part of a 
subject. Husserl’s view is that it does not really matter whether the object so 
concerned is real or imagined. On this account he says, "The house- 
perception means a house - more precisely, as the individual house - and 
means in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house 
in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-fantasy, in the fashion peculiar 
to fantasy"46. This means that the phenomenon can be effectively described 
purely without the implication of a quantitative or metaphysical relationship. All 
said and done, the role of the subject in its attentiveness, and object under 
the aspect in which it is under attention cannot be ignored. It can be said 
that a phenomenological study of consciousness will consider subjective pole 
under the aspect of the particular intending action that may be concerned. 
Object on the other hand, will be considered according to the particular sense 
or meaning-aspect within which it is showing itself.
It then follows that the two correlative avenues are involved in 
phenomenological description of an act of intending consciousness. One 
concerns the attending or intending actions. The other concerns the attended 
or the intended sense or meaning through which an object is attained. The 
first of this is Husserl’s noetic analysis, dealing with the noesis involved. He 
calls the second noematic analysis, dealing with the noema or noematic sense
involved. On the correlates just discussed, Husserl has this to say "on the 
one hand, the descriptions of intentional objects as such, with regard to the 
determinations attributed to it in the modes of consciousness concerned...is 
called noematic. Its counterpart is noetic description, which concerns the 
modes of the coaito/itself. the modes of consciousness (for example: 
perception recollection, retention), which the modal difference inherent in them 
(for example: differences in clarity and distinctness)"47. It can be said that it 
is only in condition of phenomenologically an object for and within 
consciousness that anything could possess meaning-fullness. It follows that 
an object for perceptual consciousness, grasped as really existing 
autonomously, is meaningful in that way precisely in being 
phenomenologically an object of that character within intentional 
consciousness. This however, is not to say that a knowing substance 
possesses the thing known out of its own substance. As he puts it, "Just as 
the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the 
worldly nor any worldly object is a piece of my Ego...This ’transcendence’ is 
part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the fact that anything 
worldly necessarily acquires all sense determining it, along with its existential 
status, exclusively from my experiencing...48. It then follows that anything that 
makes its appearance does so in my consciousness, in my experiencing it.
It is in virtue of my radiating an act of attention - intention - that an object will
be an object phenomenologically. As meaningful, as appearing in this or that 
fashion depends on my intentional act. Upon my activation of the field in 
grasping of this object. For Husserl, an object, in whatever noematic sense 
it has, is ’constituted’ by my noetic act.
This is to say that the meaning is set up or formulated in my attention to it. 
Its unity and identity as a phenomenon is such that it is by the virtue of its 
inseparable correlate, the act of intending it.
As a phenomenological subject, I notice that "a basic and essential difference 
arises between Being as Experience and Being as a thing"49, between "Being 
as Consciousness and Being as ’declaring’ itself in consciousness, or as 
’transcendent’ Being"50 between "transcendental and transcendent Being"51. 
In all these I realise the phenomenological dependence of the second upon 
the first because "The realm of transcendental consciousness had proved, 
as a result of phenomenological reduction, to be, in a certain sense, a realm 
of ’absolute’ Being. It is the original category of Being generally (or, as we 
would put it, the original region), in which all other regions of Being have their 
root, to which they are essentially related, on which they have therefore one 
and all dependent in an essential way"52.
It can be said that "Intentional constitution and the transcendent as appearing
in the transcendental are, then, two basic points that must be understood 
clearly...Simply put, the phenomenologically transcendent is what appears in 
consciousness as essentially other than consciousness, while consciousness 
itself and all its functioning and factors is the phenomenologically 
transcendental, in as much as it is the activator of the transcendental field laid 
open by the phenomenological or transcendental reduction"53. Objects of a 
formal type "are in a certain way" ’transcendent’ to pure consciousness, and 
not to be really found in it"54. Although Husserl sees logic as quite a possible 
way into transcendental phenomenology, on account of the fact that the 
phenomenologist has to accept the concept and propositions which formal 
logic has decreed concerning meanings in general, there is a possibility on 
close examination, certain provisional conditions for placing formal logic under 
’brackets’. Not only formal logic but all the disciplines of formal mathesis 
(algebra, theory of numbers, theory of manifolds, and so on). This is clear 
when he says, "if we may take for granted that the inquiry of phenomenology 
into Pure Consciousness sets itself and needs set itself no other task than 
that of making such descriptive analyses can be resolved into pure intuition, 
the theoretical framework of the mathematical disciplines and all the theorems 
which develop within it cannot be of any service"55. Having said this, it does 
not mean that phenomenology has nothing to do with formal logic however, 
the "logical propositions to which it might find occasion to refer would 
throughout be logical axioms such as the principle of contradiction, whose
universal and absolute validity, however, it could make transparent by the help 
of the examples taken from the data of its own domain"56. With regard to the 
intentional presentation of objects or constitution properly speaking, 
phenomenological reflection shows that for an object to be given, does not 
mean a passive receiving of object data, it rather means that an object comes 
to definiteness and unity in the complexity of its aspects and ways of 
appearing only in virtue of attending - intending - action of a subject. To be 
given therefore means to be constituted. Intuiting of an individual is a 
constituting of it as that individual, a bringing of that kind of meaning to 
definiteness and giveness. Intuiting an eidos. an essence, is a constituting of 
it as that eidos. Bringing eidetic structure to intuitional evidentness could be 
said to mean accomplishing, by appropriate method the realization of a 
certain meaning in its essentials. To be able to do this is what Husserl calls 
’first hand giving intuition’. In a word, it could be said that constitution is the 
action of meaning giving consciousness, of noetic intentionality, by which an 
object becomes a phenomenon in some noematic sense.
Having said this much, we can define phenomenology according to Husserl 
as "a pure descriptive discipline which studies the whole field of pure 
transcendental consciousness in the light of pure intuition"57. What should the 
actions of the phenomenologist be? Husserl speaking for the rest says "To 
claim nothing that we cannot make essentially transparent to ourselves by
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reference to Consciousness and on purely immanental lines"58.
Philosophical phenomenology did not end with Husserl, after him, others 
followed in his footsteps. What contributions did they make to Husserl’s 
original ideas. How did they apply the phenomenological method? This we 
shall find out in looking at the works of some of his successors. For that we 
shall look at the works of Martin Heidegger and the works of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.
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Martin Heidegger’s Understanding of Phenomenology.
Phenomenology did not begin and end with the works of Edmund Husserl. 
Having paid so much attention to his work, we now turn to other scholars to 
see how far their idea of phenomenology is in keeping with Husserl’s. We 
begin with the work of Martin Heidegger. The justification for choosing of 
Martin Heidegger can be seen in the following quotation from Spiegelberg, 
"The accepted story, especially among outsiders, says that Heidegger is 
Husserl’s legitimate heir, as evidenced by his succession to Husserl’s chair 
in Freiburg; that consequently Heidegger’s philosophy represents the rightful 
development of Husserl’s phenomenology; and that the case for or against 
phenomenology can be settled by looking at its logical outcome in 
Heidegger’s work"59.
The truth and the falsity of this statement notwithstanding, we shall try to find 
out what Heidegger means by phenomenology and how far he did agree or 
disagree with Husserl.
Born at Messkirch, Baden in 1889 of Catholic parents, Heidegger was sent 
as a boarder to a Catholic gymnasium in 1903 under the Rectorship of 
Conrad Grober. In 1907 Grober gave Heidegger a copy of Franz Brentano’s 
dissertation Von der Manniq - fachen Bedeutunq des Seienden bei Aristotle
(on the Manifold Sense of Being according to Aristotle). This initiated his life­
long fascination with Aristotle and the meaning of Being. At the age of 
seventeen, Heidegger proceeded to the Jesuit seminary in Freiburg. Having 
already been initiated into the rudiments of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
philosophy, he found himself prepared for his work in philosophy. He left the 
seminary after one year. By the time he was twenty years old, he had given 
up the idea of becoming a priest. From 1909 to 1917 when he went into 
military service, he broke out of his Catholic background and read widely, 
including the works of Hegel, Schelling, Holderlin, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and 
Dostoevsky. Heidegger studied under Heinrich Rickert whose main interest 
was the methodology of the historical sciences. He also read Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations. His doctoral dissertation Die Lehre vom Urteil in 
PsvcholoQicismus (The Doctrine of Judgement in Phsychologism) presented 
in 1914 showed the influence of both Rickert and Husserl.
When Husserl arrived in Freidburg in 1916. Heidegger had not only 
completed his studies under Heinrich Rickert, but had been admitted as a 
Privatdozent. His inaugural lectures on July 27, 1915 dealt with the ’Concept 
of Time in Historiography’.
When Husserl came to Freiburg, he made Heidegger one of his assistants, 
and soon discovered the originality and vigour of his new colleague.
Heidegger’s lively interest in phenomenology - made Husserl hope that his 
own phenomenology would be developed. Heidegger’s identification with 
phenomenology is evidenced by the titles of the series of lectures he gave 
from 1919, ’Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value’. From 
then on until his transfer to Marburg as a full professor in 1923, Heidegger 
offered courses and seminars every semester in the titles of which the world 
’phenomenology’ always occurred. This continued even at Marburg where he 
was independent of Husserl. In 1928 when Heidegger was invited back to 
Freiburg to succeed Husserl, it was as a faithful disciple. Though his first 
semester courses were announced as ’Phenomenology’, he was now nearly 
forty and had discovered his own way which was rapidly to lead him away 
from anything that might be labelled phenomenology as known to Husserl.
Though Heidegger published profusely, what he understands as 
phenomenology is spelt out in his major work Sein and Zeit60. This treatise 
first appeared in the Spring of 1927 in the Jahrbuch fur Phanomenoloaie und 
phanomenoloaische Forschunnq edited by Edmund Husserl and was 
published simultaneously in a special printing"61. In this book, Heidegger 
carefully explains the sense in which he wishes to employ the 
phenomenological method. In Husserl’s phenomenology the concept of 
phenomenology was not clear from the start. When he took up 
phenomenology, he did not explain what he meant by the word. It was as
his idea matured into something distinctive and fundamental for philosophy 
that he felt the need for a redefinition. After abandoning Bretano’s idea of 
phenomenology in his Logical Investigations, he produces a precise meaning 
first in his lectures on the Idea of Phenomenology of 1907 and in the 
introduction to the Ideen. Here as already discussed in the section on 
Husserl, the pure phenomena of the new phenomenology are non-individual. 
It is the general essence of empirical phenomena obtained by eidetic 
reduction. In addition to that, they are as non-real refined by what he calls the 
phenomenological reduction which has bracketed their reality. Consequently, 
their ontological or metaphysical status was deliberately left undecided while 
the final word was that they owed their being to consciousness.
What does Heidegger understand as phenomenology? It can be seen that 
Heidegger decides to say what he has to say about phenomenology in his 
treatment of the meaning of ’Being’. "With the question of the meaning of 
Being, our investigations comes up against the fundamental question of 
philosophy. This is the one that must be treated phenomenologically1162. 
Heidegger does not see the question of the approach phenomenologically as 
something that represents a ’standpoint’ or special ’direction’. For him it does 
not constitute the ’what’ of the research but the ’how’. This is to say that 
’phenomenology’ for him "signifies primarily a methodological conception"63. 
In line with Husserl who sees the progress of phenomenology as lying in
presuppositionlessness, Heidegger says "the term ’phenomenology’ expresses 
a maxim which can be formulated as ’To the things themselves’. It is opposed 
to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to 
taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; 
it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 
’problems’, often for generations at a time"64. By the phrase ’back to the 
things themselves’, Heidegger does not mean to that stage in consciousness. 
Already here the difference between him and Husserl is evident. His concept 
of phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself" or that which is 
manifested. This does not remove from the fact that phenomena sometimes 
hides behind a deceptive or misleading appearance. It is also clear, however, 
that it is not the distillate of special reductive operations. It is rather an 
autonomous entity with power of its own, independent of, and prior to our 
thinking. Heidegger is well aware of the common use of the word as applied 
to the empirical world which is also the phenomena of the natural sciences.
Heidegger goes further to analyze the word phenomenology and comes to 
the conclusion that phenomenology in the last analyses is "the science of 
phenomena"65. Heidegger distinguishes the formal concept of phenomena 
from the phenomenological concept. For him the phenomenological 
phenomenon is distinctive. He poses several questions. He answers his 
questions by stating that phenomenological phenomenon as "something that
proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something 
that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part 
does show itself, but at the same time is something that belongs to what 
shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning 
and its ground"66.
For Heidegger, that which remains ’hidden’ as such is not an entity but the 
Being of a thing itself. The covering up or the hiddenness sometimes results 
in its getting lost. It is then the work of phenomenology to make it appear. 
The demand of phenomenology is for this distinctive quality of a thing to 
appear. It becomes our only way to get access to this ground. Heidegger 
sees phenomenology as "our way of access to what is to be the theme of 
ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as 
phenomenology is ontology possible"67. For him the phenomenological 
phenomena is that behind which nothing else appears. In Being and Time 
Heidegger defines philosophy as a "universal phenomenological ontology, and 
takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein. which, as an analytic of 
existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the 
point where it arises and to which it returns"68. For Heidegger, the primary 
consideration which defines the philosophical task is the problem of Being. 
The proper method of a philosophical analysis which seeks to delineate the 
structures and explicate the meaning of Being is phenomenology. The point
of departure of such an ontological analysis which employs the 
phenomenological method is hermeneutics or the historical interpretation of 
existence. The philosopher as an ontologist seeks to delineate the character 
and the universal structure of Being as they manifest themselves in 
phenomena. The discernment of Being (Sein) in which is (Seienden) and the 
explication of Being is the task of ontology.
Here, Heidegger is in accord with the traditional philosophers whose question 
has been, what is the nature of Being? This is the question he shares with 
Anaximander, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Duns, Scotus, Spinoza 
and Hegel. The essence of truth as Heidegger wrote in one of his essays is 
the disclosing of meaning of Being69. The proper method of an ontological 
analysis which seeks to explicate the meaning is the method of descriptive 
phenomenology. Since this is the case, philosophy must be understood as 
a phenomenological ontology. The phenomenological method as we know 
from Husserl has for its guiding principles, ’back to the data themselves’. Only 
by strict adherence to this phenomenological formula, argues Heidegger, are 
we able to remove all abstract constructions and formulations and other 
presuppositions that prevent us from getting to the real phenomenon.
Heidegger sees the task of the phenomenologist as being able to describe, 
analyze and interpret the data of immediate experience. Any ontological
description which remains true to the phenomenological method can never 
cut itself off from the original data. Heidegger rejects without qualification any 
rationalistic metaphysical speculations and a priori epistemological 
constructions which focus their attention upon mental and cognitive processes 
to the neglect of the phenomena themselves. Heidegger is in agreement 
with Husserl in their criticism of the way in which philosophy and even 
metaphysics and the natural sciences have diverted man’s attention away 
from the real phenomena. He accuses philosophers of being unable to 
separate Being from the things-in-Being. By this, they have even deviated 
from original Greek thought. Heidegger intends to study Being by taking a 
specific thing in Being, Dasein. This reason for choosing Dasein as the 
starting point of his ontology which is only possible phenomenologically is 
that "Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. 
Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being 
is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s 
Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards 
that Being - a relationship which itself is one of Being70. Why start from 
Dasein as the basis of the ontology. In this Heidegger justifies himself by 
saying that "Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted 
a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from 
its own most aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, 
and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task"71. If the phenomenon
of Being is to be arrived at, that will disclose Being itself, there has to be 
some act of purification, Being has to be made to have its own history free 
from any other conceptual interpretations. If this is to be achieved, Heidegger 
says, "we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we 
arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of being"...72.
The phenomenological procedure of ’destruction’ involves an emancipation 
from any possible epistemological prejudgments and a priori limitations which 
can only distort the original phenomena in question or indeed prevent their 
manifestation. The data or the phenomena are always prior to man’s logical 
and epistemological theories about them. If the aim of the phenomenological 
method is to return to the primary data as they are given, and Heidegger’s 
phenomenology signifies primarily a methodological conception, it then follows 
that phenomenology so understood provides the appropriate mode of access 
to that which constitutes the subject matter of ontological investigation-Being.
In Heidegger’s phenomenological method can also be found a radical 
doctrine of intentionality. Though its roots can be traced back to medieval 
philosophy, Husserl and Brentano are clearly in the background. He is with 
them in his view that intentionality is one presupposition of the 
phenomenological method. In his Ideas, Husserl made the notion of
intentionality a fundamental theme of his philosophy. Intentionality for Husserl 
as we saw in the section on Husserl is the basic structure of consciousness. 
The act of consciousness (noesis) is always directed towards the intentional 
object (opema). Heidegger follows Husserl in the accentuation of the theme 
of intentionality but he regards as more inclusive the framework in which 
intentionality really functions. For Husserl, the intentional relation of the act 
of knowing and the thing as known as primarily a cognitive or theoretical 
operation which he calls ’pure consciousness’.
For Heidegger, the intentional structure is the present. It is not only in the 
realm of consciousness understood in terms of man’s precognitive awareness. 
In Being and Time Heidegger avoids the traditional way of speaking about 
man in terms of the conscious subject, I and the like. In its place he uses 
the word Dasein which is to say being-there. Heidegger then finds the 
starting point of the analysis of the Dasein in averageness and everydayness. 
In the mode of being which we come across in the first instance, in the mode 
of being in which we ourselves are. "Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an 
entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent 
Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and 
inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or other of these 
two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated"73. The main characteristic of 
Dasein however, is that of ’Being-in-the-world’. Heidegger tries to explain
what he mans by ’Being-in-the-world’ by first analyzing Being in which cannot 
be thought of "as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporal Thing (such as 
a human body) ’in’ an entity which is present-at-hand. Nor does the term 
’Being-in’ mean a spatial in-one-anotherness’ of things present-at-hand, any 
more than the word ’in’ primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this 
kind..." ’Being-in* is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of 
Dasein which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state"74. In distinguishing 
Being-in as an existential and thing like entity or as something present-at- 
hand, we are however not saying that Being-in has no relation to space.
However, this is a relation to which we cannot gain access so long as we 
approach it in terms of the spatial relation of one thing being contained in 
another. Heidegger puts it this way "On the contrary, Dasein itself has a 
’Being-in-space’ of its own; but this in turn is possible only on the basis of 
Being-in the world in general"75.
By the ’world’ Heidegger does not mean entities into which various categories 
are classified. Man, things made by man, natural things. By putting these 
things together, we cannot arrive at the world. The fact that these things can 
be traced to their ultimate foundation in nature does not make them constitute 
the world. In a way the enumeration of things in the world would be said to 
pre-phenomenological. "Ontologically, ’world’ is not a way of characterizing
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those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of 
Dasein itself"76.
Man intends his world. So it is an ontological feature of human intentionality. 
This is because the ’world’ from the beginning is determined as an element 
in Being-in-the-world which is the basic structure of man relating himself to 
reality. We are not unfamiliar with the use of the world ’world’ in this way. As 
Bernsen puts it, "We speak of the ’world of the schizophrenic’ or we ask if 
the natives of the Bellona Islands do not (or did not) decidedly live in another 
’world’ than does today’s European, and the answers are left to some of the 
hermeneutic sciences, in casu psychiatry and ethnography of anthropology"77, 
man not only intends his world in perceiving and judging but also in the use 
of tools or utensils (Zeug) in his daily practical concern (Besorgen) and his 
encounter and response to other selves who share his world which Heidegger 
calls solitude. "Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with 
which it is concerned"78. In Dasein there is no real dichotomy when it comes 
to intentionality. It is not to say that Dasein is the subject that stands out to 
grasp a particular tool. On the other hand, "when Dasein directs itself 
towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an 
inner sphere in which it has proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of 
Being is such that it is always ’outside’ alongside entities which it encounters 
and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere
abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and 
determines its character; but even in this ’Being-outside’ alongside the object, 
Dasein is still ’inside’, if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to 
say, it is itself ’inside’ as a Being-in-the-world which knows"79.
Prior to any cognitive reflection, there is primordial, pre-conceptual awareness 
through which man already understands himself fundamentally related to this 
world. For Heidegger, human being or Dasein has a pre-conceptual 
understanding of Being in which the intentional experience is already 
operative.
A similar attempt is made by Sartre in the development of his notion of coqito 
prereflexi to reach preconceived level of experience. The primacy of cognitive 
knowledge is abandoned. The world is disclosed through man’s prereflective 
acts80. Mood in its various forms or modifications of melancholy, boredom, 
fear and despair discloses possible modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. For 
Heidegger, "The mood has already disclosed, in every case. Beina-in-the- 
world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards 
something. Having a mood is not related to the physical in the first instance, 
and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical 
way and puts it mark on Things and persons. It is in this that the second 
essential characteristic of states-of-mind shows itself. We have seen that the
World, Dasein - with and existence are equiprimordiallv disclosed; and state- 
of-mind is a basic existential species of their discloseness, because this 
discloseness itself is essentially Being-in-the-world"81.
For Heidegger, attunement or mood has in addition the function of giving to 
Dasein itself access to its aspect throwness. "The expression ’throwness’; is 
meant to suggest the facility of its being delivered over. The ’that it is and 
has to be’ which is disclosed in Dasein’s state-of-mind is not the same ’that- 
it-is’ which expresses ontologico-categorically the factuality belonging to 
presence-at-hand... Facticitv is not the factuality of the factum brutum of 
something present-at-hand. but a characteristic of Dasein’s Being - one which 
has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. 
That ’that-it-is’ of facticity never becomes something that we can come across 
by beholding it"82. It then follows that "Dasein’s openness to the world is 
constituted existentially by the attunment of a state-of-mind"83. From this it can 
be seen that attunment is by no means a phenomenon that is limited merely 
to the subject and his perceptions. It is rather a mode of being open by 
which the world can become accessible in various ways. Here mode is 
understood as an intentional determinant. To say that Dasein is in the world, 
is to say that he lives, dwells and sojourns in the world.
Heidegger’s accentuation of the pre-conceptual understanding of Being
constitutes an explicit rejection of the epistemological subject or the res 
coqitans as formulated in the Cartesian tradition. There is never an isolated 
T given without a world, which is then confronted with the task of formulating 
a theory of knowledge to account for both its own existence and that of an 
’external world’ prior to the epistemological question. There is a pre- 
conceptual disclosure of man’s relation to his world. For Heidegger, the 
mistake of Descartes was that he never accounted for the understanding of 
the ’sum’ which is presupposed by the coqito. With the coqito sum Descartes 
claimed to provide philosophy with a new and certain foundation. However, 
what he leaves as undetermined is the kind of Being characterised the res 
coqitans. that is to say, the meaning of the sum.
For Heidegger in line with Kierkegaard, the primary datum is not the thinking 
subject of the Cartesian coqito. but the sum or the act of existing, and this 
in a sense of already Being-in-the-world. In all man’s practical and personal 
concerns, a world is pre-supposed. To exist is to find oneself in a world 
which one is related to in one or several manifestations of care (Sorge). In 
one’s construction and use of tools, one encounters and deals with others.
More could be said on the general development of Being and Time, but we 
conclude this section with a summary of Heidegger’s view of phenomenology.
The distinctive character of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology is that it 
is an ontology of Dasein or human existence. For this reason it is sometimes 
mistaken for an existentialist ontology. The point of departure is the 
hermeneutics of concrete experience of the historically existing self. Here it 
can be seen that such phenomenological ontology contrasts with Husserl’s 
conception. For Husserl, at least at the time of his ’Writings’ the name 
’ontology’ stood not for science of the Being of things, in Being. Primarily, it 
stood for a branch of pure logic, that is the eidetic science of the pervasive 
category of all things in Being (formal ontology). This was followed by 
regional ontologies dealing with supreme categories of each science in their 
different essential natures. The difference between Husserl and Heidegger is 
clear here. Heidegger’s philosophical intention is to delineate the universal 
structure of human beings as they show themselves in the actualization of 
existence. Man, in his historical existence, provides the gateway to the 
understanding of Being84. Historical existence itself becomes the subject of 
a hermeneutic interpretation and phenomenological description. Man is 
indelibly historical. History is a fundamental determinant of his nature. This 
Being (Dasein) is in himself historical, thus unique. Ontological illumination of 
this Being necessarily becomes an historical interpretation.
It is clear from the work of Heidegger that even at the time when Husserl was 
still proposing his idea of phenomenology, difference was already
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conspicuous.
We shall now look at the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to conclude our 
investigation of the phenomenological method.
Maurice Merleau-Pontv and the Phenomenological Method
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Born in Normandy (La Rochelle) in 1908, Maurice Merleau-Ponty graduated 
from L’Ecole Normale in 1930. After teaching in several lycees, he returned 
there as an agrege repetiteur in 1935.85 After demobilization from the army 
in 1940, he resumed his lycee teaching. During this time he was associated 
with the resistance movement. After the war, he became master of 
conference and later professor at the University of Lyon. From 1949 to 1952, 
he was professor of child psychology and pedagogy at the Sorbonne from 
where he was called to College de France where he was to assume the chair 
previously held by Bergson, Leroy, Gilson and Lavell, a position he held until 
his death in 1961.
The justification on examining the work of Merleau-Ponty can be seen in the 
fact that he was the author of the first French work which displays the word 
’phenomenologie’ in its main title86, The Phenomenology of Perception87.
It was Merleau-Ponty’s ambition to develop a non-Cartesian phenomenology 
which would preserve the basic intention of Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty was first introduced to Husserl’s writing in 
1935 by Jean Paul Sartre who recommended that he read Husserl’s Ideas88. 
He did that and read other works of Husserl as well, but before long, he
found that his interest in Husserl lay in the themes of the then unpublished 
and inaccessible works of Husserl’s later thinking. These were available to 
him solely from the published first half of the Crisis lectures of 1936. He saw 
these themes as dominant in his later thinking. This is particularly true of the 
life and the perceptual consciousness because these coincided with his main 
concerns. From 1944-1948 Merleau-Ponty had access to some of the most 
important studies of the unpublished Husserlian legacy89 Taking into account 
other texts which he was able to consult from 1950-1960, he became 
acquainted with both the published and unpublished works of Husserl. He 
placed much emphasis on the unpublished texts. This was because, for him, 
all Husserl’s philosophy is almost entirely contained in the unpublished 
writing90. For Merleau-Ponty, the essence of Husserl’s thought was the 
phenomenology of his later thinking, the phenomenology of the life-world and 
perceptual consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty is not interested in merely explicating Husserl. For him 
phenomenology is meant to be a science that describes what appears and 
he continues the movement on his own account without regard to 
orthodoxy91. This is evident from Merleau-Ponty’s own writings. The opening 
sentence in his first major work, The Structure of Behaviour92 which appeared 
in 1942 is an indicator of what he has to say about philosophy "Our goal is 
to understand the relations of consciousness and nature, organic,
psychological or even social"93 This implies that for him, biology, psychology 
and indeed all we term objective sciences are unable to account for these 
relations. This is followed by the main book for which he consulted the 
Husserlian texts at Louvain. After the Phenomenology of Perception most of 
his philosophical thoughts were expressed in the form of articles or 
addresses. From time to time, collections of those shorter pieces were 
published. Humanism and Terror. 1947, Sense and Non Sense in 1948, The 
Adventures of Dialectics in 1955, and the Signs in I96094. Attention should 
also be drawn to two writings. The first is the study of Husserl’s position on 
the relation between phenomenology and certain sciences dealing with man, 
psychology, linguistics and history in particular. These were given in a series 
of lectures in Sorbonne between 1950-1951 under the title The Science of 
Man and Phenomenology95 Here Merleau-Ponty interprets Husserl’s 
phenomenology particularly the essence-intuition of Husserl. Mention must 
also be made of The Visible and the Invisible which was published 
posthumously. It contains the materials Merleau-Ponty was working on before 
his death in 1961 and shows the position he had reached as regards 
phenomenology.
What Merleau-Ponty has to say about phenomenology is set out in the 
Phenomenology of Perception particularly in the Introduction. He begins by 
asking the question ’What is Phenomenology?’ Although to him the posing
of such a question seems strange after the long history of phenomenology 
has had since the turn of the century due to the work of Husserl, he provides 
an answer. Phenomenology "is the study of essences". But phenomenology 
is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not 
expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting 
point other than that of their ’facticity’"96 Having said this, he follows most of 
the themes in Husserl, making them the central concern of his 
phenomenology. When he talks of phenomenology as "a transcendental 
philosophy which places in abeyance the assertions arising out of the natural 
attitude, the better to understand them,"97, he is not saying anything other 
than what Husserl said as regards bracketing the natural world to get to the 
essence intuition. In saying that "it is also a philosophy for which the world 
is always ’already there’ before reflection begins - as an inalienable 
presence"98, he is almost echoing Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty made the non 
Cartesian Husserl and the Husserl of later life and the later philosophy his 
starting point. It was with this other phenomenology, the phenomenology 
towards which Husserl moved as he advanced from the ’eidetic’ method or 
logicism of his earlier stage to the existentialism of the last period that 
Merleau-Ponty cast his lot. Whether Merleau-Ponty identified with the latter 
or earlier Husserl, it is obvious that both he and Husserl aim to achieve as 
purely as possible an uncovering of the phenomenal field. For Merleau- 
Ponty the "phenomenal field is not an ’inner world’, the ’phenomenon’ is not
"a state of consciousness", or a ’mental fact’ and the experience of 
phenomena is not an act of introspection or an intuition in Bergson’s 
sense"99.
At this stage, it is easy to see the difference between the work of Merleau- 
Ponty and that of Husserl. If for Merleau-Ponty what matters is the perceptual 
field of consciousness, it means that this situation is not reached out of the 
objective defense of essences. Neither is it out of the procedure for clarifying 
essence with the movement that begins in logic and proceeds to perceptual 
consciousness. Instead, he begins with consciousness as conducted in 
psychology in order to move directly into an attitude and approach to 
experience on a perceptual level, unmodified by specific exigencies of natural 
sciences. To come to this perceptual experience, a sifting will be done. In 
Husserl’s term this will be the epoche which corresponds to Merleau-Ponty’s 
setting aside of the ’oreiude du monde’ of the implicit or explicit notion of the 
world as an itself objective world. He finds such presuppositions operating 
in the scientific studies of perception. "Scientific points of view, according to 
which my existence is a moment of the world’s, are always both naive and 
at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly 
mentioning, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through 
which from the outset a world forms itself around me and begins to exist for 
me"100 In the Phenomenology of Perception he attacks this attitude of the
sciences and sees the attitude as an obstacle to getting to the lived 
experience. This having been done, Merleau-Ponty invites us again to find a 
direct experience that has to be at least provisionally in relation to scientific 
knowledge, psychology reflection. "The sensible configuration of an object or 
a gesture which the criticism of the constancy hypothesis brings before our 
eyes, is not grasped in some inexpressible coincidence, it is understood 
through a sort of act of appropriation which we call experience when we say 
we have ’found’ the rabbit in the foliage of a puzzle ... once the prejudice of 
sensation has been banished, a face, a signature, a form of behaviour cease 
to be mere visual data whose psychological meaning is to be sought in our 
inner experience, and the mental life of others becomes an immediate object, 
a whole charged with immanent meaning"101. In pursuit of this objective 
Merleau-Ponty works out a detailed criticism of psychology, uncovering 
inherent difficulties and inconsistencies. At the same time he finds and follows 
leads towards that new type of analysis which he then enters directly, namely, 
analysis of the phenomenal field as it is discovered lying under, and within 
our natural point of view, scientific construction, explanation and the reflective 
procedure of traditional philosophies. "Psychological reflection, once begun, 
then, outruns itself through its own momentum. Having recognized the 
originality of phenomena in relation to the objective world..., it is led to 
integrate with them every possible object and to try to find out how that 
object is constituted through them. At the same time the phenomenal field
becomes a transcendental field. Since it is now the universal focus of 
knowledge, consciousness definitely ceases to be a particular region of being, 
a certain collection of ’mental’ contents; it no longer resides of and is no 
longer confined within the domain of ’forms’, like all things, exist for it. It can 
no longer be a question of describing the world of living experience which it 
carried within itself like some opaque datum, it has to be constituted"102 For 
Merleau-Ponty the first philosophical task is to return to the world as lived in 
experience, to find again the phenomena, the living experience layer through 
which other things are first given, the system in ’Self-others-world’. "The 
system ’Self-others-world’ is in its turn taken as an object of analysis and it 
is now a matter of awakening the thoughts which constitute other people, 
myself as individual subject and the world as a pole of my perception".103 
This act is what Merleau-Ponty describes as the phenomenological reduction 
in the sense given to it by Husserl. The reduction by Merleau-Ponty as 
pointed out here can be seen to be in contrast to Husserl’s idea of arriving 
at reductions. As Schmidt puts it "With this interpretation of the goal of the 
phenomenological reduction, all the distinctions Husserl had so laboriously 
drawn between the natural and the transcendental attitudes crumbled".104
For Merleau-Ponty the phenomenon is seen as the function of expressing 
between the objects and the subjects and the presence of solid structure in 
both which distinguishes phenomena from mere appearing. About phenomena
Merleau-Ponty says "Their appearance is not the external unfolding of a pre­
existing reason. It is not because the ’form’ produces a certain state of 
equilibrium, solving a problem of maximum coherence and, in the Kantian 
sense, making a world possible, that it enjoys a privileged place in our 
perception; it is the very appearance of the world and not the condition of its 
possibility; it is the birth of a norm and is not realized according to a norm; 
it is the identity of the external and the internal and not the projection of the 
internal in the external."105
It is at the same time not an outcome of the circulation of some mental state, 
nor is it an idea. For Merleau-Ponty, there is nothing like a universal 
constituting consciousness. For a reflection to maintain in the object in which 
it bears, its descriptive characteristics, it must not be seen as a return to a 
universal reason. Rather "we must regard it as a creative operation which 
itself participated in the facticity of that experience. That is why 
phenomenology, alone of all philosophies talks about a transcendental field. 
This word indicates that reflection never holds, arrayed and objectified before 
its gaze, the whole world and the plurality of monads, and this view is never 
other than partial and limited power"106 A discipline devoted to the study of 
these phenomena become phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
has to contend itself with the rejection of certain positions and conceptions 
in order to let the phenomenon in question be seen purely as it is
primordially. He sees two positions as obstacles to getting to the primordial 
phenomena. The first he calls the empiricist, the second he calls intellectualist. 
The former accords primacy to nature and the latter to consciousness. The 
difference between ’empiricist approach and the intellectualist is that the first 
sees the fully determined universe as all given in itself, while the second sees 
pure thought on the part of the subject to be the basis of reality.
In the Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty sees the frame of mind 
held by both the empiricist and the intellectualist positions as beginning with 
the idea of perception and not with the phenomenon of perception itself. It 
is to detach oneself from the experience of perception only to attend to the 
idealized concept of it. Consequently, the primary task of reflection is to 
reverse this disorientation and to recover the basic phenomenon in its 
authenticity as the starting point of philosophy. One has to replace ideas, 
meanings previously taken to be evident and assure, ’objective’ and 
determinate, in the matrix from which they take their origin. For Merleau- 
Ponty a return to the phenomenon is a return to a type of reality anterior to 
the dichotomous terms within which the two classical terms move. Beyond the 
en-soi and the pour-soi. the phenomenon of perception manifest a type of 
event in which meaning is neither fixed nor utterly random or absent. 
Merleau-Ponty’s centre of phenomenology is perception as primarily the 
phenomenon of passive constitution, passive genesis of meaning, what he
calls ’operative intentionality’. This "operative intentionality already at work 
before any positioning or any judgement, a ’Logos of aesthetic world;, an ’art 
hidden in the depths of the human soul’, one which, like my art, is known 
only in its result."107 It is continually at work as the basis out of which definite 
meaning develops, comes to be posited and comes to be assumed. It is this 
phenomenon that phenomenology is all about, that phenomenon beyond 
which it is meaningless to look. Merleau-Ponty goes further to explain the 
task of the radical reflection as consisting in the rediscovering the unreflective 
experience of the world. It takes hold of one while still in the course of 
forming and formulating the ideas of subject and objects. It brings to light the 
source of these two ideas. It is reflection not only in operation but as well 
conscious of itself in its operation. What is given is neither (pure) 
consciousness nor (pure) Being but experience. The phenomenon being 
described is not only put by Merleau-Ponty as the primordial foundations 
phenomenon, it is identified by him as the primordial ’kind of Being’ for man. 
Human being is at the bottom of this stratum of meaning giving. To name 
man Being-in-the world is for Merleau-Ponty to give a metaphysical definition 
of human being. It now follows that Merleau-Ponty has given phenomenology 
a metaphysical significance. With phenomenology having now reached the 
stage in which its principle task is the explanation of the life-world, 
phenomenology for him becomes explicitly philosophical.108 For Merleau- 
Ponty, the phenomenon of perception reveals a mode of being which is
neither that of a pure thing nor a pure thinking. It reveals a third gender of 
being in which body and consciousness are one and the same phenomenon. 
An example is given with one’s body which reveals to one an ambiguous 
mode of existence. The body is not an object and the consciousness I have 
of it is not a thought. I have no other way of knowing the human body other 
than by living it. The body belongs to both subject and object at the same 
time. "The body, together with the objects perceived, constitutes the entire 
’field’ of perception. But the body is not identifiable with the objects it 
perceives. There is a unity of perception but also a distinction between the 
body and the perceived objects, in as much as I can never take a distance 
from my body as I can take from other objects"109.
We find anterior to the objective body, the phenomenal body, a knower. 
Giving an example Merleau-Ponty says, "If I stand holding my pipe in my 
closed hand, the position of my hand is not determined discursively by the 
angle which it makes with my forearm, and my forearm with my upper arm...l 
know indubitably where my pipe is, and thereby I know where my hand and 
my body are".110 We can see here that the subject agent of perception is not 
a transcendentally pure thinking but a being-present-within-the world, though 
in, and as bodily being. The two are one and that one Being-present-within- 
the world (etre-au-monde) can be called existence. As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it, "if my body can be a ’form’ and if there can be, in front of it, important
figures against indifferent backgrounds, this occurs in virtue of being polarized 
by its tasks, of its existence towards them, of its collecting together of itself 
in its pursuit of its aims; the body image is finally a way of stating that my 
body is in the world".111 At this primary level consciousness is experience 
precisely as experiencing in or of the world. This experiencing is bodily 
perception as the genesis of meaning at the grips of the world. It is at this 
level that reflection itself becomes possible as a second level and comes to 
recognize its own level.
In summing up Merleau-Ponty’s view, one would say that for him, 
phenomenology of perception is primarily an attempt at exploring the basic 
stratum in our experience of the world as given prior to all scientific 
interpretation. Perception is simply our privileged access to this stratum. It 
is not the essence that he describes but experience in the fullest sense. This 
said, it can then be said that the phenomenology of perception is actually the 
phenomenology of the world as perceived rather than the perceiving act. The 
three phenomenologists treated here are not the only names in 
phenomenology. There are many other great names. However, what seems 
to be the driving force in anything that has to do with phenomenology is the 
need to go ’back to the phenomenon themselves’. Back to the preconceptual 
period. In trying to do this, the phenomenologists have tended to disagree 
on how to get there. With these in mind and what we have learnt from the
phenomenologists, we proceed to examine the phenomenology of religion to 
see whether it has made use of the insights and methods of these 
philosophers.
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CHAPTER 2 WORKS HITHERTO TAKEN TO REPRESENT 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION.
THE
91
Rudolf Otto: The Numinous Experience as the Basis for Religion.
In the last chapter we dealt with the origins of Phenomenology and 
development of the phenomenological method. The method has been 
applied in various fields of study, but has it been applied successfully in the 
study of religion? Has the phenomenology of religion, as hitherto known, 
anything to do with the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl and 
continued by his successors, or is the similarity only in name? How far has 
the phenomenology of religion been able to clarify the phenomenon of 
religion? To find the answers to these questions, an attempt will be made in 
this chapter to study the works of outstanding scholars in the field of religion 
and particularly those who set out to solve the problem of phenomenon of 
religion. We shall examine the works of four prominent scholars, Otto, 
Kirstensen, van der Leeuw and Eliade. We begin our quest with Otto.
The question that one encounters immediately is, why begin with Otto in a 
work that has to do with the phenomenology of religion, when he did not 
regard himself as a phenomenologist? After his discussion of the numinous 
experience, he said, "Here I do not find but I have been found, I do not seek 
but I have been sought after, I do not discover, but I become enlightened. 
Here, I stand farthest removed from phenomenology all phenomenology."1
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Despite Otto’s claim it would be impossible to avoid including Otto among the 
phenomenologists in view of the following words of Husserl: "Das Heiliqe, 
has impressed me greatly as hardly any other book has for years...It is first 
a beginning for a phenomenology of religion...".2
Born in Peine, Germany in 1869, Louis Karl Rudolf Otto was the twelfth of the 
thirteen children of Wilhelm Otto, a manufacturer who owned factories in Peine 
and later in Hildesheim, and Katherine Karoline Henriette nee Reupke. He 
received both his primary and secondary education at Peine and Hildesheim. 
When in 1880, the family moved to Hidesheim, Otto enroled in the 
Andreanum. a grammar school. His father died shortly after. From 1888 to 
1898, Otto studied theology at the Universities of Enlargen and Gottingen. 
In 1898, Otto presented the first of his major works; Geist und Wort nach 
Luther (Spirit and Word Accounting to Luther) for which he received the 
Licentiate of Theology of the University of Gottingen. In the same year, 1898, 
the work was published under the title Die Anschauunq Vom Heiliaen Geiste 
Bei Luther (Luther’s Conception of the Holy Spirit).3 In 1899, Otto was made 
a Privatdozent in the University of Gottingen, and in the same year, 1899, he 
published a new edition of Uber die Religion: Reden an die Gibildenten unter 
Ihren Verachfern. Schleiermacher’s Speeches on Religion.4 In 1903 he wrote 
an essay on Schleiermacher’s discovery of the essence of Religion.5 In 1904, 
he became an Extraordinarius. and in 1907 he obtained his Ph.D at the
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University of Tubingen, and a Th.D honoris causa at the University of Geissen. 
From 1914 to 1917, he was Professor of Systematic Theology at the 
University of Breslau; from 1913 to 1918, a member of the Prussian Diet; from 
1917 to his retirement in 1929, he taught at the University of Marburg, where 
he died in 1937.6
Otto was a prolific scholar. Apart from the influence of Luther and 
Schleiermacher as shown in the works already cited, Otto was indebted to 
several writers, as indicated by Darwinismus und Religion7 and Kantisch- 
Fries’sche Reliaionsphilosophie.8 The main idea in what was to be his major 
work Das Heiliqe.9 appeared in 1910 when Otto in an article in Theoloaische 
Rundschau10 on ’Myth and Religion’ in Wundt’s Volkerpsvcholoqie considered 
the Sensus Numinis as a historical origin of religion.
Other influences in Otto’s career began in 1911-12 when he went to India to 
begin studies in Sanskrit. This led him to the study of various religions of the 
East with particular emphasis on Hinduism. The fruits of his study was made 
manifest in 1916, when he published Dioika des Nivasa: Eine indische 
Heilslehre.11 In 1923 Otto was invited to give the Haskell lectures at Oberlin 
College in the United States. He took for his theme the comparison of 
Eastern and Western mysticism, and from these lectures arose his 
comparison of Meister Eckhart and Shankara. His book West-ostliche
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Mvstik12 was published in 1926. He further explored the convergences and 
divergences between Christianity and Hinduism in ’Die Gnadenreliaion Indiens 
und das Christentum’13 published in 1930. Having been familiar with religion 
East and West, he began to look for a ground that was common to all 
religions. This was the background that led to the writing of Das Heilige.
In Das Heilige. Otto attempted to clarify the distinctively religious element in 
religions by attending to the specifically non-rational factor. He began his 
work by distinguishing between the rational and the non-rational. "It is 
essential to every theistic conception of God, and most of all to the Christian, 
that it designates and precisely characterizes Deity by the attributes Spirit, 
Reason, Purpose, Good Will, Supreme Power, Unity, Selfhood. The nature of 
God is thus thought of by analogy with our human nature of reason and 
personality; only, whereas in ourselves we are aware of this as qualified by 
restriction and limitation, as applied to God the attributes we use are 
’completed’, ie. thought as absolute and unqualified. Now all these attributes 
constitute clear and definite concepts. They can be grasped by the intellect; 
they can be analysed by thought; they even can admit of definition. An 
object that can thus be thought conceptually may be termed rational. The 
nature of deity described in the attributes above mentioned is, then, a rational 
nature; and a religion which recognises and maintains such a view of God is 
in so far a ’rational’ religion. Only on such terms is belief possible in contrast
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to mere feeling1.14 Having said this, Otto goes on to say that we must be on 
our guard against regarding the rational element as the only side to religion, 
for this will make religion a ’one-sided’ affair.
Otto seems to see everything in religion as being attributed to the rational 
aspect. This according to him does not take away from its misleading nature. 
The rational aspect is an aspect of the non-rational nature. The rational aspect 
does not tell all the story. "For so far are these ’rational’ attributes from 
exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational or supra- 
rational Subject of which they are predicates".15 Otto goes on to accuse 
Orthodoxy of being responsible for this misinterpretation that has been a 
common phenomenon in dealing with God and religion. "It is not simply that 
Orthodoxy was preoccupied with the doctrine ad the framing of dogma, for 
these have been no less a concern of the oldest mystics. It is rather that 
Orthodoxy found in the construction of dogma and doctrine no way to do 
justice to the non-rational aspect of its subject. So far from keeping the non- 
rational element in religion alive in the heart of the religious experience, 
orthodox Christianity manifestly failed to recognise its value, and by this failure 
gave to the idea of God a one sidedly intellectualistic and rationalistic 
interpretation".16 For Otto, religion does not only contain a rational aspect, 
both rational and non-rational go together.
Otto sees ’Holiness’ as a category of interpretation that is peculiar to the 
sphere of religion. He however, does not see this category as merely 
rationalistic. The word ’holy’ has acquired several meanings and as soon as 
it is mentioned, the real meaning tends to get lost. "The fact is we have 
come to use the words holy, sacred in an entirely derivative sense, quite 
different from that which they originally bore. We generally take ’holy’ as 
meaning ’completely good’; it is the absolute moral attribute, denoting the 
consummation of moral goodness".17 Otto sees this overemphasis on the 
word as the basis for all the misconceptions about the word ’holy’ and 
continues "In this sense Kant calls the will which remains unwaveringly 
obedient to the moral law from the motive of duty a ’holy’ will; here clearly we 
have simple the perfectly moral will".18 The same could be said of other 
things for example; "the holiness of sanctity of Duty or Law, meaning merely 
that they are imperative upon conduct and universally obligatory".19 The use 
of the word ’holy’ in the sense that has just been described is seen by Otto 
as inaccurate. For him the word does not only contain the moral significance 
but something more than that. "It is true that all this moral significance is 
contained in the word ’holy’, but it includes in addition - as even we cannot 
but feel - a clear overplus of meaning, and this it is now our task to isolate".20 
Otto saw this overplus of meaning in the ’holy’ as primarily concerned with 
religion. On account of the fact that this word that should designate the 
special religious dimension has lost its meaning, and has come to designate
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ethical and moral self-righteousness. Otto wants to retrieve its meaning. He 
draws attention to the use of the word ’holy’ in Latin, Greek and other ancient 
languages to make his point clear: "’holy’ or at least the equivalent words in 
Latin and Greek, in Semantic and other ancient languages, denoted first and 
foremost only this overplus: if the ethical element was present at all, at any 
rate it was not original and never constituted the whole meaning of the 
word".21 Otto intends to use this overplus, that is the ’holy’ minus its rational 
aspect in describing religion. However,in doing so, he does not intend to 
deny the rational aspect.
To refer to holiness without the moral factor he has to devise a new term. 
"For this purpose I adopt a word coined from the Latin numen. Omen has 
given us ominous, and there is no reason why from numen we should not 
similarly form a word ’numinous’".22 The numinous indicates the special 
religious overplus of meaning. He then tries to describe this state which is 
sui generis. "I shall speak then of a unique ’numinous’ category of value and 
of a definitely ’numinous’ state of mind, which is always found wherever the 
category is applied. This mental state is perfectly sui generis and irreducible 
to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary 
datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined".23
If this experience is sui generis, it therefore follows that it can only be
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understood existentially. It is for this reason that Otto looks to personal 
experience to justify his stand. Inability to recall such experience excludes one 
from coming to terms with the numinous. "The reader is invited to direct his 
mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible 
qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever 
knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no further: 
for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who 
can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestions, 
or say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings".24 
From this, it is clear that Otto takes the numinous experience to be a unique 
experience.
How then does Otto go about describing this experience which has not got 
its equivalent anywhere? Since there are no terms in ordinary language 
which belong to the area of the numinous, words have to be got from the 
natural area to describe it. By ’natural’ here, Otto means those experiences, 
feelings, or dimensions of life which are not numinous, that is to say, which 
do not pertain exclusively to the idea of the holy in its non-rational aspect. "As 
Christians we undoubtedly here first meet with feelings familiar enough in a 
weaker form in other departments of experience, such as feelings of gratitude, 
trust, love, reliance, humble submission, and dedication. But this does not 
by any means exhaust the content of religious worship".25 One can see that
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Otto is careful to note that the passage from natural to numinous feeling 
which can occur when natural terms are given numinous significance does 
not involve merely a change in intensity of the natural feeling. He therefore 
begins by marking the differences between numinous consciousness and 
Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence. "The feeling of which Schleiermacher 
wrote has an undeniable analogy with these states of mind: they serve as an 
indication to it, and its nature may be elucidated by them, so that, by 
following the direction in which they point, the feeling itself may be 
spontaneously felt. But the feeling is at the same time also qualitatively 
different from such analogous states of mind. Schleiermacher himself, in a 
way, recognises this by distinguishing the feeling of pious or religious 
dependence from all other feelings of dependence. His mistake is in making 
the distinction merely that between ’absolute’ and ’relative’ dependence, and 
therefore a difference of degree and not of intrinsic quality".26
Turning then to the analysis of the numinous, Otto describes the object to 
which the numinous consciousness is directed. He asserts that the nature of 
the numinous "can only be suggested by means of the way in which it is 
reflected in the mind in terms of feeling".27 It is for this reason that he tries 
as much as possible to identify each state of mind through which the 
numinous is expressed and made known. He says that it is "by adducing 
feelings akin to them for the purpose of analogy or contrast, and by the use
of metaphor and symbolic expressions, to make the states of mind we are 
investigating ring out, as it were, of themselves1.28 What then does Otto 
mean by the word analogy? The answer to what Otto means by analogy can 
be seen in the following example, "The phrase ’he loves me’ is verbally 
identical, whether it is said by a child of his father or by a girl of her lover. 
But in the second case a ’love’ is meant which is at the same time ’something 
more’ (viz. sexual love), and something more not only in quantity but in 
quality. So, too, the phrase ’We ought to fear, love, and trust him’ is verbally 
identical, whether it refers to the relation of child to father or to that of man 
to God. But again in the second case these ideas are infused with a 
meaning of which none but the religiously-minded man can have any 
comprehension or indeed any inkling, whose presence makes, eg. ’fear of 
God’ ’something more’ than any fear of a man qualitatively, not merely 
quantitatively, though retaining the essence of the most genuine reverence felt 
by the child for his father".29
Further analysis of the numinous reveals the presence of a complex reaction 
which Otto calls the experience of the Mvsterium tremendum or the 
awareness of the numinous object as a "Mystery inexpressible and above all 
creatures".30 Accompanying this awareness of the numinous or the Mvsterium 
tremendum. is a specific emotional response which can best be expressed 
by the German word ’Shauer’ or the English word ’Awe’. This emotion is also
sui generis, a thing quite in itself indefinite and primary. Its specific character 
or ’quale’ persists throughout the evolution of religion from the primitive 
feeling of "something uncanny", "eerie", or "weird" right up to the ’awe’ of the 
developed religious consciousness". It is this feeling which, emerging in the 
mid of the primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire religious 
development in history...It implies the first application of a category of 
valuation which has no place in the everyday natural world of ordinary 
experience, and is only possible to a being in whom has been awakened a 
mental predisposition, unique in kind and different in a definite way from any 
’natural’ faculty. And this newly-revealed capacity, even in the crude and 
violent manifestations which are all it at first evinces, bears witness to a 
completely new function of experience and standard of valuation, only 
belonging to the spirit of man".31
Ordinary language does not have the same means with which to speak 
comprehensively of the qualities and attributes of the Numen. It is therefore 
necessary consistently to resort to figurative language, images and symbols 
to which Otto gave the name ’ideogram’. An ideogram is a "sort of illustrative 
substitute for a concept",32 "an analogical notion taken from the natural 
sphere, illustrating, but incapable of exhaustively rendering our real 
meaning".33 Otto is of the view that the most important and persistent 
indicator of awefulness in religious literature is the stress placed on the ’Wrath
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of God’ or ’ferocity’ or the jealousy of God. One can see that these 
analogies from the domain of ordinary experience are the only concepts 
available to us, but viewed as ideograms of awefulness, they become apt and 
striking. In their most original religious meaning such terms are fundamentally 
independent of any moral significance, such as swift requital or punishment 
for moral transgression.34 They refer instead to the dreadful daunting 
character of the divine, the awesome power and the might with which as St. 
John of the Cross puts it, the Holy God "destroys, crushes, and overwhelms 
(the soul) in such a deep darkness, that it feels as though melted and in its 
misery destroyed by a cruel death of the spirit..."35
On the objective side; the mvsterium tremendum possesses the 
characteristics of ’Overpoweringness’ (majestas), of ’energy’ or ’urgency’ and 
is viewed as the ’Wholly Other’or the ’mysterious’ which Otto describes thus: 
"The truly ’mysterious’ object is beyond our apprehension and 
comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable 
limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently ’wholly other’, 
whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before 
which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb".36
Closely related and yet distinct from awefulness is overpoweringness (or 
maiestas). Otto brings this into focus by discussing what he calls creature
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feeling. Here he sees Schleiermacher as coming close to the proper 
appreciation of this element by his emphasis on the feeling of dependence, 
but he treated the phrases too rationally, converting it into a speculative 
concept, instead of an ideogram. The correlate for Schleiermacher was 
causality, that is, God as causing and all conditioning, but Otto insists that in 
the first experience of the creature-feeling, the notion of divine causality does 
not enter it at all. The immediate feeling is not one of createdness or the fact 
of having been created as Schleiermacher thought. Instead, it is the feeling 
of creaturehood, of lowly status of creature feeling in this way. 
Overpoweringness therefore is the correlate of creature feeling taken as "the 
consciousness of the littleness of every creature in the face of that which is 
above all creatures".37
The next element is that of ’energy’ or ’urgency’. Otto recalls this with terms 
like vitality, passion, excitement, activity and impetus. Most of these terms are 
drawn from conative and emotional life. These examples could be seen also 
in the idea of the ’wrath of God’ and in the consuming flame of divine love, 
of which the mystics wrote. He writes; "In mysticism, too, this element of 
’energy’ is a very living and vigorous factor, at any rate in the ’volunataristic’ 
Mysticism, the Mysticism of love, where it is very forcibly seen in that 
’consuming fire’ of love whose burning strength the mystic can hardly bear, 
but begs that the heat that has scorched him may be mitigated, lest he be
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himself destroyed by it'1.38 The ’wrath of God’ or gods is an ideogram not 
only of the awefulness of the numinous but also of its over brimming energy 
and vitality, experienced as capricious, as ferocity that knows no bounds. 
Otto suggests that this aspect of the numinous experience is the origin of the 
idea of Lucifer and devilish attributions in all religions. Seen this way, it could 
be taken as mvsterium horendum or as that which is negatively numinous.
The next element to be discussed is the Mvsterium - the ’Wholly Other’ or the 
Mysterious "that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible 
and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ’canny’ 
and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and 
astonishment".39 According to Otto, the most fitting ideogram to express this 
state of mental reaction is stupor. "Stupor is plainly a different thing from 
tremor: it signifies blank wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, 
amazement absolute. Taken, indeed, in its purely natural sense, ’mvsterium’ 
would first mean merely a secret or a mystery in the sense of that which is 
alien to us, uncomprehended and unexplained; and so far ’mvsterium’ is in 
itself merely an ideogram".40 Religious fear is not simply natural fear taken or 
raised to the highest level, it is rather sui generis.
Otto calls the last element in the experience of the numinous the ’Dionysian 
element’. Whereas tremendum suggests the daunting and fearful side of the
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divine. Fascinans calls attention to a side of it which is alluring and joyful. 
If the moment of worship contained no more than the other experiences of 
the numinous already mentioned, we should be left with the picture of religion 
as an influence working to overawe, depress, intimidate and to debase the 
spirit of man. Its natural offsprings would have been magic and superstition. 
In worship however, there appears a paradoxical alliance with the impulse to 
approach the divine "the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and 
cast down, has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even 
to make it somehow his own. The ’mystery’ is for him not merely something 
to be wondered at but something that entrances him; and beside that in it 
which bewilders and confounds, he feels something that captivates and 
transports him with a strange ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of 
a dizzy intoxication".41 This is the major element in cultic acts in religion. As 
with the mvsterium. fascinans finds expression in a terminology which is 
negative in its conceptual significance and yet refers to an experience of an 
intensely positive sort. These experiences are so ’rapturous’ exuberant or 
’overabounding’ as to defy positive description. The specific quality of 
religious attainment of salvation, of atonement of identification exhibits once 
more the presence of non-rational factor. Salvation is something the natural 
man cannot understand because no manipulation of his vocabulary can bring 
him to the translation of it. The transports of the mystics or the converted 
man are as unintelligible to the secular man as the felicity of the lover to the
unromantic. "Every salvation is something whose meaning is often very little 
apparent, is even wholly obscure, to the ’natural’ man; on the contrary, so far 
as he understands it. he tends to find it highly tedious and uninteresting, 
sometimes downright distasteful and repugnant to his nature, as he would, 
for instance, find the beatific vision of God in our own doctrine of salvation, 
or the ’Hemosis’ of ’God all in all’ among the mystics".42 Otto perceives two 
values within the element of fascinans which he is careful to distinguish. The 
first is the subjective value of the numinous, that is the beatitude it promises 
or brings to man. The second is the objective value implicit in the fascinans. 
Otto thinks this can be designated by "August".43 The subjective value finds 
its most notable expression in the idea of salvation which Otto thinks lies at 
the root of religion everywhere. The element of fascinans and tremendum 
though they are opposed in one sense, they are nevertheless brought 
together in the actual experience of the numinous.
Mvsterium tremendum et fascinans. an object of boundless wonder repelling 
and yet attracting constitutes the "positive content of the ’mvsterium’ as it 
manifests itself in conscious feeling".44 For Otto attempts to describe these 
feelings in contrast to the mvsterium will be impossible and so the only option 
left is "by taking an analogy from a region belonging not to religion but to 
aesthetics".45 Otto contrasts sublime with the numinous to bring out what he 
means by analogy of feeling. "The analogies between the consciousness of
the sublime and the numinous may easily be grasped. To begin with, ’the 
sublime’, like ’the numinous’, is in Kantian language an idea or concept ’that 
cannot be unfolded’ or explicated (unauswickelbar). Certainly we can tabulate 
some general ’rational’ signs that uniformly recur as soon as we call an object 
sublime; as, for instance, that it must approach, or threaten to overpass, the 
bounds of our understanding by some ’dynamic’ or ’mathematic’ greatness, 
by potent manifestations of force or magnitude in spatial extent".46 Otto 
insists that though these things come to mind as soon as the word sublime 
is mentioned, they are only conditions of sublimity and not of the essence. 
He continues "A thing does not become sublime merely by being great. The 
concept itself remains unexplicated; it has something mysterious, and in this 
it is like that of ’the numinous’. A second point of resemblance, is that the 
sublime ’exhibits the same peculiar dual character as the numinous; it is at 
once daunting, and yet again singularity attracting, in its impress upon the 
mind. It humbles and at the same time exalts us, circumscribes and extends 
us beyond ourselves, on the one hand releasing in us a feeling analogous to 
fear, and on the other rejoicing us".47 Otto sees the idea of sublime as 
closely similar to that of the numinous and it is in the position to "excite it and 
be excited by it, while each tends to pass over into the other".48 The sublime 
can excite the feeling of the numinous and so can the numinous to the 
sublime. This according to him is in accordance with "a well-known and 
fundamental psychological law that ideas ’attract’ one another, and that one
will excite another and call into consciousness, if it resembles it. An entirely 
similar law holds good with regard to feelings".49 What holds good for the 
association of ideas also holds for the association of feelings. A feeling can 
arouse a similar one in the mind, "the presence of one in my consciousness 
may be the occasion for my entertaining the other at the same time. Further, 
just as in the case of the ideas the law of reproduction by similarity leads to 
a mistaken substitution of ideas, so that I come to entertain an idea x, when 
y would have been the appropriate one, so we may be led to a 
corresponding substitution of feelings, and I may react with a feeling x to an 
impression to which the feeling y would normally correspond. Finally, I can 
pass from one feeling to another by an imperceptibility gradual transition, the 
one feeling x dying away little by little, while the other, y excited together with 
it, increases and strengthens in a corresponding degree".50 Religious feelings 
have normally been considered side by side with other feelings. This however 
is not to say that religious feelings developed into other feelings or that other 
feelings have developed into religious feelings because in the case of the 
feelings concerned, what undergoes transition "is not the feeling itself. It is not 
the actual feeling gradually changes in quality or ’evolves’, that is transmutes 
into quite different one, but rather that J pass over or make the transition from 
one another as my circumstances change by the gradual degree of the one 
and the increase of the other".51 For Otto, a transition of actual feeling from 
one to the other is an impossibility. The equivalent of such a possibility is in
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the case of an alchemist producing gold from the transmutation of metals, this 
we know is impossible.
Having discovered by analysis the non rational element in religious 
experience, viewed by subjectively as emotion, and objectively as content of 
the religious consciousness, and having pronounced them a priori and sui 
generis springing from original root in the soul and constituting the very 
essence of the religious reaction, Otto goes on to show how the category of 
the numinous clothes itself in rational and moral forms. Although the 
numinous experience was originally distinct from and independent of the 
rational and the ethical, yet in the development of religion, an ever closer 
association is established between them. The category of the numinous 
spreads out, as it were, or grows into the more complex category of the 
’holy’ by taking into itself rational and ethical elements. This process of 
comprehension is described as a process of ’Schematization of categories’ 
much in the fashion of Kant. "Schematization means that there is an essential 
correspondence between rational and non rational element in the religious a 
priori, and that, since the non rational is the core of the religion, all religious 
doctrine can be seen as the result of an operation of the rational upon the 
non rational".52 In this way religion becomes moralized and human. Rational 
qualities are conferred on the numinous which appear as a corresponding 
enrichment of the religious emotions. Otto takes time to show how this
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rationalization and the moralizing of the numinous takes place.
"Accordingly we see religious feeling in permanent connection with other 
feelings which are cojoined to it in accordance with this principle of 
Association. It is indeed, more accurate to say ’cojoined’ than rally 
’connected’, for such mere conjunctions or chance connections according to 
laws of purely external analogy are to be distinguished from necessary 
connections according to the principles of true inward affinity and cohesion".53
The numinous as something sui generis, cannot from itself become moralized, 
nor can what has been pronounced non rational put on rationality. There is 
no logical evolution of one from the other, yet the connection takes place 
according to the principle of true inward affinity and cohesion already 
mentioned. Both the category of the numinous and the category of the moral 
obligation are a priori and sui generis. The one cannot derive from the other. 
Both spring from the spirit of man, but the become associated or cojoined in 
the course of history. At the same time, in developed religion, the numinous 
or the non rational element is never eclipsed by the rational and the moral. 
The former element’s continuous presence in the latter gives its specific 
character as an experience of reality. There is a relationship between the 
rational and the non rational in the idea of the holy or sacred but the relation 
is "just such a one of ’schematization’, and the non rational numinous fact
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schematized by the rational concepts we have suggested above, yields us the 
complex category of ’holy’ itself, richly charged and in its full meaning".54 
Otto likened the interpretation of the rational with the non rational to the ’warp 
and woof’ in a fabric. He made clear his point by using a "familiar case, in 
which a universal human feeling, that of personal affection, is simply 
interpenetrated by a likewise thoroughly non rational and separate element, 
namely, the sex instinct. It goes without saying that this latter lies just on the 
opposite side of ’reason’ to the numinous consciousness; for, while this is 
’above all reason’ the sex impulse is below it, an element in our instinctive life. 
’The numinous infuses the rational from above, ’the sexual’ presses up from 
beneath, quite wholesomely and normally out of the nature which the human 
being shares with the animal world, into the higher realm of the specifically 
’humane’".55 Otto further suggests another example of the interpenetration of 
the rational with the non rational. This is the ’erotic’ experience. Here the 
feeling is both non rational and ’supra-rational’.
Otto sees two processes in the development of religion. The numinous 
consciousness develops along its own inner non rational impulsion, "this 
element or ’moment’ passes itself through a process of development of its 
own, quite apart from the other processes - which begin at an early stage - 
by which it is ’rationalized’ and ’moralized’, ie. filled with rational and ethical 
meaning".56 Then "secondary and subsidiary to this, is the task of tracing the
112
course of the process of rationalization and moralization on the basis of the 
numinous consciousness".57 These two processes ’if not quite’ yet ’nearly’ 
synchronize and keep pace one with another. In so doing, the category of 
the holy is enriched by the non-rational and the rational, the numinous and 
the moral, the sacrosanct and the good, developing in harmony pari passu, 
as if by pre-established harmony. But the ’holy’ as the supreme religious 
category, must be regarded throughout as definitely a priori in character. 
What does Otto mean by a prior category? Here a quotation from Davidson 
clarifies. "Those categories of thought that appear to be universal and 
rationally necessary in the interpretation of human experience are taken by 
Kant to be a priori principles inherent in the structure of the mind itself."58 For 
Otto "an a priori religious category of meaning and value must be 
recognized, independent of, although comparable to the a priori rational and 
moral categories identified by Kant".59 From all that has been said, it can 
be seen that the holy in its fullest sense is for Otto; "a combined, complex, 
category, the combining elements being its rational and non-rational 
components. But in both - and the assertion must be strictly maintained 
against all Sensationalism and Naturalism - it is a purely priori category".60
Having said this, Otto goes on to discuss the recognition of this a priori 
religious category which is the ’holy’ in its appearance in the phenomenal 
world. For him the belief in reality beyond the senses and the experience of
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it are two different things. By the operation of the religious a priori, the divine 
can be apprehended in the depth of self. It can also be encountered in the 
phenomenal world. The religious a priori of the phenomenal world can be 
seen as a manifestation of the divine. This is because "Religion is convinced 
not only that the holy and the sacred is attested by the inward voice of 
conscience and the religious consciousness, the ’still, small voice’ of the Spirit 
in the heart, by feeling, pre-sentiment and longing, but also that it may be 
directly encountered in particular occurrences and events, self-revealed in 
persons and displayed in actions, in a word, that beside the inner revelation 
from the spirit there is an outward revelation of the divine".61
Otto describes the faculty by which the ’holy’ in its manifestation in the 
phenomenal world is ’cognized’ and ’recognized’ as the faculty of divination. 
It consists "in the fact that a man encounters an occurrence that is not 
’natural’, in the sense of being inexplicable by laws of nature. Since it has 
actually occurred, it must have had a cause; and, since it has no ’natural’ 
cause, it must (so it is said) have a supernatural one"62 Theology bears 
witness to this faculty or capacity of divination in "Testimonium Spiritus Sancti 
Internum, the inner witness of the Holy Spirit-limited, in the case of dogma, 
to the recognition of Scripture as ’Holy’".63 In divination Otto finds "a 
independent religious apprehension of deity - the culmination indeed of what 
autonomous recognition of transcendent meaning and value expressed
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immediately in the sense of the numinous and mediately in the categories of 
sanctity, sin and salvation".64 A typical example of divination in an 
unsurpassable form is found by Otto in "Isaiah’s moving representation of the 
sovereign might and awesome majesty of God"65
After his treatment of divination, Otto goes on to try the theory on the 
historical religions. A careful study will reveal if he was successful in the 
application of the theory or not but for now this is Otto’s view of the 
phenomenon of religion and treatment can be taken by us to be his 
phenomenology of religion.
Evaluation and Place in the Phenomenology of Religion
A full evaluation of the work of Otto is not easy to come by because of the 
popularity of the work. However as much as possible an attempt will be 
made to see to what extent the work has contributed to our search for the 
phenomenon of religion. An understanding of the contents and arguments 
of Otto in The Idea of the Holy is impossible without the understanding of the 
philosophical system taken over from Fries and expounded in The Philosophy 
of Religion.66 Perhaps it was the reductionist’s view of religion that was 
prevalent at that time that led Otto to seek for the core of religion that is not 
reducible to anything else. For this programme he found in the philosophy of
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Fries taken over from Kant, as an aid to make his point about the uniqueness 
of religion. It was thought by Otto, and vaguely by Fries, that this 
philosophical system can provide the basis of an account of religion in 
general. It was thought that all religions are the same due to the fact that the 
dogma of religion, of all religion ie. what in religion can be categorically 
known, reduce to the ideas and thus derive from reason which is common 
to all men. Otto’s philosophical position following Fries is that although we 
cannot say what God is except negatively by denying of him the attributes or 
the limitations of earthly life, we can in Ahnuna feel what he is. The 
philosophy of Fries as we know, is a development and a modification of the 
philosophy of Kant. In The Idea of the Holy. Otto does not present his or 
Fries’s philosophy of religion, which of course, is not phenomenology, but 
there is every indication that he relied on it. He tries to bring to the fore what 
he considers the core of religion. He begins his analysis by distinguishing the 
rational from the non rational aspects and the non rational aspects he calls 
the numinous whose experience is to be the core of religion. For him in the 
numinous experience there is the apprehension of the numinous object. Said 
in another way, wherever the category of the numinous is applied, there is 
always to be a numinous state of mind.67 This signifies the feeling of 
something objectively present - the experience of the numen praesens. It then 
follows that the experience of the numen praesens is a part of the 
phenomenology of experience. In The Idea of the Holy the ’holy’ is
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apprehended through the operation of an a priori category unique to that 
which is a source of cognition. Can one not see the hand of the idealist 
philosophy taken over from Fries here? For Fries the religion-aesthetic 
experience of Ahnuna gives us positive knowledge of the noumenal realm and 
its relation to the phenomenal world. For Otto religious experience gives a 
positive knowledge of the numinous and through the faculty of divination, its 
manifestation in the world. Here it can be seen that the numinous has the 
framework of Friesian metaphysics.
We are not going to delve into the problem of discussing the implications of 
whatever philosophy may have influenced Otto or why we think he chose to 
think the way he thought. Our main interest is in looking at the relevance of 
the work for our on going enquiry into the phenomenon of religion. "An 
accurate determination of just what constitutes the religious experience and 
what distinguishes religions from every other human interest is the main 
concern of all Otto’s work".68 In attributing to the numinous a unique quality 
otto has isolated religion. His separation of the ethical entirely from the 
religious is in danger of destroying the meaning of both the ethical and the 
religious. If the numinous is entirely non ethical then it follows that it cannot 
produce the feeling of unworthiness. It can only stunt man into abject fear 
and obedience. It may compel acquiescence it can never deserve it. It cannot 
serve as a basis for the development of those higher religions in which the
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holiness of God is saturated with the ethical meaning. In anticipation of these 
objections, Otto insists that in the expression such as Tu solus sanctus’ the 
object is not simply absolute might making in its claim and compelling their 
fulfilment, but a might that has at the same time the right to service and 
praise because it is in absolute sense worthy to be praised. Regarding the 
second objection, he has this to say, "In every highly-developed religion the 
appreciation of moral obligation and duty, ranking as a claim of the deity 
upon man, has been developed side by side with the religious feeling itself1.69 
He gave the example of the venerable religion of Moses as marking the 
beginning of a process by which the numinous is throughout rationalized and 
moralized, that is charged with ethical import until it becomes the holy in the 
fullest sense of the word. Whatever Otto has to say, one wonders if the 
answer to the anticipated objection solved the problem.
It is not debateable that "Otto’s analysis makes too violent a separation of 
religion from ethics, that the original datum of religion - call it the numinous 
or what you will - contains a moral element, that from the beginning one has 
to do with a nucleus from which religion and ethics in their specific form later 
develop".70 One cannot but agree with Charles Bennet in the above 
quotation. The separation after all cannot be distinct as Otto would want us 
to believe because "Since the numinous evidently implies some constraint, 
however mysterious, upon the conduct of the natural man, it is so far moral.
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Anything that enables a man to check or renounce his natural desires for the 
sake of some good only negatively known contains within itself the promise 
of moral development, for it brings with it at least the recognition that there 
are some things you cannot do".71 Having looked at the impossibility of the 
separation from the religious side, it can also be seen from the ethical side. 
Bennett continues, "Moral obligations contain an element of mystery which is 
of a piece with religious awe. It ceases to be a moral obligation if divested 
of that quality".72 An example is given with what happens in time of crises, 
where a man’s duty will require of him the sacrifice of his earthly goods. Here 
one finds the same phenomenon as that found in religion: "the 
acknowledgement of a claim of absolute value that is incommensurable with 
natural claim. Whether a man identify his duty with ’the good of his soul’ or 
with ’the will of God’ is a matter of indifference: the essence of the situation 
in either case is that no amount of natural happiness could compensate him 
for being false to soul or to God".73
Closely related to the separation of the numinous from the moral is the 
separation of the numinous from the rational. It follows that Otto did not 
remain faithful to his own earlier distinctions. In the development of his 
doctrine of the numinous consciousness he forgets the nature of the 
distinctions he made between the rational and the non rational. Instead of 
accepting it as an expression of two phases of one and the same experience,
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he persists in regarding the numinous as a specific experience per se 
occurring as it were in complete independence of all rational factors. It can 
be seen here that what Otto begins with as a mere overplus of meaning he 
later turns into an independent experience that could happen without 
reference to the rational. Just as religion was marked by a progressive 
infiltration of the moral, so also it is marked by a continuous interpenetration 
of the numinous by the rational. "The degree in which both rational and non 
rational element are jointly present, united in healthy and lovely harmony, 
affords a criterion to measure the relative rank of religions...".74 In 
disagreement with Otto here, it follows that the process by which religion is 
said to develop is one in which in the light of Otto’s analysis, cannot take 
place, for in the numinous, man is confronted by something mysterious and 
incomprehensible. "The absolute exceeds our power to comprehend; the 
mysterious wholly eludes it. The absolute is that which surpasses the limits 
of our understanding, not through its actual qualitative character, for that is 
familiar to us, but its formal character. The mysterious, on the other hand, is 
that which lies altogether outside what can be thought, and is, alike in form, 
quality, and essence, the utterly and ’wholly other’".75 Since this is the case, 
reason can only schematize in Kantian language, the elements of the 
mysterious. "’Revelation’ does not mean a mere passing over into the 
intelligible and comprehensible. For all the time all the elements of non 
rational ’inconceivability’ are retained on the side of the numinous and
intensified as the revelation proceeds".76 Following this account, the 
experience of the numinous as such would be a sort of interruption in the life 
of the mind. The instances of this interruption in the life of the mind. The 
instances of this interruption should then be looked for in miracles of prodigy. 
Surprisingly enough, Otto does not see miracle or prodigy as having religious 
significance. For Otto "genuine divination, in short, has nothing whatever to 
do with natural law and the relation of our lack of relation to it of something 
experienced. It is not concerned at all with the way in which a phenomenon - 
be it evident, or person, or thing - came into existence what it means, that is 
with its significance as a ’sign’ of the holy".77 It is not that the natural is 
invaded, but it is the invasion of the supra-natural of different value that 
evokes the holy. Religion cannot be an interruptive phenomenon in the 
phenomenal world for it that were the case, it would be difficult to explain why 
the mystics of religious men have always felt an urgent need to translate their 
experiences into conceptual terms.
The rational and the numinous cannot be as separate as such nor can the 
numinous be a mere interruption because as Bennett puts it, "...history of 
religion presents a record of intellectual construction in the form of theology 
and philosophy which cannot be dismissed as accident or meaningless 
accretion, and even the mystics who insist most on the ineffability of God 
have been remarkable for the vehemence and persistence with which they
121
have tried to express the inexpressible. The non-rational passes by some 
inherent necessity into the rational. Faith needs reason, reason to complete 
it as intuition needs concepts. The difference between them cannot be so 
radical as Otto would have us believe. Religious knowledge, if different from 
conceptual, must still be knowledge of a sort. The original datum of religion 
must be rational as well as supra rational. The discontinuity cannot be 
complete".78 One wonders if it is possible to get religious in isolation of an 
ethical. The necessity by which religion becomes moralized and rationalized 
is a symptom of the mind’s indivisible unity. Religion, ethics, science, 
philosophy - these are not separate compartments, they are phases in the life 
of the mind, phases that have their varying degree of purity and intensity, but 
in each case the whole mind is present. This however, is a point which Otto 
failed to emphasise. This might be because of what he primarily set out to 
do. His purpose was to differentiate religion from things that it has been 
confused with, and to exhibit it in isolation. In the concept of the numinous, 
he has found a stain to which religion is peculiarly sensitive.
The work of Otto in The Idea of the Holy has been seen by David Bastow as 
a work of a phenomenologist. "The most obvious way of taking The Idea of 
the Holy is a work of phenomenology - as a description in the very general 
terms of religious phenomena and their structure".79 Or again, "If Otto had 
just argued that religion was, or some religions were, true, his claims would
have been only theological interest. But what makes his writings especially 
important is that he looks at religion not merely as a theologian, but also a 
phenomenologist; he is concerned to explain religion and religions as they 
are; even to explain the diversity of religions (with a version of 
evolutionism)".80 He distinguished what he saw as the main theses in The 
Idea of the Holy which he graded into philosophical, phenomenological and 
theological theses. In trying to describe the various theses, he tried to bring 
out their main points. He saw Otto’s problem as having to grapple with type 
of judgement made in these disciplines. Other minor theses such as the 
philosophical - theology and philosophical phenomenology are also indicated. 
On philosophical thesis he said that this is indicated when "By means of a 
Critique of Reason on Kantian lines, Otto following Fries, claims that 
knowledge of absolute reality, with absolute value, is possible for man. 
Reflective conceptual but negative knowledge is possible - this Fries calls 
faith; but also positive knowledge is possible; this is by means of a kind of 
feeling, which Fries calls Ahnunq or intimation; it is non-conceptual, ineffable. 
These possibilities of knowledge are not merely inborn in all men, but are a 
consequence of their most essential nature".81 On the phenomenological 
theses "all religions are grounded on religious experience...This experience is 
basically similar in all religions, and is of a mvsterium Tremendum et 
Augustum".82 The third major thesis can be see in "so far as religious clearly 
base themselves on his experience, they are true; Christianity supremely so".83
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There is no need to go into details in this distinction, it suffices that David 
Bastow’s distinctions noted. From the analysis given by Bastow we can 
pinpoint the different thesis.
It follows that Otto is not and cannot be said to be primarily a 
phenomenologist. He combines the phenomenologist, philosopher and 
theologian. The need for full analysis of each discipline involved does not 
arise here but Otto himself did not aim at a phenomenological, philosophical 
or theological exposition, his aim was to save religion from the things it has 
been confused with and in doing things a lot has come into his work which 
he did not anticipate. In grounding his thesis in the final analysis in the 
Fresian metaphysics he can be said to have treated religion philosophically, 
phenomenologically by concluding that all religions are grounded in religious 
experience and that the experience is basically the same in all religions and 
that it is of a mvsterium tremendum fascinans et Auqustum. By basing the 
truth of religion according to their having their base in such an experience as 
he has described that is the experience of the numinous he is a theologian. 
Otto however tried to distance himself from phenomenology when he said 
"Here I do not find but I have been found, I do not seek but I have been 
sought after, I do not discover, but I become enlightened. Here, I stand 
farthest removed from phenomenology all phenomenology".84
Though Otto rejects the fact that he has something to do with 
phenomenology, one cannot say there are not phenomenological aspects in 
his work. These aspects have been stated above. While Otto rejected any 
account of religion which would explain it in terms other than the religious 
ones, he did not operate from criteria which were normative for any particular 
religious tradition. He did not assume the falsity of all religious data or the 
truth of any particular set of data as a ’methodological principle’. While one 
would argue that he does have a method of comparison, but that is based 
in their having a common basis which is the numinous experience without 
which whatever it does not pass for religion. It is clear that Otto saw himself 
as trying to make clear as much as possible the meaning of such data for the 
believers and practitioners at least with regard to their essentials. The 
description Otto has given to what he sees as the core of religion can aid the 
understanding of a large number of religious phenomena. But the substance 
of his description is welded to philosophical theory so that the truth and falsity 
of the theory will determine the truth and falsity of his arguments. However in 
so far as religion is concerned, it remains a classic. Husserl however, sees 
the work of Otto in The Idea of the Holy somehow as the beginning of 
phenomenology that eventually went wrong. In a letter to Otto on the 5th 
March 1919 he wrote "Das Heiliqe has impressed me greatly as hardly any 
other book has for years...It is the first a beginning for a phenomenology of 
religion...In word - I cannot sympathise with the philosophical theorising
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instead...The metaphysician (theologian) has, it seems to me, carried the 
phenomenologist Otto away on his wings...Be that as it may, this book will 
retain an abiding place in the history of genuine philosophy of religion, or 
rather of phenomenology of religion".85
We can see from every indication that Otto has attempted a 
phenomenological description of religious experience but it is dependent on 
certain philosophical presuppositions. The most important of these is that 
religion as a complex of rational and non rational elements arises from "a 
category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of the 
religion".86 Though the work of Otto was acclaimed as a beginning of the 
phenomenology of religion by Husserl his presuppositions prevent us from 
using his work as a basis for a phenomenology of religion.
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Brede Kristensen: The believer’s point of view as a prerequisite for the 
phenomenology of religion.
In our discussion of Rudolf otto’s The Idea of the Holy we saw what 
according to Husserl was the beginning of the Phenomenology of Religion 
that turned to something else in the end. We cannot blame Otto because 
from the start, he did not set out to do what we should call the 
Phenomenology of Religion. How then should we proceed? It would seem 
obvious that we should now turn to the work of scholars who regard 
themselves as working in the field of Phenomenology of Religion. The 
questions that should be uppermost in our minds are: how far have they 
solved the problem of the phenomenology of religion and how near is their 
solution to finding the direction for the phenomenology of religion. Is the work 
of Husserl or his successors decisive for them? How close is their method 
to his phenomenological method? We begin with Kristensen.
Born in 1867 at Kristiansand Norway, William Brede Kristensen received both 
his primary and secondary education in Kristiansand and in Oslo. In 1884, he 
enroled at the University of Oslo in the Faculty of Theology but transferred 
to the Faculty of Arts in 1885 where he studied Sanskrit, Hebrew, Egyptian, 
Babylonian, Avestan and Phoenician, with Lieblein. From 1890 to 1892, he 
studied in Leyden under C.P. Tiele, A. Kuenen and W. Pleyte. From 1892 to
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1894, he continued his studies of ancient languages in Paris under a famous 
Egyptologist G. Maspero. At the same time together with his friend Nathan 
Soderblom he continued his study of Avestan language. He spent a year in 
London working particularly in the British Museum. In 1896, he obtained his 
doctorate from the University of Oslo with a dissertation entitled "Aeavpternes 
Forestillinaer om livet doden i forbindelse med auderne Ra oa Osiris" 
(Egyptian Ideas about Life after Death in Connection with the Gods Re and 
Osiris). From 1897 to 1901, he was a lecturer at the University of Oslo in 
Avestan religion. In 1901, he was appointed to the chair of History of 
Religions in Leyden, where he succeeded his teacher C.P. Tiele. In 1913, he 
became naturalized as a Dutch subject. In 1916 he married Jacoba Heldring 
the daughter of a well known church minister in Amsterdam. In 1922 he 
delivered the Claus Petri lectures in Uppsala, leading to the publication of the 
book Livet fra doden (Life out of death). He retired in 1937. In 1946, he was 
a guest Professor at Oslo University. The lectures there resulted in a book 
Reliaionshistorisk Stadium, translated into Dutch by Mrs Kristensen under the 
title: Inleidinq tot de Godsdienstqeschiedenis (Introduction to the History of 
Religion). He died in 1953.87
Kristensen’s most famous book The Meaning of Religion was compiled 
posthumously from his lectures on Phenomenology of Religion.
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By the time Kristensen came to Leyden in 1901, he had already lost interest 
in the evolutionist explanation of religion. In that respect, he was not following 
his great teacher and predecessor C.P. Tiele. Tiele may be considered a 
pioneer of the ’Science of Religion’ and it is largely due to his activity and that 
the History of Religions became a recognised discipline in the theological 
faculties of his country. He was one of the first to offer a historical survey of 
a number of religions based on the study of source materials. In his general 
view of religions he stressed the evolution of the religious idea through 
historical forms of religion which represented different stages. Tiele looked for 
the law of this evolution, passing from nature religions to ethical religions. In 
his studies he combined a historical with a systematic interest.
In his studies of ancient historical religions of Egypt, Greece, Persia and 
Mesopotamia, Kristensen made an attempt to come to an understanding of 
the religious values which, in his view, were proper to the religion studied. He 
was opposed to the evolutionary views in the development of religion because 
as Kraemer puts it, he felt that "...phenomena had to be grasped in their own 
authentic significance and value. The genetic, evolutionist explanation and 
grading of Religions repelled him by their superficiality and artificiality. This 
approach to the mystery of Religion seemed to him a wasteful occupation 
about Religion, but not a serious entering into the reality of Religion".89 He 
preferred to study the texts apart from their time sequence, and to
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concentrate on their conceptual differences. In this he differs from his master.
What Kristensen had to say about the Phenomenology of Religion is set out 
in The Meaning of Religion. For him it "is the systematic treatment of History 
of Religion. That is to say, its task is to classify and group the numerous and 
widely divergent data in such a way that an overall view can be obtained of 
their religious content and the religious values they contain. This general view 
is not condensed History of Religion, but a systematic survey of the data".90 
For Kristensen, what is crucial to the phenomenological task, what sets it out 
apart from the ’older’ systematic and comparative studies is not the method 
of comparison but the way in which the interpreter undertakes the work. 
"Phenomenology does not try to compare religions with one another as large 
units, but it takes out of their historical setting the similar facts and 
phenomena which it encounters in different religions, brings them together 
and studies them in groups. The corresponding data, which are sometimes 
nearly identical, bring us almost automatically to comparative study. The 
purpose of such study is to become acquainted with the religious thought, 
idea or need which underlies the group of corresponding data. Its purpose 
is not to determine their greater or lesser religious value. Certainly, it tries to 
determine their religious value, but this is the value they have for the believers 
themselves, and this has never been relative, but is always absolute".91
If every religion takes itself to be absolute as it is the case, how would the 
phenomenologist get about describing them? Kristensen is of the view that 
for a phenomenologist to be worthy of his name, he has to take this claim by 
the believers of the absoluteness of their religion seriously: that is the key to 
understanding the believers as they understand themselves. For him 
phenomenology extracts data from religions, putting them together and 
studying them in groups with the aim of discovering the religious need that 
lies behind the data. In all religions there is a religious element or the religious 
need that gave rise to the expressions in particular concepts or notions; it is 
this common element that Kristensen sets out to investigate. It is never the 
case of evolution or what is true or false about religion. Though for 
Kristensen comparative studies are necessary for the understanding of 
religious data, or the phenomenon of religion, he considers such studies 
inadequate because the "result of comparative research, and of every kind of 
historical research, is likewise less than ideal; only approximate knowledge is 
possible".92 As Kristensen indicates, the comparative religion has existed 
since the later part of the 19th Century, but studies were characterized by an 
attitude seeking to determine the religious value of a phenomenon, that is 
which religions were ’lower; and which were higher. The phenomenological 
approach though employing the same method of enquiry, that is, historical 
comparison brought to this method, a particular attitude that definitely sets it 
apart from the branch of religious studies known as the ’Comparative
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Religion’. Whereas the ’Comparative Religion’ field defines itself by normative 
attitude which the various phenomena were compared on the basis of a 
previously established standard, the phenomenology of religion is descriptive 
and brings to the comparative work no value systems nor does it attempt to 
establish one from within the phenomena compared. This is to say that 
phenomenology according to Kirstensen should be free of evaluation. Is this 
freedom from evaluation completely devoid of values? Waardenburg states 
that "the only historical evaluation which Kristensen admits is an evaluation 
which uses the values of the people who are studied; moreover there is a 
’comparative history’, which uses a comparison which is not evaluative".93 It 
is taken for granted that behind each particular religious phenomenon, there 
is a fundamental religious view, which it shares generally and which is the key 
to the understanding of the particular religious phenomenon. The comparative 
method serves as an inference-method to clarify the unknown meaning of a 
phenomenon when the meaning of an analogous phenomenon is known. In 
the search for religious idea that is to say the common religious need that 
gave rise to the expression, "it is not important in which religion we find them. 
We must try then to see whether they do not clarify other cases where the 
religious meaning comes less clearly to light. Thus data from one religion 
can shed light on data from another because the meaning of the former 
happens to clearer than that of the latter".94
132
This can lead to the discovery of the religions idea or common view which 
would characterize groups of phenomena like altars, sacrifices, oracles. 
Giving an example with the phenomenon of sacrifice he says, "in any given 
religion perhaps only one particular conception of sacrifice is expressed. We 
wish to know more; what religious need has caused men, in all times and 
places, to present offerings to God? To learn this, we must study the 
category ’sacrifices’ in various religions; we must pay attention to that which 
in the actions and conceptions of the various peoples is common to the basic 
idea of sacrifice. Now to determine what is not so simple. It is certainly not 
to be sought in the outward traits which are held in common, in how the 
priests are clad and how rites are divided among them. It is the common 
meaning of the sacrificial acts that is important, and that we must try to 
understand".95
Kristensen’s view about the common ideas that gave rise to the different 
expressions is nearer to Schleiermacher’s definition. As Kramer puts it, 
"Kristensen, who rightly had a high regard for Schleiermacher’s power of 
religious intuition, was in fact the man who spelled out in concrete 
interpretations Schleiermacher’s famous definition of Religion as ’Anschauuna 
des Universums’".96 What then does Schleiermacher mean by seeing some 
aspects of history of religion as Anschauuna des Universums. Perhaps here 
Waardenburg again comes to our aid; "he means by Anschauuna the intuitive
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capacity to conceive of a spiritual reality, and by Universum something 
equalling God, to be contemplated in its ’phenomena’, whereby each 
phenomenon finds itself in an infinite connection ie. a connection with the 
infinite Universum1.97 It is suggested that the religious emotion is roused in 
man, when he is touched by the activity of the Universum and when he 
becomes fully aware or conscious of it. By proposing this Universum 
Schleiermacher "laid the foundation for a history of religions which come as 
near as possible to religious reality ie. ’the absolute belief of all believers’".98
Kristensen sees the phenomenologist or the historian of religion as someone 
who is aside from the religion he is studying or examining. The historian of 
religion, like the symbolist is interested in finding the hidden sense of the 
external facts by rediscovering the Anschauuna. the view of religious reality 
which lives in the heart of believers, in doing this, he aims at disclosing 
something of the infinity of the divine reality. It is a question of asking what 
religious needs led the believer to his actions in such matters as sacrifice, 
building places for worship such realities discovered in other believers or 
found in other traditions, whether the outward expression meant exactly the 
same thing or not is for Kristensen what phenomenology is all about. In this 
case, his phenomenology could rightly be called typological phenomenology 
of religion. His main aim is to understand the common needs that gave rise 
to what is expressed in different types of religious phenomena. It is like
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asking the believer what experiential religious needs gave rise to his actions 
as expressed in sacrifice, prayer. This is a phenomenological question.
Kristensen finds one way of gaining some understanding of the common 
basis in generalisation based on special investigations carried out by 
specialists in various fields of religion. However, the question of which 
phenomena are typical and which gives weight to the phenomenon remains 
a thorny issue.
For Kristensen, "That which is really essential is shown by philosophical 
investigations. Essence is a philosophical concept, and it is the chief task of 
Philosophy of Religion to formulate that essence".99 However, there should 
be a mutual working relationship between phenomenology and the philosophy 
of religion, "The principal ideas in Phenomenology are borrowed from 
Philosophy of Religion" and if that is the case, "Philosophy must furnish the 
guiding principles in the research of Phenomenology".100 Apart from the use 
of deduction in philosophy and comparative method in phenomenology, 
history which uses descriptive method is a third province of the science of 
religion. Phenomenology can be said to be between history and philosophy 
because of the interpenetration of the particular and the universal in 
phenomenology. This makes it at once a systematic History of Religion and 
applied Philosophy of Religion. Nevertheless, Kristensen continues, "A rational
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and systematic structure in the science of religion is impossible...We are 
certainly not confronted with a comparative science of religion (history- 
phenomenology-philosophy) systematically built up as a logical unity. The 
purely logical and rational does not indicate which way we must follow 
because in Phenomenology we are constantly working with presumptions and 
anticipations. But that is what makes our labour important. This study does 
not take place outside our personality. And the reverse will also prove to be 
the case: the study exerts an influence on our personality...There is an appeal 
made to the indefinable sympathy we must have for religious data which 
sometimes appear so alien to us. But this sympathy is unthinkable without 
an intimate acquaintance with the historical facts - thus again an interaction, 
this time between feeling and factual knowledge".101 For Kristensen, the 
scientist has to have "a feeling for religion".102 Ultimately, the task of the 
phenomenologist is not to analyze religion rationally, but to attempt to come 
close to the mind of the believer.
When Kristensen writes of the essence of religion, he has in mind something 
different from what is usually meant. The essence of religion, which he said 
should be determined by philosophy, is arrived at by determining the relation 
of religion as ’a religious reality’ to other spiritual realities, in order to arrive 
at a definition of what must be called religion’s distinctive nature. The basis 
of this is what he calls ’a feeling for religion’, by which this means "an
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awareness of what religion is, and this awareness is precisely what philosophy 
of Religion attempts to formulate".103 A researcher should not try to interpret 
religious views from his own narrow point of view for, "If the historian tries to 
understand the religious data from a different viewpoint than that of the 
believers, he negates the religious reality. For there is no religious reality 
other than the faith of the believers".104 For Kristensen "this believer’s 
viewpoint is feasible to a certain extent - but never completely - by means of 
a close study of material available to the phenomenologist".105
Kristensen sees Otto as right in his conception of the ’holy’ as a typical 
religious principle. He however disagrees with him in the expression of the 
numinous experience. Kristensen thinks that "The holy is an element sui 
generis and cannot be expressed in intellectual, ethical, or aesthetic terms".106 
This however is not to say that Kristensen doubts Otto’s important 
contributions to the study of religion. He sees Otto’s analysis of the concept 
of holiness though not original, as a major contribution. Kristensen thinks that 
by the analysis of the concept of holiness, Otto provided terms for the 
historians of religion. For him the studies are rather studies in the psychology 
of religion and because it is theoretical in nature, it belongs to the field of the 
philosophy of religion. Otto’s work is seen by him as having some fatal 
errors in its exposition because according to him "Otto the philosopher and 
systematic theologian does not see that on this basis no transition is possible
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to the historical understanding which he sets as his goal".107 He compares 
what he calls Otto’s mistake to those of Tiele and Pfleiderer but in the 
opposite direction. While Tiele and Pfleiderer tried to get the essence through 
the historical data, Otto on the other hand tried to get to the historical 
through the essence. Kristensen is of the view that "Like, Hegel, Otto believes 
that in the essence the germ of all phenomena is contained, that the 
phenomena have to be understood on the basis of the essence".108 He 
makes reference to the oak tree being present in the acorn but denies the 
connection of this with botany. "The analysis of the structure of acorns does 
not give us the slightest inking of the nature of the growing tree. It is simply 
an illusion to think that even a partial understanding of the developed 
organism can be gained from its germinal form. So too, it is an illusion to 
suppose that there can be a systematic development of the science of 
religion from the essence to the phenomena, or vice versa, whatever notion 
of religion is employed".109 In Otto Kristensen sees evidence of the 
evolutionary pattern being "forced upon the historical reality - for the sake of 
a certain conception of the ’germinal forms’ of the religious consciousness".110 
He thinks that Otto is wrong in thinking that history will prove his theory right. 
This is because, human history unlike the acorn and the oak tree does not 
have a regular growth. "Egyptian civilization and religion remained about the 
same for two thousand years and then disappeared. And how many thousand 
years has the culture of the primitive people remained at the same level?"111
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Kristensen however, believes that Otto took whatever stand he took in the bid 
to automatically bridge the gap between his position as a Christian theologian 
and a primitive idea of the divine. To every religious man, his faith is the 
point of departure and it is absolute. "If a cultured Parsi priest wished to 
present an overall view of the history of religion, he would undoubtedly say 
that his own religion was the crown of historical development. Such 
statements come, not from a historian, but from a theologian...The believer 
finds the validation of his faith in quite a different realm. This validation comes, 
not in comparative approach in which one’s own religion is thought to be the 
purified form of the religious heritage of mankind, but in the actual practice 
of religious life. Any believer will say that he owes the certainty of his faith to 
God. That is the religious reality".112
For Kristensen therefore, there is a presupposition which according to him is 
the believers viewpoint and not the ’holy’ as proposed by Otto. He 
nevertheless, admits that the ’holy’ is a part of it and an essential one at that, 
thus he suggests "We must put the questions differently than Otto does. We 
should not take the concept ’holiness’ as our starting point, asking, for 
example, how the numinous is revealed in natural phenomena. On the 
contrary, we should ask how the believer conceives the phenomena he calls 
’holy’. We do not need to make a particular application of the concept
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’holiness’ to any object for holiness is the most essential element in reality 
itself1.113
In Kristensen’s view, in dealing with the religion of the ’Ancients’ we must 
understand that our conceptions and perceptions of nature are different from 
theirs and in studying their religion, "it is their feelings and conceptions which 
we must try to understand".114 We must however be conscious of the fact 
that the believers were right and their religion should not be viewed as 
primitive as suggested or thought by Otto. In applying the viewpoint of the 
believer as the starting point of phenomenology, "all the theories about 
primitive, higher, and highest standpoints at once collapse".115 For Kristensen, 
by following the viewpoint of the believer, "we shall become acquainted with 
more and more different expressions of the holy, but we shall never arrive at 
a definition of the holy. It is indeed presupposed in historical and 
phenomenological study that holiness is also a reality for us, a reality sui 
generis. That is an a priori assumption in our research".116 The analysis of 
this a prior which is the holy as a religious category however, belongs to the 
philosophy of religion. That notwithstanding, "the historian who wishes to 
understand phenomena has a different attitude than the philosopher, who 
wants to understand the essence of a reality, and who tries to comprehend 
himself. It would be foolish to sacrifice one discipline to the other, or to deny 
the distinctive value of both".117 He sees Otto as trying to speak both as a
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historian and a philosopher and in the bid to satisfy the two disciplines he 
runs into problems. This is as much as we can say about Kristensen’s 
observations on Otto’s work.
A further understanding of Kristensen’s phenomenology will be clear if one 
examines the way he arranged religious phenomena in the Introduction to the 
Meaning of Religion. This involves two groups. The type represented by 
Christianity and classical antiquity and the ’Ancient type’...which the natives 
of antiquity represent and at least for the most part, those civilization that is 
alien to the Western way of thought.118 It is likely that the purpose of this 
grouping is to bring out the differences between the known and the unknown 
referring to present and old civilization. For him these groupings are of great 
importance to the phenomenology of religion, that is to say, to 
phenomenological studies. In this grouping "A difference comes to light which 
it is impossible to formulate".119 Kristensen thinks that by this way he could 
distinguish between two types of religious civilization, ancient and modern. 
Within these categories he groups religious phenomena around three themes, 
Cosmology, Anthropology and Cult.
He sees these groups of religious phenomena as expressions of the reality 
which differs in mode of expression. The different cultures, the different levels 
of development have this expression in a way intelligible to them. In that case
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the religious needs may remain the same but the expression may change. 
There could be a common religious need that gave rise to the concept of 
sacrifice but the concepts as such have meaning only for the believer. The 
believer is thus the ultimate determinant of that reality which the concept 
expresses. How could Kristensen’s treatment of this reality lead us to the 
underlying reality? That is the question that still remains unanswered, the key 
to the solution of the problem of Phenomenology of Religion.
Evaluation And Place in the Phenomenology of Religion
In evaluating the work of Kristensen as presented in The Meaning of Religion 
attention should be paid to the differences between what he proposes as the 
basis for the phenomenology of religion, and what other scholars are saying. 
In Otto the holy as an a prior category could be called the ground or the 
essence of religious experiences. In Kirstensen’s view however, the question 
of looking for the essence of religion does not arise, rather he thinks that 
phenomenology has to do with the common religious beliefs which led 
believers to express their feelings in concrete or institutionalized form. The 
capacity of the researcher to deal with this common basis is of utmost 
importance. It appears as if for him, the discovery that something sometimes 
was sacred made him search for what he calls the religious belief as the 
basis for it. In his work he is of the view that phenomenological research
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must not patronize or exclude certain religions. Whether he kept to this in his 
work or not is a matter which is debateable. However, as Kraemer puts it 
"Kristensen does not make extravagant claims for phenomenology, as if it can 
deliver all the goods we desire. He takes care to note that the 
phenomenological endeavour towards true understanding and adequate 
interpretation remains necessarily proximate, because we as detached 
observers always remain the sphere of ’imaginatively entering into’".120 On the 
question of the belief of the believers being the core of the phenomenological 
research in religion, one ought to be cautious. The question that now arises 
is this, do the different believers of the same religion or faith actually interpret 
their religious experience in the same way? It is obvious that every religion 
harbours varying conceptions. Our question now becomes, "to what extent 
can the scientist or the researcher get to them and analyse them".121 If 
religions cannot be compared, it means we can only attain an approximate 
knowledge of it. "The phenomenologist or the historian is always one 
removed from the religions he is examining; a scientist can only partly 
interpret the religion he is working with. One way of gaining some kind of 
understanding is by means of generalization based on special investigations, 
carried out by specialists in the various field of religion. But which religious 
data are typical? Which phenomenon gives ’weight’ to a certain religion? 
These matters are difficult to establish and, according to Kirstensen, they 
would not be of much help in a phenomenological study".122
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If the only point of view in the phenomenological research on religion is that 
of the believers, how then does the researcher go about describing it? Must 
one be one with the believers in order to do a meaningful research? Perhaps 
Kristensen’s view of the position of the researcher is nearer to what Ninian 
Smart had in mind when he said that "the Religionist requires to enter into 
engagement with those who carry on the Expression of the faith, though this 
does not entail that he is thereby chiefly concerned with Expression".123 How 
then is the researcher going to get at the heart of the problem if he is not 
concerned with the Expression and not one of the believers himself? How 
could he give an accurate representation of what the believers belief is? 
Ninian Smart here tries to indicate the possibility of such a position by giving 
an example. "I may not share the beliefs and values of Father Zossima in 
The Brothers Karamazov’, but I can (so to say) act his part. An important 
feature of human capacities is that we can use imagination and empathy as 
well as reasoning powers".124 His view then implies that one can gain some 
understanding of the belief of the believers of sufficient imagination. How 
does the researcher succeed in describing the viewpoint of the believers 
without evaluations and prejudice? Smart again seems to be on the side of 
Kristensen when he says "It is that we are not solely concerned with the 
beliefs (eg. in doctrine or myths); we are not solely concerned with the 
matters of truth, but also of value, feeling, ritual, etc. In phenomenological
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exploration it is not possible to confine the eooche (to use Husserl’s jargon) 
to suspend judgement as to the truth of what is being investigated. The 
bracketing must also be a bracketing of expressions of value, feeling, etc. 
This point can be brought out by considering the familiar linguistic device of 
oratio obliqua"125 That the believer expresses his belief does not make it true 
or false. However, "the project of bringing out what a situation is like is 
important in trying to convey the content of religious perception and religious 
practice. This does not commit oneself to that content or to those feelings 
(just as the novelist and biographer brings out feelings of character with 
whom they identify, a self-critical sympathy being however, some advantage). 
Thus religious phenomenology requires not merely the oratio obliqua of 
beliefs that, but a bracketing of all that is being presented. This presentation, 
however, within brackets, uses many of the elements of Expression, not just 
doctrinal statements. Thus an important part of description is what may be 
called ’bracketed Expression’."126
At first glance, Kristensen’s phenomenological study appears to verge on 
regional phenomenology of religion. However, it is doubtful if this is the case. 
In his discussion he excludes primitive religion thereby breaking his own rules 
but he however, makes occasional reference to them.127 This is in some way 
seen as inconsistency for it will result in the superficial treatment and mis­
interpretation of the elements from the field of primitive religion. A
characteristic trait of the work is that he is only concerned about historical 
religions in the past. The fundamental idea of his phenomenological research 
is that the scientist as said elsewhere in this work must start with the 
experience of the believer. Even if this is true, it gives rise to the problem 
formulated by Eric Sharpe as follows: "what then is left for the
phenomenologist of religion, other than tamely to acknowledge that ’the 
believer’ is always right - even though the believer on an occasion appears 
to have been disastrously wrong".128 The essence of Kristensen’s viewpoint 
is the striving to protect the integrity of the confessors of a certain faith 
against the "unintentional distortions of scholars who, while not unfriendly, had 
never learn to understand".129 But one can see that the problem facing the 
researcher here is that he can never attain integrated objective knowledge 
and gain complete understanding of a ’foreign’ religion. It is by means of 
comparison that Kirstensen arrives at his typology ’ancient and modern’, but 
do religions not become incomparable when seen from this viewpoint?
It cannot be doubted that the work of Kristensen has something to offer to 
phenomenology of religion. It can be noted that Kristensen does not aim at 
the essence of religion as do other phenomenologists. For him that is not 
even to be considered. However, Kraemer thinks that Kristensen’s 
"phenomenological approach leaves the mind with an indelible impression of 
the seriousness and relevance of Religion, but it offers no way to uncover and
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tackle such a disturbing problem as that of the perennial ambiguity of 
Religion".130
That notwithstanding, in not explaining religion away he is in line with the 
phenomenologist. His apparent neutrality is another point that places him in 
the tradition of the phenomenologists. The title of the work "studies in 
phenomenology of religion" seems vague. In one sense it could be called a 
typological phenomenology of religion. This is correct in so far as what it is 
trying to treat is the common religious needs that gave rise to the expressions 
in, for example, sacrifice and cults. It could have been a typological 
phenomenology of sociology if it had tried to trace the common sociological 
needs that gave rise to the same acts. It does not answer the question of 
what constitutes a religious phenomenon nor do we know what differentiates 
the religious phenomenon from other phenomena. Kirstensen’s contribution 
however, is that religious sentiments or feelings should not be dismissed as 
a meaningless accretion of individual believers or be dismissed as illusions as 
some have done.
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Garadus van der Leeuw: Religion as Power
Having discussed the works of Rudolf Otto and Brede Kristensen, our 
attention now turns to the works of Geradus van der Leeuw whose work is 
highly regarded in the area of Phenomenology of Religion. Our line of inquiry 
will follow those of the two scholars already mentioned.
Born in the Hague, Holland, in 1890, Gerardus van der Leeuw received his 
primary and secondary education there. In 1908 he enrolled in the Faculty 
of Theology of the University of Leyden where he studied History of Religions 
with W.B. Kristensen and Egyptian with P.A.A. Boeser. He finished his studies 
in 1913 and continued to study a semester in Gottingen and a semester in 
Berlin where he worked with K. Sethe and A. Erman. In 1916, van der Leeuw 
obtained the Th.D. degree at the University of Leyden with a Dissertation on 
Representation of the Gods in the Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts.
From 1916-1918 he was a Minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, and in 
1918, he was appointed to Chair of the History of Religions, the Theological 
Encyclopedia’ and Egyptology at the University of Groningen. In his student 
days, apart from religion, philosophy and related subjects, he studied music, 
painting, literature and poetry.
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From 1945-46, he was the Minister of Education, Art, and Science for the 
Netherlands. In 1950, he presided over the International Congress of the 
History of Religions held in Amsterdam and became the first President of the 
International Association for the History of Religions. He died in Utrecht in 
1950. van der Leeuw wrote several books and articles including Religion in 
Essence and Manifestation, a study on the Phenomenology of Religion (1938), 
Virainibus Puerisaue. a study of the service of children in worship in ancient 
Rome (1939), and Sacred and Profane Beauty, the holy in Art.131
What van der Leeuw regards as the Phenomenology of Religion is spelt out 
in his Phanomenoloqie der Religion.132 At the beginning of this work he goes 
straight to discussing what has been called the object of religion. He says 
that what the sciences concerned with religion have described as the object 
of religion, is itself for religion the centre of activity. For the religious man, 
what religion deals with is life and reflection on the activity is, in a way, an 
afterthought. It is only when he reflects that he sees this experience as an 
object.
For van der Leeuw, mere mention of the Object of religious experience 
suggests a ’Somewhat’ and this ’somewhat’ is something ’Other’. An 
encounter with this something other which is a religious experience makes it 
dawn on us that "the first affirmation we can make about the Object of
Religion is that it is a highly exceptional and extremely impressive ’other’".133 
Man’s subjective reaction to this encounter is that of amazement. For man 
there arises an experience that is connected to the ’Other’ which seems to 
push itself forward. These experiences seem to be obstructions and the 
question of theories or generalization does not arise at this stage. This 
’somewhat’ which is the object of religion is seen as something that is a 
departure from, the familiar things because it tends to generate power. This 
is to say that at this stage belief is empirical. On this account whenever 
reference is made to the religious experience of the primitives we must 
"accustom ourselves to interpret the supernatural element in the conception 
of God by the simple notion of an ’Other’, of something foreign and highly 
unusual, and at the same time the consciousness of absolute dependence, 
so well known to ourselves, by an indefinite and generalised feeling of 
remoteness".134
van der Leeuw refers to a letter by R.H. Codrington in which the word mana 
was mentioned for the first time. Codrington in both his letter and book 
defines mana as a sort of supernatural power that inheres in physical objects 
though the power itself is not physical. In this view mana can inhere in 
anything and anything can convey it. This power is verified empirically and 
people talk of mana when something is effective, striking, overpowering and 
whatever that can be said to be beyond ordinary comprehension and it
cannot be if it does not command all that has been mentioned, van der 
Leeuw also refers to the South Sea islands where mana has always meant 
Power; however, "the islanders include this term, together with its derivates 
and compounds, such various substantial, adjectival and verbal ideas as 
Influence, Strength, Fame, Majesty, Intelligence, Authority, Deity, Capability, 
extraordinary Power; whatever is successful, strong, plenteous: to reverence, 
be capable, to adore and to prophesy".135 van der Leeuw takes time to 
indicate that our sense of the supernatural cannot be intended here by the 
islanders. He mentions Lehmann’s reproach of Codrington for mentioning the 
supernatural at all. On the other hand he criticises Lehmann for setting up 
what he calls "false antithesis between the ideas of ’the supernormal’ and ’the 
amazing’ on the one hand, on the other the primitive ideas of ’the powerful’ 
and ’the mighty’ in general".136 For van der Leeuw, the primitive mind does 
not distinguish between magical power and others. He does not want the 
idea of mana to be thought of as emanating from the supernatural. To make 
the point clear, he goes on to say that a lot of things are attributed to mana. 
The creative act of God becomes the work of the divine mana. There is the 
talk of the mana of the king. Apart from the mana. there were other 
discoveries of similar terms in other parts of the world. The orenda of the 
Iroquois, the wakanda of the Sioux Indians, the Manitu of the Algonquins of 
North-West America, the petara of the Dyaks of Borneo which is something 
as well as someone, and the hasina of the people of Madagascar. In all
these, Power is seen as the basis of all that is religious, not only religious but 
sometimes what we will in the present day call areligious. In addition to the 
examples mentioned, van der Leeuw goes on to say something about 
Europeans, to show how universal power is the basis of religion or belief. 
"Among the ancient Germans, too, the idea of Power was dominant. The 
power of life, luck (Hamingja), was a quantitative potency. Men fought by 
inciting their luck against somebody (Old Nordic: etia haminaiu). and were 
defeated because they possessed too little ’luck’. The Swedish peasant 
senses ’power’ in bread, in the horse, etc., while Nordic folklore the woman 
whose child has been stolen by a troll is unable to pursue her because she 
’has been robbed of her power’".137 Apart from objects or things, van der 
Leeuw talks of power emanating from certain persons who were supposed 
to possess them. He gives an example with the Arabian baraka which is 
supposed to be an emanation from holy men and is connected with their 
graves. One acquires this by pilgrimage and it is an effective cure for 
maladies. It is therefore no wonder that "to be cured of some disease a 
king’s wife seeks the baraka of a saint".138 Whether a name is assigned to 
power or not, the basis of religion has always been power and for the 
primitives, the power in the Universe is an impersonal power.
For van der Leeuw, the primitive mind does not make any distinctions 
between the organic and inorganic nature. His concern is not with life which
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for him was self-explanatory but with power as manifested in one event or the 
other. Whatever appears strange becomes an object of power and it is on 
this ground that "Winnebago (Sioux) offers tobacco to any unusual object 
because it is a wakan".139 From the earliest of times the idea has had priority 
over any other conception. It can be seen from what van der Leeuw has 
been saying that whenever power is considered as a basis of any religious 
action, it is not in abstract. It is thought of "only when it manifests itself in 
some very striking way; with what confers efficiency on objects and persons 
in ordinary circumstances, on the other hand, man does not concern 
himself'.140 When in other cultural conditions this power is incorporated, it will 
no longer be power as it appears in individual objects rather it "expands and 
deepens into the concept of a Universal power".141 The religious man 
encounters this power and his reaction to this encounter with power be it the 
Universal one is that of amazement (scheu) and in extreme case fear. One 
can see a similarity here to the mvsterium tremendum of the numinous 
experience in Otto’s description of the ’holy’ as a ground for religion. Though 
van der Leeuw criticised Otto’s understanding of the ’holy’ his use of the 
terms used by Otto has not been explained. More will be said about this later.
Power in the nature that is being described by van der Leeuw, that is, the 
Universal Power can manifest itself in particular objects, material or immaterial. 
The specific instances of power give rise to different functions in different
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objects. It is on this basis that a certain "Esthonian peasant remains poor, 
while his neighbour grows steadily richer. One night he meets his neighbour’s 
’luck’ engaged in sowing rye in the fields. Thereupon he wakes his own 
’luck’, who is sleeping besides a large stone; but it refuses to sow for him 
because it is not a farmer’s ’luck’ at all, but a merchant’s; so he himself 
becomes a merchant and gains wealth".142
These specific instances of power according to van der Leeuw is responsible 
for the stratifications in Indian community. There is the power for royalty, that 
for craft and for all that man needs to do. In the case of the Christian Church 
this is the power that is conferred by ordination. Because power can be 
found everywhere and anywhere, there arises the problem of the universality 
of power which is now postulated and affirmed. By this universality of power, 
van der Leeuw sees a type of monism that is concealed in the thought of the 
primitives. Power here becomes a universal energy in this case either 
psychologically in a direct application to humanity, or cosmologically. Power 
in the first instance becomes a soul and in the second it assumes the form 
of divinity activating the Universe.
van der Leeuw sees his theoretical consideration as something that was alien 
to the ancient world. As this approaches the partially developed culture, the 
"changes and process of the Universe are then no longer accidental and
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arbitrary effects of distinct powers that emerge at each event disappear again; 
they are rather the manifestation of a unitary World-order; appearing in 
conformity to the rules, and indeed to the laws".143
For van der Leeuw, the ancients were familiar with a World-course that is a 
living power active in the Universe. These resulted in divinities in various 
parts of the ancient world. We talk of "Tao in China, Rta in India, Asha in 
Iran, Ma’at among the ancient Egyptians, Dike in Greece; these are such 
ordered systems which theoretically, indeed, constitute the all-inclusive 
calculus of the Universe, but which nevertheless, as living and impersonal 
powers, possess mana-like character".144
Having finished with the description of power as it touches the cosmological 
aspect, which in the last analysis results in the existence of divinity, van der 
Leeuw goes on to discuss what he sees as the psychological significance. 
"The power that operates within man then becomes regarded as his ’soul’, 
in the sense familiar to ourselves, but as a particular power though 
nevertheless it is superior to him".145 The concept of the soul according to 
van der Leeuw is not a primitive concept. Before "Moira became the Power 
of Destiny it was already the personal lot of man, and this it still remains even 
today among modern Greeks as Mira. The Germanic haminaia. again was 
not the soul, but the power ruling in and over a man".146
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From this it is clear that for the primitives what the present day man will call 
soul, he regards as power inherent in man though superior to him. "Power 
can be bound up with all sorts of material or corporal objects; it is this state 
of affairs that has led to the designation of ’soul-stuff’. From the soul as such, 
however, all these ideas were distinguished by the power being impersonal, 
while one might have a greater or smaller quantity of it, and could either lose 
it or acquire it; in terms, it was independent of man and superior to him".147 
Whatever man does, the idea of power has an overriding place whether this 
is bound in objects or otherwise.
Van der Leeuw goes on to give an example of the transformation of power 
within the Greek Christian world. In this case, the idea of power was 
transformed into a single Power by means of the concept of pneuma. van 
der Leeuw gives several examples of the use of the pneuma in both the New 
Testament and other philosophical movements like the Stoics and the 
Gnostics. Particularly in the New Testament pneuma is seen as being 
transmitted almost like a fluid, like the other psychological powers, charis. 
dvnamis and doxa. They are supposed to flow from God to man and the 
divine Charis is imparted by means of blessing and in some cases the 
imposition of hands. For van der Leeuw, at times the thoughts, deeds and 
principles of men can become represented as a store of power. A typical 
example is the idea of thesaurus in which cumulative deeds are seen as
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constituting a power that is effective in favour of the doer, not only the doer 
but also of another person. It is on this account that the treasury of grace 
that is said to be accumulated by Christ and the saints is effective in favour 
of the Church.
Apart from the manifestation of power in specific forms already described, 
van der Leeuw sees our modern way of describing things as dead objects 
as alien to the primitive mind. To them, everything can be a bearer of power 
and even if there is no evidence of any influence, it suffices that one regards 
such objects as such and the potency is not doubted. Van der Leeuw gives 
two examples of a negro and a Ewe tribesman, "An African negro steps on 
a stone and cries out: ’Ha are you there?’ and takes it with him to bring him 
luck. The stone, as it were gives a hint that it is powerful. Again: an Ewe 
tribesman in West Africa enters the bush and finds a lump of iron there; 
returning home, he falls ill, and the priest explain that a tro (a divine being) 
is manifesting its potency in the iron, which in future should be 
worshipped".148 This idea of power residing in everything and anything gives 
rise to ’Fetishism’, a term originally used by the Portuguese when referring to 
the customs and beliefs of the negros. It was originally applied to potent 
things made by man himself and not a natural thing. This view, however, 
widened to include the worship of nature, and in this case, power becomes 
formless. However, to the primitive mind it does not matter whether they are
objects made by him or natural objects, for he venerates what he himself has 
made, provided it is effective just as he would venerate what nature has given 
to him when it manifests power. Any peculiarity in natural objects like the odd 
shape of a stone, the shape of a shell, becomes a pointer to the existence 
of power. Another quality which the power carrier should have is portability, 
that is to say that the power bearer must be such that one can easily carry 
it or pocket it without much fuss, "it is just this feeling of being able to carry 
the sacred power with one that is characteristic of fetishism".149 Van der 
Leeuw gives an example of fetishism as the Australian churinaa which is a 
piece of wood shaped in a peculiar way in which the outline of a totem 
emblem is scratched. The churinaa is seen as the bearer of the power which 
is connected on the one hand to the individual and on the other hand to the 
totem. Comparing churinaa with the Ark of the Convenant, he says "...the 
power of the Ark of the Covenant sprang from Jahveh, a God, that of the 
churinaa from a totem; and the potent influence of the fetish, naturally is very 
often simply presupposed quite apart from any kind of attitude to spirits or 
Gods being implied - purely dynamically therefore".150 Having said all this van 
der Leeuw sees the transition from fetishism to idols as understandable. The 
problem that seems to arise from fetishism is the fact that here the power 
comes from is still unknown. He goes on to describe the heaps of stone 
found in different parts of the world and how such collections became the 
origin of divinity. Van der Leeuw distinguishes fetishes from amulets which
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are certainly containers of power, and pocket size "Stones and almost every 
imaginable thing were carried on the body as amulets to ward off danger and 
attract blessings. Like fetishes these too can acquire their influence from some 
holy person or situation; but then they are preferably called relics".151
For van der Leeuw, the experience of the power of things may occur 
anywhere and at anytime. Powerfulness reveals itself in an unexpected 
manner and so one cannot be sure of how and when it will make itself 
manifest: every moment and everything should be an instant of expectation 
for this "the place, the action, the person in which power reveals itself receive 
a specific character".152 Those who have these gifts of power are 
distinguished from those who have not and the places that manifest this 
power are different from other places. They are in other words called tabu 
(tapu). Tabu is said to be from the same cultural domain as mana. For van 
der Leeuw, it "indicates ’what is expressly named’, ’exceptional’, while the 
verb tapui means ’to make holy’. Tabu is thus a sort of warning: ’Danger 
High Voltage’ Power has been stored up, and we must be on our guard".153 
Tabu can be said to be the verified condition of being charged with power 
and man’s reaction should be that of keeping his distance to avoid a clash 
with the power.
Certain actions are avoided at certain times and places because of the
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sacredness of the time or place. Persons and things can also be tabu 
because of the power emanating from them. The sacred time is different 
from every other time, the sacred place is different from every other place. 
These can be seen as an intervention on ordinary order of times and places. 
If the tabu is violated, the result is not punishment as such but automatic 
reaction of power which at times to ordinary mind look irrational. Van der 
Leeuw gives an example of such violation of tabu from the Bible, when Uzzah 
with good intentions wanted to support the ark of Covenant but was struck 
dead. ’And when they came to the threshing floor of Nacon, Uzzah put out 
his hand to the ark of God and took hold of it, for the oxen stumbled. And 
the anger of the Lord was kindled against Uzzah; and God smote him there 
because he put forth his hand to the ark; and he died beside the ark of God’ 
(2 Samuel 6:7-8). He goes on to give several other examples of the violation 
of tabu.
Van der Leeuw sees the distance between the potent and the powerlessness 
as the distance between the sacred and the profane, or the secular. The 
sacred is as that which has been placed within the boundaries and the power 
it emanates secures for it its place and whoever encounters this unique power 
"Clearly realizes that he is in the presence of some quality with which in his 
previous experience he was never familiar, and which cannot be evoked from 
something else but which, sui generis and sui juris, can be designated only
be religious terms such as ’sacred’ and ’numinous’".154
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Man’s reaction to these is both avoidance and a seeking. Here one can see 
that van der Leeuw is using a term by Otto as if it is self-explanatory. While 
Otto tries to explain his use of the numinous, van der Leeuw does so without 
explanation. In Otto the numinous experience is sui generis and man’s 
reaction is that of mvsterium tremendum et fascinans. For van der Leeuw, "in 
the human soul, Power awakens a profound feeling of awe which manifests 
itself both as fear and as being attracted. There is no religion whatever 
without terror, but equally none without love, or that nuance of being attracted 
which corresponds to the prevailing ethical level."155 One can see van der 
Leeuw saying here that really this is the essence of religion since the thinks 
this is true of all religion. Having said this he goes on to say that the 
expression of this fear must be adopted in such a way that it reflects the 
attitude of the whole person and in countless situations. He counts physical 
shuddering, ghostly horror, fear, terror, reverence, humility, adoration, 
profound apprehension, enthusiasm as lying in the realm within the awe 
expressed in the presence of Power. A look at the above list shows two 
main tendencies: the tendency to move away from Power and the other to 
move towards it. It is on this ground that he talks of the ’ambivalent nature 
of awe’. Power as such is seen as something ’Wholly Other’ and our conduct 
in the face of such ’Wholly Other’ according to van der Leeuw is always
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ambivalent. There is love, there is hate. There is flight, there is attraction. 
Whether the sacred as such releases feelings of hate and fear or those of 
love and reverence, the obligation on the part of man is that of response. In 
his encounter with Power which is experienced as different from nature, man 
apprehends its demand. There is an irruption in his life which leaves him 
seized with dread and yet this is a loving dread.
For van der Leeuw then, it is this awe which develops into observance. He 
traces this to the Roman concept of religo which according to him originally 
signified tabu. To emphasise his point, he goes on to quote a passage in 
Virgil in which an eerie place is described as follows: "the prinal awe still 
glimmers: the sacred grove of the capitol has a ’dread awe’ (religio dira)".156 
He also mentions how the ancient idea of shudder still remains in customs 
of some people. In these customs death is seen as a portentum which is "a 
sign of potency that enters in reliqionem populo. as we shall say, ’renders the 
people impure’. It was, then, preferable to put up with a ceremonial repetition 
of the consular election, rather than permit a tabu to remain in force over the 
people"157. Van der Leeuw gives other examples where tabu, the 
’separatedness’. means both pure and polluted. He quotes Masurius Sabinus 
who defines reliqiosum as that which is withdrawn from us because of its 
sacred quality. For van der Leeuw, constant regard to that which is sacred 
is the chief element in the relationship between man and all that is
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extraordinary. He thinks that the most probable derivation of religion is from 
releaere which means to pay attention, perhaps in his own case, it is to pay 
attention to the tabu. In this case he sees homo reliaiousus as an antithesis 
of homo nealiaens.
For van der Leeuw, tabu leads to a man’s response in awe. It is this awe 
which results in observance. He disagrees with Freud who thinks that man’s 
religious purposes are governed by transmittable tabus. Rather, he thinks that 
for observance to be real observance that element of aweful potency must 
have been subsistent. He gives examples with customs, ceremonials both of 
courts and universities. It is to distinguish here between observance and 
religious observance as implied in van der Leeuw’s work. The implication in 
his thought on tabu, and observance, is that a religious act if it is to be a 
religious act has to be an observance out of fear and love, intended to deter 
and to attract Power. Power is his though therefore, becomes the 
phenomenon which in history158 gave rise to religion and its institutionalization. 
Perhaps this is why the title of the book Phanomenoloqie der Religion is 
translated Religion in Essence and Manifestation in English instead of simply 
Phenomenology of Religion. Van der Leeuw’s phenomenology of religion or 
what he understands as the phenomenology of religion is spelt out here.
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Evaluation and Place in the Phenomenology of Religion
It is obvious from van der Leeuw’s treatment of religion that he has a 
preconceived notion which places Power as the basis of religion. It looks as 
if to him Power is the essence of religion.
Religion in Essence and Manifestation suggests a continuation of a previous 
work; it seems to begin without sufficient introduction. He assumes that his 
readers must have been familiar with the terms he uses. Van der Leeuw 
identifies the element of Power in religion. This power seems widespread in 
primitive society, and pre-dates all interpretations came to be known, this 
element has been there. He however, does not give reasons for the 
existence of this power. In the introduction, he delves into the object of 
religion, saying that it is a highly exceptional and extremely impressive ’Other’. 
There is a similarity between this and Otto’s ’wholly Other’. He however does 
not offer any explanation as Otto did on the use of the ’Wholly Other’. He has 
not attempted to close the gap between Power in primitive cultures which is 
not seen as something other and the theistic conception of power. In 
discussing the letter of Codrington, van der Leeuw sees the modern man’s 
alienation from religion as arising from the failure to understand this Power 
which should be within the knowledge of everyone.
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His treatment of power helps him to see the survival of primitive experience 
which continues in the modern world. Examples could be given from 
fetishism, attitudes to certain animals and birds, and the carrying of mascot 
for good luck. Although these things no longer make sense, in the way in 
which it made originally, their survival may be attributed to their power or 
potency. Van der Leeuw gives several examples from a wide range of 
cultures and phenomena. Although he attempts to search for the essence 
of religion, which Kristensen would disagree with, nevertheless, there is a 
similarity with Kristensen in the fact of the cognizance of the believers.
In presenting power as the essence of religion, van der Leeuw has 
presupposed that which the phenomenology properly speaking will be said 
to be unsatisfactory. The task of phenomenology is to go beyond the 
successive stages of objectification so as to identify that which is never 
completely objectified. By presenting power as the essence of religion, he 
has only succeeded in presenting us with yet another manifestation of the 
essence of religion. In trying to evoke for the modern man the experience 
of the primitives which they no longer themselves experience on account of 
several objectifications, there is some similarity with Otto who assumes that 
although the numinous experience may seem to elude modern man, given the 
right circumstances and dispositions, it could be evoked for him, perhaps 
through analogous experience. Is it any surprise that J.B. Bettis says of van
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der Leeuw’s work that it "might be considered an essay in the 
phenomenology of power"159.
In the modern world, power is experience in many ways, examples of which 
are; political power, automotive power, the power of electricity and many other 
experiences of power. Van der Leeuw however does not explain why power 
as it was experienced by the primitives have eluded the modern man. Could 
the answer be found in man surrounding himself with so many artificialities? 
Were the primitives more open to nature? Van der Leeuw’s inability to explain 
this could be compared to Otto’s inability to explain why modern man is less 
likely to recognise the experience of the holy. The power that surrounds 
modern man makes it imperative for one to ask van der leeuw to explain or 
define the type of power that is not experienced by the modern man. One 
expects van der Leeuw to give guidelines on how to distinguish this power 
that he has been describing from power in general. Although he uses such 
terms as ’other’, sacred, awesome, fetish, tabu as if it indicate what type of 
power he means, these are taken together, the tendency is for one to see 
them not as aspects of power but power is seen as an aspect of a more 
fundamental experience. This is a weakness of van der leeuw’s 
phenomenology.
The category ’sacred’ which is a phenomenological category is an important
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one as such and as such is introduced by van der Leeuw in his description 
of the Melanesian mana. When he says "there is no antithesis whatever 
between secular acts and sacred"160, he does not explain what he means by 
sacred. The ’sacred’ soon becomes part of the definition of power which is 
in itself undefined. Although he goes on to say that the attitude of power is 
not regarded as supernatural, but it is something extraordinary, a sort of in 
its own class, he goes on to say "objects and persons endowed with this 
potency have that essential nature of their own which we call ’sacred’". Here 
one sees a marriage of two undefined terms. One wonders if it is right to 
bring in the sacred to clarify power, for the sacred is one of those words 
that is beset by assumptions. We may rather ask if a particular experience 
of power might be seen as an aspect of the sacred.
In his discussion of tabu he distinguishes the sacred and the profane thus: 
"We can characterise the distance between the potent and the relatively 
powerless as the relationship between sacred and profane, or secular. The 
’sacred’ is what has been placed within boundaries, the exceptional (Latin 
sanctus): its powerfulness creates for it a place of its own"161. As we shall 
see, it is this ontological distinction between the sacred and the profane that 
Eliade chose to treat in his work.
Van der Leeuw says of the experience of power that "it remains merely
dynamic, and not in the slightest degree ethical of spiritual"162. Could one not 
see the similarity between this and the point made by Otto when he says 
that the holy has attracted an ’over plus’ of meaning as if it were a moral 
category. In continuation, van der Leeuw says of power "For whoever is 
confronted with potency clearly realises that he is in the presence of some 
quality with which in his previous experience he was never familiar, and which 
cannot be evoked from something else but which, sui generis and sui juris 
can be designated only by religious terms such as ’sacred’ and numinous"163, 
he has borrowed from Otto without explanation. In Otto, the sui oenerisness 
lies in the fact that the experience is not an odd form of some other 
experiences. By using the word numinous coined by Otto, he has Otto’s 
work in mind but what is surprising is that numinous in this case is far from 
being an essence but is a qualifier of power. It is doubtful if Otto intended 
its use this way. There are other works like awe, amazement, fear and many 
others that are borrowed from Otto without expansion or explanation as given 
by otto.
Van der Leeuw says "In the human soul, then, Power awakens a profound 
feeling of awe which manifests itself both as fear and as being attracted. 
There is no religion whatever without terror, but equally none without love, 
...ll164. Here he is referring to the fear and the attraction of power. This is the 
ambivalence that Otto points to in the combination of the tremendum et 
facinans. Van der Leeuw does not analyse the experience
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phenomenologically as Otto did. It is true that schematization in Otto has not 
be dealt with, it is however interesting that van der Leeuw ends up with what 
looks like what Otto tackles in schematization: ... "that nuance of being 
attracted which corresponds to the prevailing ethical level"165 .. He however, 
does nothing to show how the original experience can be developed into 
ethical consideration. This in Otto is taken care of by schematization. There 
are many other places where similarities could be found but this would take 
us beyond the scope of this work.
From the comments so far, it can be seen that though van der Leeuw tries 
to clarify power, he has only succeeded in bringing in terms which are in 
themselves problematic. His work remains at the level of describing certain 
characteristics of the experience of power without attempting to get beyond 
it to a deeper understanding. Examining what he says, on commenting on 
the primitives that; "whence the power arises is, however, a question in 
itself"166, one would expect here that since he is referring to fetishism, he 
would pursue the issue. He however, is not concerned to do this. What is 
it that makes the sacred sacred; wherein lies the power of fetishism? What 
makes this special power special? These are problematic areas for him. He 
seems satisfied with remaining at the level of the manifestations of power 
without any real attempt to get to the essence. Can such a work really be 
called phenomenology of religion? Phenomenology of religion it is, in the fact
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that it tries to describe the phenomenon of religion as he understands it. 
This however is in line with the phenomenology proposed by P.D. Chatepie 
de la Saussaye in the first of three sections of the Lehrbuch der 
Reliaionsqeschichte of 1887. As George James puts it here, phenomenology 
"has a meaning different from that later intended by Husserl or any of his 
successors."167 Van der Leeuw’s work fits into the typological phenomenology 
of religion.
Though van der Leeuw’s work has been widely read, its contribution to the 
current debate on the phenomenology of religion has been minimal. For Ake 
Hultkrantz, the work of van der Leeuw is too ’speculative’, in some places 
incomprehensible, to be of use to empirical research168 He sees it as a 
parenthesis in the development of religion169 For Baal "there is hardly a more 
disappointing book than van der Leeuw’s Phanomenoloaie der Religion".170 
Van der Leeuw is in line with the phenomenologist trying to discover the 
essence of religion. He however has stopped at certain manifestations. The 
phenomenon is still elusive.
Mircea Eliade: Religions as Hieraphonies.
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Having discussed the works of Otto, Kristensen and van der leeuw, our 
attention now turns to the works of Mircea Eliade who is regarded as one of 
the most significant scholars in the study of the phenomenology of religion.
Born in Romania in 1907, Eliade’s early education at the University of 
Bucharest and Rome was in philosophy and especially the philosophy of 
history. He obtained an M.A. degree in 1928 for a thesis on Italian philosophy 
from Ficino to Bruno. In the same year, he went to India where he studied 
Indian philosophy at the University of Calcutta under Surendranath Dasgupta 
until 1932. During this time he spent six months in Rishiskesh learning the 
theory and practice of Yoga. In 1933, he took his Ph.D. with a dissertation 
on the subject of yoga. He lectures from 1933 to 1940 at the University of 
Bucherest. He worked in the Romanian London legation in 1940 and at the 
Lisbon legation from 1941 to 1945. From 1945 he taught at the Ecole des 
Haute Etudes of the Sorbonne in Paris, and from 1957 he was Professor of 
History of Religions at the University of Chicago171. He died in April, 1986.
Eliade’s interests are varied and wide ranging, including fiction writing, Eastern 
religion, shamanism, alchemy, phenomenology of religion, hermeneutics, 
primal religions, history of religions and the renewal of Western man’s
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religiousness. Central to his thought however, is the notion that there are 
certain basic comparative structures and patterns built into religion whereby 
man perceives the sacred. These take the form of heiraphonies, symbols and 
archetypes. The task of the student of religion is their identification. Eliade’s 
interest in primitive religions dates back from at least 1924 when at the age 
of seventeen, he read Frazer in a French translation. Later his interest was 
stimulated by his encounter with yoga which Eliade regards as a pre-Aryan 
technique of spiritually of great antiquity and therefore truly primitive. While 
teaching philosophy and history of religions at the University of Bucharest 
between 1933 and 1940, Eliade read widely in older anthropological works 
such as the works of Frazer, Levy-Bruhl, Marett, W.Schmit, Pettazzoni and 
others. He was also fascinated by the ancient heritage of Romanian folklore 
and the pre-Roman religion of his homeland.
In 1946 he published his first article on shamanism Le probleme du 
chananisme172 and his Patterns175 followed soon after. From this date, the 
bulk of his writings centered upon or at least included data from the 
’primitives’ though his interests know no bounds and he writes concerning the 
whole History of religions. Among his many publications are; The Myth of the 
Eternal Return (1954) Patterns in Comparative Religion in 1958 Birth and 
Rebirth also in 1958. The Forge and the Crucible in 1962 and Shamanism in 
1964, The Sacred and the Profane (1961) in which he contrasts the traditional
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religious ’mode of being’ in the world with that assumed by the modern man. 
In the issues of the journal, History of Religions volumes 6 and 7 of 1966174. 
Eliade published studies on Australian religion and the South American high 
gods.
In the introduction to The Sacred and the Profane Eliade indicates his 
awareness of Otto’s treatment of religion. While not downgrading the work of 
Otto, he indicates the way in which his own investigation is to be carried out. 
"We propose to present the phenomenon of the sacred in all complexity, and 
not only insofar as it is irrational. What will concern us is not the relation 
between the rational and the non rational elements of the religion but the 
sacred in its entirety".175 Eliade sees the first thing about the sacred as being 
the opposite of the profane. For Eliade the religions are heiraphonies, that 
is the manifestations of the holy: "Four I’histoire des religions, toute 
manifestation du sacre est de consequence; tout rites, tout mythe, toute 
croyance ou figure divine reflet I’experience du sacre, et par consequent 
implique les notion d’etre, de signification et de verite".176 This conception may 
be compared to the proposal by Heiler that religious phenomena point to 
’otherness’ - the holy. For Eliade, man becomes aware of the sacred because 
it shows itself to him as something that is different from the profane. It is on 
account of this that Eliade tries to "designate the act of manifestation of the 
sacred, with the term hieraphony"177 He chose this on account of the fact
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that it does not imply anything further. And as stated earlier, "the history of 
religions - from the most primitive to the most highly developed - is 
constituted by a great number of hieraphonies, by manifestations of sacred 
realities".178
He gives examples with the incarnation of God in Christ, the manifestation of 
the sacred in some ordinary objects such as stone or a tree. For those who 
worship these objects, the stone or the tree is not adored or worshipped 
because they are everyday things we know but for what is manifested in 
them. What then constitutes this ’sacred’ and the ’profane’? What does 
Eliade mean by religion? The answers to these questions will bring us nearer 
to understanding Eliade’s phenomenology of religion.
For Eliade the "sacred and the profane are two modes of being in the world, 
two existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history".179 For 
him this mode of being in the world is not only of concern to the history of 
religions or to sociology but are of concern to everyone in search of meaning 
for human existence. Perhaps it is on account of this that Eliade proposes 
to treat religion in its entirety. For Eliade, the man of the traditional society, 
that is to say, the archaic man does not distinguish between religious and 
non religious acts. It is on this account that his actions will be of interest, not 
only to the historians of religion, but also to philosophical anthropology,
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psychology and in short to all human sciences.
We have read from Eliade that religions are manifestations of the sacred, that 
the sacred is the opposite of profane, and that both are two modes of being 
in the world. It then follows that whatever is said about religious experiences, 
implies the experience of the sacred. If both are existential positions, what 
then makes the sacred different from the profane?
For Eliade, generally speaking man is basically religious, on account of his 
situation in the world. In this world then man experiences an irruption. For 
this religious man then, there is a break in the order of things and this break 
constitutes the sacred sphere. "For the religious man, space is not homo­
geneous; he experiences interruptions, breaks in it; some part of space are 
qualitatively different from others".180 Eliade quotes the case of Exodus 3:5 
where the Lord commanded Moses to take off his shoes because the ground 
on which he was standing was sacred. That is the indication of the 
differences between sacred and the profane space. It then follows according 
to Eliade that for the religious man, the world is not homogeneous and "this 
spatial non homogeity finds expression in the experience of an opposition 
between space that is sacred - the only real and really existing space and all 
other space, the formless expanse surrounding it".181 For Eliade the 
experience of the non homogeneity of space is a primordial experience which
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is to say, a primary religious experience that precedes all reflection. The break 
in the space constitutes the sacred character because it shows the fixed 
point. "The manifestation of the sacred ontologically founds the world. In the 
homogeneous and infinite expanse, in which no point of reference is possible 
and hence no orientation can be established, the hieraphony reveals an 
absolute fixed point, a centre".182 In Eliade’s view, the sacred is the centre 
of irruption. How then does he see the profane? "For profane experience, 
on the contrary, space is homogeneous and neutral; no break qualitatively 
differentiates the various parts of its mass".183 Having said this much about 
the sacred and the profane, we shall now proceed to consider what Eliade 
has to say about the phenomenon of religion.
In Eliade’s conception religion "does not necessarily imply belief in God, gods, 
or ghosts, but refers to the experience of the sacred and consequently is 
related to the ideas of being, meaning and truth"184 His point of departure 
is the historical data which expresses the religious experience of mankind. 
Throughout his phenomenological approach he tries to decipher these data, 
to describe and to interpret the religious phenomena which constitute the 
Lebenswelt of the homo relioiosus. For Eliade, the sacred cannot be reduced 
to anything else. This stems from the antireductionist stand. Having identified 
the empirical basis of religion which according to him is the experience of the 
sacred, we shall now ask what constitutes the sacred. Eliade’s answer to this
might point us in the right direction.
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Eliade is familiar with the positions of the ethnologists, the philologists, and 
the positions of Durkheim and Freud. Though he sees them as opening a 
new dimension of the sacred, they fall short by trying to explain religion away 
or by considering only the function it performs. He disagrees with these 
views and says that a historian of religion must attempt to grasp the religious 
phenomena "on their own plane of reference".185 To reduce our interpretation 
to some other plane of reference is to neglect their full intentionality. In 
Eliade’s view, what is most characteristic of religion is its being occupied with 
the sacred which it distinguishes from the profane. This sacred can be 
described and experienced as the following: ’Power’ (van der Leeuw) ’Wholly 
other’ (Otto) as ’Ultimate reality’ (Wach). One can still see places or religious 
contexts where it can be described as ’Absolute reality’, ’Being’, ’Eternity’, 
’Divine’, ’Metacultural’ and transhistoricaF, ’Transhuman’ and others.186 Eliade 
focuses on religious experiences as such because they bring a man out of 
his worldly universe or historical situation and project him into a universe 
different in quality and entirely different world, transcendent and holy. Trying 
to understand the essence of such phenomena by means of psychology, 
physiology, and sociology, economics, linguistics, art or any other study is 
false. It misses one unique and irreducible element in it which is that of the 
sacred. For Eliade the historians of religion must respect the fundamentally
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irreducible character of religion. He frequently quotes the ironical query of 
Henri Poincare: "Would a naturalist who had never studied the elephant 
except through a microscope consider that he had an adequate knowledge 
of the creature". The microscope reveals the structure and mechanism of 
cells, which structure and mechanism are exactly the same in all multicellular 
organisms. The elephant is certainly a multi-cellular organism, but is that all 
that it is? On the microscopic scale, we might hesitate to answer. On the 
scale of human vision, which at least has the advantage of presenting the 
elephant as a zoological phenomenon, there can be no doubt about the 
reply".187
Eliade like other phenomenologists of religion sees phenomenology as an 
instrument for a better understanding of the history of religion. In Patterns in 
Comparative Religion he extends his view on religion by first faulting current 
approaches to religion. "All the definitions given up till now of the religious 
phenomenon have one thing in common: each has its own way of showing 
that the sacred and the religious life are the opposite of the profane and the 
secular life".188 Here Eliade is in agreement with Roger Callois on his view of 
the definition of religion.189 Callois himself admits that the sacred-profane 
distinction is not always sufficient to define the phenomena of religion but 
such an opposition is involved in every definition of religion so far.
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From all that has been said, Eliade seems to be implying that religion always 
entails some aspect of transcendence. The transcendence is expressed in 
terms such as ’Absolute bliss and power’ ’transhistorica! and transmundane’. 
Perhaps it is Eliade’s intention that his sense of transcendence be viewed as 
a universal structure of religion. The universal characterization in terms of this 
transcendent structure is meant of course to include not to be exhausted by 
the definitions offered by Otto, van der Leeuw and others. It then follows that 
in Eliade’s conception, the ’holy’ is an aspect of the sacred. Eliade is aware 
of the secular transcendence but he differentiates that from the religious 
transcendence the basis of that of religion being homo reliaiousus as the 
norm for the religious transcendence. For Eliade religion involves a radical 
break with all secular or profane modalities, it invariably point man beyond the 
relative historical ’natural’ world of ordinary experience. He goes as far as to 
say that the main function of religion is the rendering of human existence 
’open’ to superhuman world of transcendence.190 There can be no doubt, 
however, that Eliade has brought to his treatment of religion the result of his 
investigation into the common elements in all religions. In contrasting religion 
with the mode of being in the world of the non religious man, Eliade claims 
that "the non religious man refuses transcendence, accepts the relativity of 
’reality’, and may even come to doubt the meaning of existence...Modern non 
religious man assumes a new existential situation; he regards himself solely 
as the subject and agent of history, and he refuses all transcendence. In
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other words, he accepts no models for humanity outside the human condition 
as it can be seen in the various historical situations. Man makes himself, and 
he only makes himself completely in proportion as he desacralizes himself 
and the world. The sacred is the prime obstacle to his freedom. He will 
become himself only when he is totally demysticized. He will not truly be free 
until he has killed the last god".191
According to Eliade, the sacred is always revealed through something natural, 
historical, ordinary, profane. For the religious man, the profane alone has no 
significance but only insofar as it reveals the sacred. To sacralize a thing 
involves a radical ontological separation of the thing which reveals the sacred 
from everything else. If a thing is singled out, it is not because of its size or 
impressive natural dimensions but rather, because its imposing look reveals 
something transcendent. The sacred objects, places, times are not arbitrarily 
chosen by man. If the signs are not there, they are provoked. And for the 
archaic man "neither the objects of the external world nor human acts 
properly speaking, have any autonomous intrinsic value. Objects or acts 
acquire a value, and in so doing become real, because they participate, after 
one fashion or another, in a reality that transcends them".192 For Eliade then 
the reality that transcends the ordinary mundane world becomes the universal 
structure of religion.
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It looks as if Eliade’s attempt to provide us with the universal structure of 
religion leads to a certain peculiarity. Although in Patterns in Comparative 
Religion his intention is to get rid of any a priori definition of religion; the 
reader can make his reflections on the nature of the sacred as one goes 
along. Eliade will simply investigate his data in order to see "just what things 
are religious in nature and what those things reveal".193 The definition of 
religion that will arrive from this would be open and changeable depending 
on the availability of results of research. One wonders if Eliade in his 
treatment of religion is true to his definition.
For Eliade, in the process of sacralization, the sacred and the profane co­
exist in a paradoxical relationship. To clarify this he says that "One must 
remember the dialectic of the sacred: any subject whatever may
paradoxically become a hieraphony, a receptacle of the sacred, while still 
participating in its own environment". "One need only recall the dialectic of 
hieraphony: an object becomes sacred while remaining just the same as it is". 
The dialectic of the sacred consists of the fact that "The sacred expresses 
itself through some other than itself" that "in every case the sacred manifests 
itself limited and incarnate". It is "this paradox of incarnation which makes 
hieraphonies possible at all".194
Every hieraphony proclaims the coming together of the sacred and profane,
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the being and non-being, the absolute and the relative, the eternal and the 
becoming. This coming together becomes according to Eliade the mainstay 
of any religion. The fact that comes to mind is not manifestation of the 
sacred in stones and in other things but the fact of the manifestation itself. 
That unlimited can become limited that in itself is paradoxical. It is 
paradoxical that an ordinary finite historical thing while remaining natural can 
at the same time manifest something which is not finite, not historical, not 
natural. While Eliade recognises that a religious phenomenon is at the same 
time a social, psychological and historical phenomenon, he specifically 
emphasises the autonomy of the religious dimension.195
Religion for Eliade begins when and where there is a total revelation, an 
irruption - a revelation which is at once part of the sacred, an intermingling 
of the sacred and the profane begets religion. The sacred times, places are 
all irruptions in the order of ordinary mundane world. Rites and other 
religious ceremonies are attempts to bring to the present the acts as it 
happened in the past. Rituals, symbols all become conformity to the 
archetype.
Has Eliade solved the problem of the phenomenology of religion? What 
makes the sacred sacred? These are the questions that remain unanswered 
by Eliade.
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Evaluation and Place in the Phenomenology of Religion
Having examined what is relevant to our work on the phenomenology of 
religion in the works of Eliade, we shall now consider its possible contribution 
to the phenomenology of religion. The question that should be uppermost in 
our minds is this; has his treatment of the sacred proceeded beyond the 
manifestations of religion to the phenomenon properly speaking? From our 
work so far, we can see that Eliade’s starting point is the polarity between the 
sacred and the profane. He begins his work by stating that he is going to 
treat the issue in a way different from Otto’s treatment. He says "We propose 
to present the phenomenon of the sacred in all its complexity, and not only 
insofar as it is irrational" and that "What will concern us is not the relation 
between the rational and the non rational elements of religion but the sacred 
in its entirety";196 it is natural to expect him to begin by explaining his terms 
sacred and religious, or that he treats the issue quite differently from Otto. 
When he says "Man becomes aware of the sacred because it manifests itself, 
shows itself, as something wholly different from the profane"197 and that every 
religious phenomenon is heiraphony, that is to say, a manifestation of the 
sacred or the holy, this connotes that the hieros or the holy, is perceived in 
Rudolf Otto’s image of ’the Wholly Other’. Eliade seems to be using the term 
’sacred’ with essentially the same meaning. He says that "The sacred already 
manifests itself as a reality of wholly different order from ’natural’ realities".198
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Does this not imply that he has isolated the sacred without sufficient 
introduction as to what he is about to do? This sense of mystery and 
transcendence is, to Eliade the uniquely religious dimension of human life, yet 
nothing seems distinctively to separate the sacred from the profane or the 
secular view. This is more so when for him the two are existential situations. 
As it stands, it looks as if for Eliade there is something objectively ’out there’ 
which at one time or the other enters into an object.
Elsewhere Eliade distinguishes the sacred from the profane, thus "on the one 
hand, the sacred is, supremely the other than man - the transpersonal, the 
transcendent - and, on the other hand, the sacred is the exemplary in the 
sense that it establishes patterns to be followed: by transcendent and 
exemplary it compels religious man to come out of personal situations, to 
surpass the contingent and the particular and to comply with general values, 
with the universal".199 It can be seen here that the sacred is conceived 
ontologically here. The sacred is seen as the universal basis, the reality, the 
model under which all actions, if they are to be meaningful will be exact 
copies. Eliade here seems to be basing his position on Platonism. He does 
not indicate what will differentiate the acts of the religious man from that of 
the secular or the non religious man. Eliade talks about the sacred being an 
irruption or of cosmologization of a place or the sacralizing of a thing, the 
mostly likely conclusion that any one would draw is that at some point
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something objectively ’out there’ comes into what is to be made holy. The 
manifestation of this becomes the hieros. the holy. The question that is 
bound to arise here is what happens to the sacralized object if it becomes 
desacralized? Does this not pose the problem of wherein lies the sacredness? 
Is it in the object or is a state of consciousness of the religious man or the 
man concerned? It is obvious that only the religious man will see the 
sacralized object as something special. To the secular man, the stone 
remains a stone and nothing more. The rituals remain mere observances with 
little or no meaning. If the sacred is the ideal to which the religious man 
strives to, it follows that the sacred would be identified with being. The 
conclusion we draw from this is that being is sacred and only the religious 
mans lives the life that is real. The majority of others live in chaos. Eliade 
has thus identified the whole of Being with the sacred without indicating what 
in Being constitutes the sacred sphere. For Eliade there seems to be no 
hierarchy between the sacred place, time and action. What however 
constitutes this sacred is still a question that remains unanswered by him.
Eliade contrasts the views of the religious man and the non religious thus "the 
non religious man refuses transcendence, accepts the relativity of ’reality’ and 
may even come to doubt the meaning of existence".200 It is obvious that 
Eliade has based his interpretation on narrow understanding of 
transcendence, which is influenced by a theological view. He is falling into the
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pattern of attributing transcendence and meaning to religious side thereby 
denying it to the profane. Secular existence can be characterized by 
transcendent meaning. He fails to indicate this transcendence which the 
secular or the non religious man refused to accept. It is more likely that 
when Eliade mentions the non religious man who refuses transcendence he 
has in mind 19th century nihilism and not the most sensitive forms of secular 
existence. One can see Eliade here allowing a theological view to determine 
the distinction between the sacred and the profane.
Here again he posits an ontological basis. He is not dealing with what men 
regard as sacred but the structure of the sacred. His focal point is not only 
the subjective but the objective and hence the ontological. Not only are they 
hieraphonies which describe hieraphonies for those involved, but they are in 
fact hieraphonies. It is obvious to us that in doing this, Eliade has passed 
from descriptive to normative without adequate explanation. As D. Baird puts 
it, "once one sees ’the sacred’ or ’religion’ as an ontological reality and once 
one operates as though its structures are also ontologically real, having 
identified these structures one has discovered reality. It then follows that 
those whose lives are lived in the sacred as completely as possible are the 
most authentic since they exist closest to reality".201
The accusation that modern man has lost all sense of transcendence arises
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from the establishment of this ontological basis, that modern man does not 
seem to see this basis is to Eliade an aberration.
When Eliade tries to avoid the definition of religion, he seems to be saying 
that religion can be identified without the need for a definition. One problem 
that arises is this, how can religion be distinguished from the demonic? By 
failing to provide a definition he has not succeeded in eliminating the 
ontology. What he has done is make it less clear. It is assumed that there 
is something ’out there’ that corresponds to the term ’religion’ or the ’sacred’ 
and this can be identified intuitively at least by the religious man. What 
constitutes this sacred is our quest in the work of Eliade. This will aid our 
work in phenomenology of religion. Eliade however has not gone beyond the 
sacred to see what in fact constitutes its sacredness. Meanwhile it looks as 
if what Eliade is describing is another manifestation. We need to go beyond 
that to see what constitutes the phenomenon of religion.
It can be seen that the phenomenologist of religion so far studied have 
tended to ignore the phenomenological method. Wherein lies the problem. 
What is the problem with the phenomenology of religion?
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The Dilemma of the Phenomenology of Religion
The phenomenology of religion as presented by the phenomenologists of 
religion discussed in chapter two seem to have completely ignored the basic 
insights of the phenomenological method. It is for this reason that we pause 
a bit to investigate the reason behind this state of affairs. Where lies the 
similarities and the dissimilarities between the Husserlian idea of 
phenomenology and the phenomenology of religion? What accounts for this 
apparent neglect of the phenomenological method by the phenomenologists 
of religion?
It seems appropriate to begin this section by turning once more to the work 
of Husserl. Husserl’s early work in phenomenology began in 1900 with the 
publication of the Loqische Untersuchuuaen in which he sought to make a 
systematic critique of the methods of psychology and the social sciences 
where ideas are reduced to biological facts. It was Husserl who first 
developed the method of phenomenology. Although the term phenomenology 
was in use in varying forms long before Husserl, no one had made explicit 
the distinctive approach of phenomenology, which, above all else, is its 
distinguishing characteristic. Though this part of the work has already been 
treated in the first chapter, it is good to remind ourselves that it was Husserl’s 
intention at the time of the inception of his phenomenology to release
philosophy from the death grip of the scientific-biological world view so that 
it might regain its autonomy and once again practice authentic philosophy as 
he understood it. For Husserl, the task of philosophy was to bring to light 
the ideas lodged within the facts of the world. His early work dealt with the 
ideal nature, or essence, of mental acts relating to cognition, such as 
believing, seeing and imagining, his work distinguished itself from psychology 
by the fact that it was descriptive rather than causal in approach. Husserl did 
not explain such acts in terms of known facts, but sought to describe them 
in such a way as to reveal their essential nature. He later went on to develop 
fully the implicit meanings within these early concerns. His later work is 
known as transcendental or pure phenomenology. In this work Husserl set 
forth a method, known as the reduction, which makes possible the 
reconstitution of the appearance of the world in terms of its transcendental 
structure or essence. The same reduction, applied to the investigator gave 
rise to the notion of the transcendental ego. These studies gave rise to the 
notion of the transcendental ego. These studies culminated in a series of 
lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1929, entitled Cartesian Meditations. For 
Husserl then phenomenology is a method of investigation whose effectiveness 
depends upon the assumption of a particular attitude by the investigator using 
it. "Phenomenology: this denotes a science, a system of scientific disciplines. 
But it also above all denotes a method and an attitude of mind, the 
specifically philosophical method".1 Husserl equated philosophy with
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phenomenology and felt that modern philosophy had forgotten its task and 
its peculiar genius. Husserl was interested in regaining the original and 
authentic task of philosophy, a task whose focus was not upon the facts but 
upon ideas, or rather, upon the idea of the facts. Having said this, how far 
does the phenomenology of religion so far appropriate Husserl’s insight.
It is said that although the meaning of phenomenology for the academic fields 
such as psychology, sociology, history, law, political science, art is not yet 
clear, there is a common element in the areas of study. "Within each of these 
disciplines, there seems to be at least a degree of agreement on the 
presumption that the philosophical insights of Husserl and his successors do 
have a bearing on their work and that the relation between the two is to be 
sought in the study of and reflection on the works of Husserl, his followers, 
and their critics, as the ideas and materials traditional to these domains of 
discourse are re-examined in the light of the insight they have to offer. Such 
is not the case with the academic study of religion".2 It is obvious that the 
same problem of the ’application’ of the method of phenomenology to any of 
the social and human sciences definitely applies to religion, but so far the 
work on phenomenology of religion or use made of the method of 
phenomenology seems to be in disarray. While the phenomenological method 
used in other areas of study has Husserl’s insight to phenomenology as an 
authoritative representation, in the study of religion, that does not seem to be
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the case.
In The Sacred and the Profane Mircea Eliade has the following to say about 
the phenomenology of religion. "The phenomenology of religion had its first 
authoritative representation in Gerardus Van der Leeuw (1890-1950)".3 Could 
this be a key statement in understanding the diversities in the phenomenology 
of religion? Why is van der Leeuw an authoritative representative instead of 
Husserl?
The problem of phenomenology of religion has not been helped by the 
comments of some scholars in the field of religion.
In an essay of 1954, C.J. Bleeker in a bid to clarify the meaning of the 
phenomenology of religion stated that the phenomenology of religion differs 
totally from the philosophy of Husserl. He sees phenomenology of religion 
as "an investigation into the structure and the significance of facts drawn from 
a vast field of the history of religion and arranged in systematic order."4 He 
goes on to say that as one studies religions one finds oneself forced into 
comparing religions. One sacrifice is compared with another, the prayer in 
one tradition is compared to prayer in another. In the end one finds oneself 
no longer considering the significance of sacrifice in any particular historical 
context, but prayer or sacrifice as such. With this one is already doing
phenomenology of religion. Because the phenomenology of religion does not 
limit itself to a particular time and place, it is in danger of grouping together 
materials so diverse that the scientific character of the study is endangered. 
This, according to Bleeker may be avoided through the application of eooche 
and eidetic vision of Husserl’s pure phenomenology. In this case, one has 
to adopt the position of the listener who is not normative in his judgements, 
"Phenomenology must begin by accepting as proper objects of study all 
phenomena that are professed to be religious: subsequently may come the 
attempt to distinguish what is genuinely religious from what is spurious".5 For 
Bleeker, the eidetic vision contributes the concern for the eidos. the essentials 
which are the essentials of religious phenomena. For him then, 
phenomenology is primarily a method of procedure in the study of religion. 
He also sees it as designating the specific effort in form of a handbook or 
monograph which in the last analysis is used "to assess the significance of 
religious phenomena".6
In the same year, however, another prominent scholar, Raffaele Pettazzoni 
presented a different conception of the phenomenology of religion. In this 
conception pure phenomenology had nothing to do with the phenomenology 
of religion. In Pettazzoni’s view, phenomenology of religion did not spring 
from the comparative study of religion but from certain problems that had to 
do with the examination of religious data under the umbrella of other
210
disciplines. No matter how successful the results of researches into religious 
data by philology, archaeology, ethnology, sociology, psychology to the extent 
that they study religious data in the spirit of these sciences, he feels that the 
specific and essential nature of these data, which is religious, is systematically 
evaded.
For this reason the need arises for a science that will "seek to co-ordinate 
religious data with one another, to establish relations and to group the facts 
according to these relations".7 He calls this science the science of religion. 
For him then the phenomenology of religion is a subsection of the general 
science of religion. For Pettazzoni the history of religions come into 
prominence when the relation to be established is not only that of chronology 
but when it also has to do with internal development. To do this however, 
the history of religion has first to establish the history of various religions. For 
Pettazzoni this is where the phenomenology of religion comes in. In pursuing 
the history of various religious traditions, the history of religion is necessarily 
concerned with their development within a particular environment and thus 
with their relation to non religious environments including poetry, art, 
speculative thought and social structure. Here according to him, the question 
arises as to whether a more systematic study of religious data in their 
relations to other religious data and apart from their contact with the non 
religious would make for a better understanding of religion. "It is not enough
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to know precisely what happened and how the facts came to be; what we 
want above all to know is the meaning of what happened".8
For Pettazzoni the history of religion cannot be expected to provide this 
deeper understanding but this understanding springs from another religious 
science which is phenomenology. The task of phenomenology then is the 
factoring out of different structures from the multiplicity of religious 
phenomena, from which their meaning can be understood. In this, it stands 
out as a science sui generis, quite different from the history of religion. For 
Petazzoni however, this science has not been altogether satisfactory. Seen 
correctly it is obvious that Pettazzoni’s intention was the mitigation of the 
separation of history from the phenomenology of religion. He is aware of the 
point made by Van der Leeuw that phenomenology and history of religion are 
different and that "phenomenology knows nothing of any historical 
development of religion".9
Pettazzoni contends that though phenomenology by its nature is superior to 
purely historical, ethnological, philosophical and other researches, it does not 
follow that history or religion as he sees it has nothing to contribute to an 
inquiry into the meaning of religious phenomena. For him, historical 
development can hardly be considered negligible to the interpretation of 
historical religious phenomena even if these data are systematically arranged.
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In reference to van der Leeuw, Pettazzoni states that his own confessed 
limitation requires phenomenology to apply constantly to the results of 
historical research whose progress the conclusions of phenomenology must 
continually be informed. While Bleeker relies on the eooche and the eidetic 
vision of Husserl to avoid bringing together such diverse facts and drawing 
such varied conclusions as to mar the scientific integrity of the study, 
Pettazzoni prefers to rely on historical research to provide the corrective 
necessary for phenomenology’s progress.
' ■}
The dilemma of the phenomenology of religion can be clearly seen in the 
disagreement between these two scholars. In Bleeker’s response to the 
insights of Pettazzoni, an appeal was made to the phenomenology of van der 
Leeuw, which he accused Pettazzoni as having misunderstood. For Bleeker, 
the nature of phenomenology is too complicated and its activities too varied 
to characterize it by the single aspect brought about by Pettazzoni. Bleeker 
sees his own phenomenological effort as having been mainly occupied with 
the theoria of religion which seeks the significance of various conceptions of 
the divine, of various types of anthropology, or prayer, sacrifice, and other 
elements of cult and the logos of religion (the strict spiritual laws that he takes 
to underlie the constitution of every historical religion). While he thinks that 
religious phenomenology is generally preoccupied with the various religious
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phenomena, he is of the view that phenomenology can proceed to the 
question of the entelecheia of religious phenomena. The use of the term 
entelecheia makes clear the emphasis Bleeker places on the non-static nature 
of religions. Though the term is Aristotelian, it cannot be said to be a 
substitute for evolution. As Olof puts it, "with this term he stresses that 
religion is ’an invincible, creative and self-regenerating force’. The 
phenomenology of religion must not disregard this fact".10 The question that 
arises is this, in the past history of religions, say going back about five 
thousand years, is it possible to discern a course of events in which essence 
is realized by its manifestation? Bleeker find phenomenology uniquely 
equipped to deal with this question on account of his familiarity with the entire 
field of religious phenomena.
Bleeker gives examples with Zarathustra, Jesus, Moses, Buddha and 
Mohammed and concludes that "By their work, religion suddenly reaches a 
higher level of self realisation".11 He finds further ground for this entelecheia 
in the regenerative function of period reformation that is characteristic of great 
religious tradition, the purpose of which is to recall them to their original 
purpose. It is on this account that Bleeker is of the view that modern man 
"has a clearer view of what is genuinely religious, is more able to distinguish 
the religious from the secular, and makes demands as to the quality of 
religion". He concludes that traces of an entelecheia of religion can be
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discerned that proceed according to Toynbee’s law of challenge and 
response: "Each relapse seems to evoke in religious people a strong desire 
for and an attempt of restoring religion".12
The view expressed by both Bleeker and Pettazzoni did not go without 
challenge. Widengren suggests that it is remarkable how Bleeker allowed 
himself to be influenced by his own Christian ideas. He believes that in 
pursuing the entelecheia of religion, Bleeker has executed judgement that 
phenomenological eooche cannot abide by. He thinks that Bleeker’s 
reference to certain religions as having reached a higher level of self 
realisation is an example of an imperfect practice of eooche by a scholar who 
claims to adhere to it. Widengren declared "I feel bound to declare it 
absolutely impossible for the phenomenology of religion to pass such 
judgements of value, purely subjective as they are...In a manifest way, such 
judgements transgress the borders of objective scholarly work. Here...a very 
strong eooche (is called for)".13 However, it is clear that while Bleeker is 
aware of the influence of the Husserlian eooche and eidetic vision on the 
phenomenology of Van der Leeuw. In Bleeker’s view phenomenology of 
religion is "an empirical science without philosophical aspirations".14 While 
against outside attack he claims that phenomenology never pretended to be 
a science of the essence of religion15, he described it elsewhere as "a method 
of study, which enables us to penetrate into the core and essence of the
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phenomena".16
For Widengren the eidos in the phenomenology of van der Leeuw is a search 
for the essentials of religious phenomenon. He however, asserts that the 
problem is to ascertain what the essentials of a given phenomenon really are. 
He expresses certain doubt as to the conviction of van der Leeuw that the 
entire essence of phenomena is given in the appearance.17
On his own point Hans Penner has suggested that a phenomenology of 
religion properly so called "will not be an uncritical intuition of essence, not 
a description of historical development of religions".18 For him the task of 
writing the phenomenology of religion that appropriates Husserl’s 
phenomenological insights is still to be done. Bleeker however, was not 
unaware of these problems for that he admits the need for clarity in the 
working procedure of phenomenology of religion. He suggests that it "should 
work out a more precise method" and "sharply delimit the field of its activity" 
for this to be possible. "It should keep at a clear distance from the 
philosophical so that its character stands out indisputably", and it "should be 
prudent by using as...(little) as possible of the terminology of a certain 
philosophy or psychology for fear of being forced to accept the theoretical 
implications of these concepts".19
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Having said all this the question that comes to mind is, how can there be 
such a difference between the phenomenology of religion so far and the 
philosophical phenomenology or the phenomenological method that uses the 
insights of Husserl? What is the background to the diversity of meanings? 
Here attention will now be paid to the history of the word phenomenology.
It seems likely that the earliest occurrence of the word ’phenomenology’ was 
in the work of Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-77)20. The term was employed 
by Lambert as the title of the last of his New Organon (1764), 
Phenomenology or Doctrine of Appearance. Lambert had claimed that he 
derived his phenomenology from the already developed science of a 
particular kind of phenomena and said he had extended it. His insight came 
from optics, the science of visual appearances or visual phenomena. He 
observes that it is well known that objects appear smaller and more vague 
at a distance than when situated close at hand. That things appear differently 
from different sides, that colours of objects varies according to the light shed 
on them, that a circle appears elliptical at a certain angle. What Lambert 
considers to be the contribution of his phenomenology is the insight that his 
distinction applies not only to the realm of visual phenomena, but to all areas 
of human knowledge.21 Lambert observes that it is possible by apprehending 
the principles of optics (that is the principles that determine the appearance 
of spatial objects) to proceed from the appearances towards the things as
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they are in themselves. By apprehending and applying this principle he notes 
astronomers have been able to proceed from the manifest shape of the 
heavens towards conclusions about the true structure of the universe. In this 
way, Lambert contends that it is possible to proceed beyond the manifest 
shape of things as they appear in an intellectual region be it in psychological, 
moral, idealistic or whatever, the way they are themselves. He calls this 
phenomenology a transcendental optics.
Another mention of the word phenomenology was in Kant’s reply to Lambert’s 
letter of November, 13th 1765, in which he was calling the attention of Kant 
to the similarity of their views. In it he was proposing a joint philosophical 
project directed towards the improvement of metaphysics through the 
perfection of a new philosophical method to be erected in the light of evident 
inadequacy by Wolf.22 In December of the same year, Kant replied 
expressing interest in the proposal. February 3rd the following year, Lambert 
wrote again to Kant expressing a preliminary way, a number of key 
propositions: that philosophy is concerned with material not merely formal 
truth and that if philosophy was to make progress it would be through 
recourse to the simplest elements of knowledge. If that is to be the case, 
how far does the knowledge of form lead to the knowledge of matter.23 Kant 
responded to this last letter on 2nd September 1770. In the letter he 
responded to Lambert’s insights. Included in the reply was a copy of his
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inaugural dissertation concerning the form and principles of the sensible and 
intelligible world. Here we find Kant’s own use of the word ’phenomenology’. 
This may be the second historical use of this term. He says "It seems that 
a quite special, if merely negative science (Phenomenologia generalis) must 
precede mataphysics, wherein the principles of sensuality, their validity and 
their limitations, must be determined, in order that they do not confuse 
judgements of objects of pure reason, which has nearly always happened in 
the past...It occurs to me also...that such a propaedeutic discipline could be 
brought to a state of useful elaboration and evidence through our relatively 
modest effort".24
As was said earlier, Lambert derived his phenomenology from the science of 
the visual phenomena which he extended into all regions of human 
knowledge, making it more general. In the same way, Kant spoke of the 
negative science that would determine the principles of sensuality, as well as 
their validity and limitation, as a general phenomenology. In his 
communication to Lambert he said he had now arrived at a philosophical 
point of view that he should not be required to abandon, a position through 
which all metaphysical questions will be tested and answered. In a letter to 
Marcus Hertz in February 21, 1772, Kant speaks of a projected work on ’the 
limits of sensuality and reason’. This was to be divided into theoretical and 
practical parts. The first part again was to be divided into two parts: a
219
general phenomenology ("Die Phanomenologie uberhaupt"), to be followed by 
*
a metaphysics ’according to its nature and method’. In this letter, the work is 
referred to for the first time as a "critique of pure reason"25. We are not going 
into details as to the differences between Lambert and Kant but it is certain 
each understood the way in which the other used the term phenomenology.
The first occurrence however in English has quite a different meaning or 
should we say stands for something quite different.
In an article by John Robinson (1739-1805) in third edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica (1798) phenomenology denotes the first of three 
distinctive phases of a philosophy of nature consciously based on Francis 
Bacon’s conception of the subject. Here philosophy is described as "the study 
of the phenomena of the universe, with a view to discovering the general laws 
which indicate the powers of natural substances, to explain subordinate 
phenomena, and to improve art".26 The task of the philosopher is three fold, 
consisting of, description, arrangement and reference to events or 
phenomena. The description also termed a ’philosophical history’, involves 
the complete or copious enumeration of facts, properly selected, cleared of 
all unnecessary or extraneous circumstances, and accurately narrated. The 
second operation called ’investigation’ puts these into compendious and 
perspicuous form, based on observed resemblances ’so that a general
knowledge of the universe may be easily acquired and firmly retained’. The 
third question known as ’aetiology’ rates the perceived uniformity of events 
to some natural bond between them. Having said something about Lambert’s 
phenomenology, Robinson’s view becomes interesting. The use of the term 
phenomenology in English in the following century shows meanings to accord 
with that in Robinson’s article. In his Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic of 
1836-1837, Sir William Hamilton argued that the whole of philosophy, a 
science exclusively concerned with the mind, is occupied with three great 
questions. What are the facts to be observed? What are the laws which 
regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? And what 
real results, not immediately manifested, follow from these facts or 
phenomena. To these three questions, there correspond three general 
divisions of philosophy of which ’phenomenology of mind’ is the first. Hamilton 
equated this first division with empirical psychology or the inductive 
philosophy of mind phenomenology, which considers the mind ’merely with 
the view of observing and generalising the various phenomena it reveals’ is 
to be followed in Hamilton’s scheme by a nomology of mind or nomological 
psychology, concerned with the laws by which our faculties are governed, 
and again by ontology or metaphysics, which is concerned with the character 
of that ’unknown substance’ of which phenomena are manifestations. This 
division includes such subjects as the being of God, the immortality of the 
soul and so on.27 There may not be any more need to treat other scholars
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that we have not touched.
However from the observations above, it seems that in early history the term 
’phenomenology’ was used in two different ways and although they were no 
longer exclusive, it denoted two quite different types of intellectual activity. 
The term was used differently by two different communities of discourse. The 
two communities correspond to the use of the term in German and English, 
respectively. As James puts it "As used by Lambert and Kant, it stood for an 
exploration of the principles that determine appearances in all intellectual 
regions. In that community of discourse, it eventually denoted an exploration 
of the a priori subjective conditions of knowledge as such. As used by 
Robinson and others, the term denoted an operation concerned with the 
description and perhaps the classification of empirically accessible facts 
according to observable resemblances".28 It looks as if the science of religion 
has equivocated between these two different meanings. When Bleeker 
speaks of phenomenology as an enterprise that transforms the chaotic field 
of the history of religion into a ’harmonious panorama’, a ’typological survey’ 
or as ’an empirical science without philosophical aspirations’, it is the English 
community of discourse that stands behind his use of the term. When on the 
other hand, he is preoccupied with certain strict spiritual laws which underlie 
the constitution of every historical religion, when the essence of religious 
phenomena is in question, he appears closer to the transcendental
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preoccupation of the phenomenology of Kant and Lambert. It seems likely 
that this equivocation is at the root of the confusions in the phenomenology 
of religion.
There arose however another use of phenomenology just before the advent 
of phenomenology in the study of religion. It is good to call to mind the fact 
that the term was used by Fitche as the title of the part of his 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 that undertook the deduction of appearance 
(Erscheinunq) or the world of consciousness from the Absolute.29 Following 
this, it came to stand for Hegel’s philosophical effort to demonstrate that the 
time had arrived for the elevation of philosophy to the level of science, his 
effort to furnish the individual with the ladder to the absolute standpoint and 
show him that standpoint within himself. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
could be said to conform to Robinson’s understanding of the term in as much 
as it constitutes a perspicuous description and arrangement of the data in 
question, constituting a copious history of the subject. This said, the 
arrangement of Hegel’s phenomenology is not based on empirically 
observable resemblances. Nor is this arrangement to be followed by the 
inference of natural laws. It might be suggested that, where Hegel’s use of 
the term diverges from that of Robinson, it more closely resembles the sense 
the terms receives with Lambert and Kant.
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Having gone this far in our exposition, we can now safely distinguish between 
two early communities of discourse within which the term ’phenomenology’ 
was employed. We can now see both the position of Husserl and that of 
certain key exponents of the phenomenology of religion. It might be possible 
to see the course that was taken by Husserl. While one cannot call Husserl 
a Kantian, it is significant that among Husserl’s first definitions of 
phenomenology was ’a critique of cognition’ and in his last work he 
characterises the transcendental philosophy of Kant, which he specifically 
opposes to the naturalism of empirical psychology and the natural sciences, 
as a prodigious scientific effort towards his philosophical goal.30
Without pursuing the question any further it is obvious that the Husserlian 
phenomenology has its root in the phenomenology of Lambert and Kant. The 
phenomenological studies on religion have tended to use the idea of 
phenomenology as understood by Robinson and others. This has led to the 
colossal misunderstanding of the nature of the phenomenology of religion. 
Earlier in the chapter we said the uses of the term phenomenology in areas 
other than the field of religion though unclear have something in common 
which is the fact that they appropriate or try to appropriate Husserl’s insight 
into their investigation. Having taken the trouble to point out the root of the 
problem we shall now continue the work by looking for the conditions that are 
necessary for the phenomenological method to be applied to the
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phenomenology of religion.
This will enable us to approach the phenomenology of religion that is in line 
with other disciplines that have the Husserlian method as their guiding 
principle.
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CHAPTER THREE
RELIGION BEYOND THE FIELD OF THE GENERAL HISTORY OF RELIGION.
Ludwig Feuerbach: Man’s Self Consciousness as Religious.
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The Husserlian idea of phenomenology is the description of the essence- 
intuition of a phenomenon. Pure phenomenon which phenomenology 
describes is that state of consciousness beyond which it is impossible to 
proceed. Since this is the case, the phenomenology of religion that 
appropriates the Husserlian method must attempt to describe the essence- 
intuition of the phenomenon of religion to enable it to stand a chance of 
being a phenomenology. It is with this in mind that we set out to investigate 
what the nature of religion is. This will put us in the right direction for the 
phenomenology of religion. The phenomenologists of religion as hitherto 
known besides identifying the unique nature of religion have not gone beyond 
the identification to tell us what the phenomenon of religion is. It therefore 
follows that in the field of the general history of religion from which they have 
investigated, we remain at the level of manifestations of religion. This is of 
little use in the phenomenology of religion. Is it possible to step outside the 
field of the general history of religion to investigate the nature of religion? It 
is with this in mind that we proceed to discuss the works of three scholars 
namely Ludwig Feuerbach, Thomas Luckman and Peter Berger. Though the 
three scholars wrote independently and in different fields, they have interest 
in one way or another in the nature of religion.
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We begin with work of Ludwig Feuerbach. Later we shall look at the works 
of Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger.
Born on July 28th, 1804 at Landshut in Bavaria, Ludwig Andrea Feuerbach 
was the son of a famous jurist Paul Johann Anslem von Feuerbach (1775- 
1833). In 1823 he went to Heidelberg where he began his studies in theology 
under H.E.G. Paulus and Karl Daub. In 1824 he went to Berlin where he came 
under the personal influence of G.W.F. Hegel and decided to change from 
theology to philosophy. In 1828 he became a Privatdozent in Philosophy at 
the University of Erlangen. In 1832 his appointment was terminated because 
of an anonymous work which he published entitled Gedanken uber Tod 
Unsterblichkeit (Thoughts on Death and Immortality). Feuerbach devoted the 
rest of his life to study and writing. After 1860, he lived on the Rechenberg 
near Nuremberg and died in 1872.1 Feuerbach’s philosophy developed out 
of criticism and ultimate rejection of Hegelian dualism. For Feuerbach, all 
reality was material nature of which man formed a part, his consciousness 
being dependent upon nature for its development. Among his works are Das 
Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity) first published in 1841, 
Vorlaufiae Thesen zur Reform der Philosoohie (Preliminary Thesis for the 
reform of Philosophy) and Grundsatze der Philosoohie der Zukunft (Basic 
Propositions of the philosophy of the Future) both published in 1843. Das 
Wesen der Religion (The Essence of Religion) in 1846 and Vorlesunaen uber
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das Wesen der Religion (Lectures on the Essence of Religion) in 1851.2
In The Essence of Christianity.3 Feuerbach describes religion as a basically 
human phenomenon. He sees it as the essential difference between man and 
brutes. This difference between man and brutes is based in consciousness. 
Although animals have consciousness, human consciousness is unique. 
"Consciousness in the strict sense is present only in a being to whom his 
species, his essential nature, is an object of thought".4
While in brutes the inner and the outer lives are one, and the same thing, for 
man there is a distinction or a difference between the ’inner* and the ’outer’ 
life. This inner life of man is seen by Feuerbach as that which relates a man 
to his species. "The inner life of man is the life which has relation to his 
species, to his general as distinguished from his individual nature".5 The 
capacity to live by inner non-coercive authority to which his life yields is the 
distinctive trait of man. It is here that he differs from brutes or animals whose 
behaviour may be either attractive or perverse according to human standard 
but is neither good nor bad. An animal reacts to a stimulus, man responds 
to a situation. All acts of man are motivated by his inner authority which acts 
upon him with an objective force. In ordinary parlance this may be called 
conscience, it could also be called the power to live by ideals. It is through 
ideals that the element of infinity become operative in us. While the inner life
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of man enables him to be conscious of his species and his relations to them, 
the brutes do not perform any such function.
Feuerbach sees the capacity for speech and thought as the distinguishing 
factor between men and brutes and this he regards as "the true function of 
the species".6 This function implies man’s relations with individual. It follows 
that conscious awareness is implicitly a social awareness. The use of speech 
or thought implies the presence of the consciousness of the species. 
Contrasting with a caterpillar, he sees the limit of conscious nature as the limit 
of consciousness. "The limit of the nature is also the limit of the 
consciousness. The consciousness of a caterpillar whose life is confined to 
a particular species of plant does not extend itself beyond its narrow 
domain".7 However, man’s consciousness is infinite because "The 
consciousness of the infinity of consciousness or, in the consciousness of the 
infinite, the conscious subject has for his object the infinity of his own nature".8 
If religion generally expressed is the consciousness of the infinite, it follows 
that man’s self consciousness which is the consciousness of the infinite and 
religion identical. In Feuerbach’s term man as different from the caterpillar 
has an object for consciousness, his generic nature. Human consciousness 
alone can attain infinity and the infinity attained by consciousness is the infinity 
of the generic species nature. For Feuerbach then, the objective essential 
nature of the species is the highest object to which the species
consciousness can attain. Feuerbach sees the nature of man as constituting 
of Reason, Will and Affection. These are qualities that make up man or 
constitutes human nature and so according to Feuerbach are religious. 
These activities which are religious are imperative in man and so he is nothing 
without them. For Feuerbach, man’s life has always tended towards an 
objective. Whatever they do in life tend towards the realization of the aim 
which is the essential object of the activity. This implies that man tends 
towards an object. "Man is nothing without an object. The great models of 
humanity, such as reveal to us what man is capable of, have attested the 
truth of this proposition by their lives. They had only one dominant passion - 
the realization of the aim which was the essential object of their activity".9 But 
Feuerbach goes on to say that this object to which the subject tends is 
nothing different from his subject. It might be of interest to note that when 
Feuerbach speaks of species, his idea is that of species as an ideal concept. 
Taken in another way, Feuerbach will have us believe that man tends towards 
an ideal but the ideal to which man tends is nothing but his own nature.
In the ideal which man contemplates himself, the consciousness of the ideals 
. become self consciousness. "In the object which he contemplated, therefore 
man become acquainted with himself; consciousness of the object is self 
consciousness in man".10 Whatever man contemplates as outside him has 
been in his nature so his nature become his absolute. "The absolute to man
is his nature. The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his 
own nature".11 So in Feuerbach the consciousness of any object is man’s 
consciousness of his own nature. The human activities of affection, will and 
thought cannot be seen as limited powers. When consciousness is discussed, 
it is in connection of being becoming objective to itself. Feuerbach claims 
that, "...it is impossible that we should be conscious of will, feeling, and 
intellect, as finite powers, because every perfect existence, every original 
power and essence is the immediate verification and affirmation of itself. It 
is impossible to love, will or think without perceiving these activities to be 
perfection - impossible to feel that one is a loving, willing, thinking being, 
without experiencing an infinite joy therein. Consciousness consists in a 
being becoming objective to itself; hence it is nothing apart, nothing distinct 
from the being which is conscious of itself".12 Feeling is seen by Feuerbach 
as one’s own inward power but at the same time a power distinct and 
independent of itself. It is in itself that which constitutes the object of self. 
Consciousness is seen as the highest form of self assertion. In general there 
is no limit to the nature of man. Though the individual can see himself as 
limited, this limitation arises from his perception of the infinity of his, as an 
object of feeling or of consciousness. "It is true that a human being, as an 
individual, can and must - herein consists his distinction from the brute - feel 
and recognise himself to be limited; but he can become conscious of his 
limits, his finiteness, only because the perfection, the infinitude of his species,
is perceived by him, whether as an object of feeling, of conscience, or of the 
thinking consciousness".13 Consciousness as such has no limit. Every being 
is seen by itself as being infinite. Whatever is in consciousness is a reflection 
of infinity of consciousness. Feuerbach continues thus "...if thou thinkest the 
infinite, thou perceivest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of thought; 
If thou feelest the infinite, thou feelest and affirmest the infinitude of the power 
of feeling. The object of the intellect is the intellect object to itself; the object 
of feeling is feeling objective to itself".14 For Feuerbach then, whatever 
sensibility we have is an objectification of an ideal which we project and 
internalize. Taking feeling as an example, if it is taken to be an essential 
organ of religion, it follows that the nature of God is nothing other than the 
nature of feeling. He states "Feeling is thy own inward power, but at the 
same time a power distinct from thee and independent of thee; it is in thee, 
it is in itself that which constitutes the objective in thee - thy own being which 
impresses thee as another being; in short, thy God".15 This is not only limited 
to feeling but it applies also to others like power, faculty, reality and whatever 
else.
In considering the essence of religion generally, Feuerbach distinguishes 
sense consciousness from that of religious consciousness. He contrasts the 
difference between the two by saying that whereas in perception of sense 
consciousness the object is distinguished from conscious self, in religion,
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consciousness of the object is identical to self-consciousness. While the object 
of the senses is outwith man, the object of religion is within man. This is why 
it is said to be the closest object to man. Since the object of any subject is 
the subject’s own nature taken objectively, it follows that any knowledge of 
man is self knowledge. Consciousness of God is self consciousness and the 
knowledge of God is the knowledge of man. The essence of God is the 
essence of man. The attributes of man when stretched to infinity becomes the 
attributes of God. God becomes a projection of man and man becomes a 
projection of God. Anthropology become theology and theology become 
anthropology. Religion in the final analysis for Feuerbach becomes "that 
conception of the nature of the world and of man which is essential to ie. 
identical with, man’s nature".16 However, it stands above man, it animates 
him, determines and governs him. God per se is man’s relinquished self. 
Whatever man thinks of himself that God is. It is with this theory that 
Feuerbach went to treat religion as it appears, paying special attention to 
Christianity. For him in religion, man projects his being into objectivity.
Feuerbach’s theory of religion comes to the conclusion that religion whatever 
it is, is the same with the essence of human nature. What lessons if any do 
we learn from Feuerbach or how far has he contributed to our search for the 
phenomenon of religion? In identifying the possible root of religion in human 
consciousness, we have no quarrels with Feuerbach. We however run into
trouble when we insist with Feuerbach that the object of religion is nothing 
other than the object of man and the object of man is nothing other than the 
subject of man taken objectively. That the essence of religion is nothing other 
than man’s consciousness or shall we say his self consciousness objectified 
and internalized. From whence comes the ideals that is objectified, internalized 
and objectified again? There seems to be ’the egg and the chicken situation’. 
Which is first, the chicken or the egg? If we are to remain at the level at 
which Feuerbach leaves us, the motion will merely be a circular motion 
without any beginning or point of entry. It is not to be denied that 
Feuerbach’s way of looking at religion rests upon a real perception of truth. 
It is profoundly true that our human idea of God must of necessity be 
constructed from the knowledge of the attributes that we observe in our own 
selves. To realise that man attains to the idea of God by projecting a 
construct of his own self consciousness or self awareness upon the screen 
of the beyond is probably to realise a deep truth. Perhaps the work would 
have been looked at differently had Feuerbach said that religion stands for 
not what man wants to be true but for what he feels to be true. In Feuerbach 
the image of God reflects an idealization of man. Man makes the gods in his 
own image, not just any image but his ideal image. The ideal of man is 
fulfilled in the gods or God. In God is combined, the factor of utility on one 
hand and man’s quest for an ideal on the other. The process of idealization 
may be regarded as a leap forward in Feuerbach’s thinking. It is obvious to
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us that without the idea of certain values, which are distinct and probably 
superior, there can be no idealization. How then does he come to create the 
ideal for himself? This is the question that Feuerbach does not answer. 
Man’s quest for idealization can be said to be a basic component of 
Feuerbach’s thesis. Feuerbach has taken us to man’s consciousness of 
ideals by which he lives. The ideals are in man but their origin transcends 
man’s human nature. Feuerbach has so far identified these ideals however, 
its origin is not explained by him. What we are certain of however, is that 
ideals are both within and beyond us. They are with us, yet at least in their 
social and perhaps their cosmic origin they come from without. They operate 
subjectively yet with objective power. It is this combination of objectivity and 
subjectivity that gives them potency for moulding of life.
The tendency might then be to say that ideals are merely products of 
biological forces modified by social conditioning, it seems at least to be more 
sensible to say that they are the products of an inherent tendency within 
man’s nature which enables him to direct his life. But that man has ideals is 
rooted in the fact that he is human. If intellect, will, affection as maintained by 
Feuerbach are ideals which man internalizes and objectifies, it means that it 
goes beyond self consciousness but they transcend the human nature of 
man. It is this process of the transcendence of the biological nature of man 
that Luckmann calls religious17, as we shall discuss later in this chapter.
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Though Feuerbach does not go beyond the human nature of man, he has at 
least brought us to a point in the quest for the phenomenon of religion. The 
root of religion is to be found in man’s self consciousness. Self 
consciousness presupposes man’s consciousness of ideals which transcend 
the biological nature of man. How could the knowledge of ideals relate to 
human consciousness? The problem with Feuerbach is that he has not 
related the origin of the ideals which transcend the biological nature of man 
to man’s self consciousness.
What is the relationship between self consciousness and the ideals which in 
Feuerbach’s term the mind objectifies? What is the relationship the self and 
the sacred or holy? What makes the sacred sacred or religion religion? 
These are the problem s we have to tackle if we are to make any headway 
in the phenomenology of religion.
The work of Feuerbach so far seen has its contribution to the phenomenology 
of religion in the fact that it locates the possible root of religion in human 
consciousness. As seen earlier in the dissertation, the phenomenology of 
Husserl deals with the states of consciousness. The justification for examining 
the works of Feuerbach then, can be seen in the fact that unlike the 
phenomenologists of religion seen so far, he relates religion to consciousness. 
In the human consciousness is located the ideals that give rise to religion in
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its various forms. He points indirectly to the ideal, he however fails to locate 
the relationship of the ideal to the human consciousness. While agreeing with 
him in some aspects, we beg to differ by saying that there is more to religion 
that the human projection which he advocates.
As already hinted, a possible solution might be found in the work of Thomas 
Luckmann.
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Thomas Luckmann: Religion as Transcendence of the Biological.
Having examined the work of Ludwig Feuerbach, we now turn to consider the 
possible contribution of Thomas Luckmann to the phenomenology of religion. 
Though he is a sociologist, his interest in religion and phenomenological 
description is not in doubt. In Life-World and Social Realities he says, 
"Phenomenological description strips away, layer by layer, the intentional 
activities of human beings without which a specifically human social world is 
simply unthinkable. It uncovers the universals and the invariant structures of 
human existence at all times and in all places".18
Thomas Luckmann was born in 1927 in Yugoslavia. Presently he is a 
professor of sociology at the University of Constance, Switzerland. He has 
published widely and his titles include Das Problem der Religion in der 
Modernen Gesellschaft (1963). The Invisible Religion (1967), Lebenswelt und 
Geselleschaft (Life-World and Social Realities (1983) as well as many articles 
written for Journals. He is an American citizen married with three daughters.
In The Invisible Religion. Luckmann tries to disconnect religion from the 
institutional forms in the bid to solve the problem of secularization.
From the beginning, Luckmann is critical of his contemporaries whom he
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considers as having left the traditional patterns set by the ’classical 
sociologists’ notably Durkheim and Weber. Luckmann sees both Durkheim 
and Weber as being interested in the fate of the individual in the modern 
society. Although they have come up with different theories for Luckmann "it 
is remarkable that both Weber and Durkheim sought the key to an 
understanding of the social location of the individual in the study of religion."19 
They both see the problem of the individual in the society as a religious 
problem. Having said this Luckmann goes on to note the lack of well 
articulated links with this theoretical foundation in the recent sociology of 
religion. Though the sociology of religion seems to be flourishing, he cannot 
find a theoretical significance in the recent sociology of religion. Instead of 
advancing on the work of the ’classical’ scholars, "the state of theory in the 
recent sociology of religion is, in the main, regressive".20
The result of this abandonment of the ’classical’ situations is narrowness and 
triviality in the study of the sociology of religion. Luckmann can find an active 
field of research in parish sociology, in demographic and statistical analyses 
of churches and of institutional participation. So also, is in the studies of 
church organization. There has also arisen church journals and organisation 
of specialized institutes. What however appears to be lacking according to 
him is the proper ’informing’ of this research by broader theoretical concerns 
that characterized the works of the sociologists including Durkheim and
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Weber. As a result, much research has been narrowly empirical and has 
been dominated by interest in the apparent decline of traditional religious 
institutions often orientated towards an institutional defined set of problems 
and strategies for their solution. This is because religion as such has been 
identified with the institutionalized form. It is the decline of church life that 
leads to new conceptualization of religion.
Luckmann opens his work by pointing to the way in which the churches have 
become marginal to the modern society. "The marginality of traditional church 
religion in modern society poses two distinct, although related, theoretical 
questions which must be answered by sociology...First, it is necessary to 
identify the causes which pushed traditional church religion to the periphery 
of modern society and give an account of the latter process in terms 
consistent with general sociological theory. Second, it is necessary to ask 
whether anything could be called religion in the framework of sociological 
analysis replaced traditional church religion in modern society".21
Though these questions are of no relevance directly to the phenomenology 
of religion, it is in answer to these that Luckmann theorizes about the nature 
of religion. Interestingly enough as said earlier, it is the decline of church life 
that has led to the new conceptualization of religion.
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Luckmann is not surprised about the identification of religion with the 
institutional form because, according to him, it is in this form that religion 
appears in the Western society. "It is easy to understand why religion is 
commonly identified with one of its particular forms; that is, the form in which 
it appears in the history of Western society. It was in this form that religion 
became an impressive yet familiar reality for many generations".22 Whatever 
work that has been done on religion has taken off from this standpoint. 
However, Luckmann does not quite agree with such identification of religion 
with the institutional forms. He sees religion as a universal phenomenon while 
the institutionalization cannot be said to be so. "Religious institutions are not 
universal; the phenomena underlying religious institutions or, to put it 
differently performing analogous functions in the relation of the individual and 
the social order presumably are universal".23 Luckmann asks, "What are the 
general anthropological conditions for that which may become institutionalized 
as religion?"24 It is here that his work becomes of interest to us. He is not 
only concerned with the institutionalized form, but the basis on which 
institutionalization stands.
Luckmann begins the solution of this problem by stating that "The familiar 
forms of religion known to us a tribal religion, ancestor cult, church, sect and 
so forth as specific historical institutionalizations of symbolic universes".25 If 
religions are specific historical of symbolic universes, the question that readily
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comes to mind is this, what are the symbolic universes? Luckmann answers, 
"Symbolic universes are socially objectivated systems of meaning that refer, 
on the one hand, to a world of everyday life and point, on the other hand, to 
a world that is experienced as transcending everyday life".26 Taken that 
institutionalized religion is specific historical institutionalization of socially 
objectivated meaning system that refers to the world of everyday life and 
point on the other hand to a world that is ’transcendent’, what differentiates 
other meaning systems from symbolic universes?
Luckmann’s answer is that while the symbolic universes refer to the 
transcendent, other meaning systems do not. "Other systems of meaning do 
not point beyond the world of everyday life; that is, they do not contain a 
’transcendent’ reference"27 If institutionalized religions are specific historical 
objectivations of meaning systems. The question that we should ask now are, 
what are objectivations and how do meaning systems come about. Perhaps 
understanding this may hold the key to understanding what Luckmann has 
to say about religion. For Luckmann objectivations "are the products of 
subjective activities that become available as elements in a common world 
both to their producers and to other men".28 He goes on to explain how the 
objectification of a symbolic universe as a meaning system can be achieved. 
For it to be, the subjective activities that make up the objectification must 
according to him be meaningful. Meaningfulness on the other hand, comes
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about by the fact that it is bestowed on it by an interpretative act, which 
locates the subjective act in the interpretative scheme. He goes on to say 
that the meaning of an ongoing experience is therefore derived from the 
previous acts deposited. For an interpretative act to be meaningful, it has to 
draw from the scheme of deposited acts, otherwise the act will be nothing 
other than successive meaningless activities. "Subjective experience 
considered in isolation is restricted to mere actuality and is void of meaning. 
Meaning is not an inherent quality of subjective processes but is bestowed 
on it in interpretative acts. In such acts a subjective process is grasped 
retrospectively and located in an interpretative scheme. Such ’meaning’ as 
may be superimposed on ongoing experiences is necessarily derived from 
prior - eventually habitualized - interpretative acts".29
The fact that there is an ongoing act and an interpretative scheme 
presupposes two activities, the ’outer’ and the ’inner’. He goes on to say that 
the interpretative scheme however transcends the ongoing experience. How 
then comes the interpretative act? Luckmann answers, "Interpretative scheme 
results from sedimented past experience".30 The possibility of experiences 
sedimentation involves some degree of detachment from the ongoing 
experience. Such detachment however, does not originate from isolated 
subjective processes. "Now it is true that a genuinely isolated subjective 
process is inconceivable. At the very least, each ongoing experience has a
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temporal horizon of past and anticipated future experience".31 To achieve 
detachment from immediate and ongoing experience is for Luckmann a social 
act. His actions will be a succession of acts that would not be meaningful 
because there is no interpretative scheme. "A human organism considered in 
a rigorously biological perspective would be wrapped up, as it were, in the 
immediacy of its ongoing experience. It could learn from past experience but 
experience could not be sedimented into interpretative schemes".32 The 
action now lacks an inner force. In brutes it is this succession of activities that 
make them what they are. Meaning is created by human being being 
conscious of itself. This is only possible in recognition of a self to self 
consciousness. Human organism in isolation does not create meaning. 
Meaning creation is a social activity. This takes us back to Feuerbach, in his 
term, self consciousness is a species consciousness which is a social 
process.
From what we have said so far, it follows that detachment is possible 
because of interpretative scheme and the interpretative scheme is possible 
because of sedimentation which is a social process. If the interpretative 
scheme transcends the individual experience, it follows that individuation of 
consciousness is only possible in the human organism by way of social 
process. So for individuation to emerge, it has to be in a social context. 
Simply put, self consciousness becomes a social process which is only
attainable by the individual transcending his biological nature in the 
interpretative scheme. There is a similarity here to what Feuerbach says 
about the formation of consciousness. The process that leads to self 
consciousness becomes the process of man transcending his biological 
nature. This is the level of meaning given. The ability to transcend the 
biological nature of man becomes the ability to be religious. "The organism 
in isolation is nothing but a separate pole of ’meaningless’ subjective 
processes becomes a Self by embarking with others upon the construction 
of an ’objective’ and moral universe of meaning. Thereby the organism 
transcends its biological nature".33 This transcendence of the biological is 
according to Luckmann a universal human phenomenon, following this, 
religion then becomes a universal human phenomenon. The outcome of this 
for Luckmann is that man is of necessity a homo reliaiosus. thus the root of 
religion is the human consciousness. Since human beings exist everywhere 
and in every generation, religion now becomes a necessity for man 
everywhere he finds himself.
If meaning systems emerge by man transcending his biological nature, and 
Luckmann identifies this transcendence of the biological with religion, surely 
not all aspects of the transcendence of the biological are religious. While 
agreeing that the root of religion is in the transcendence of the biological, we 
cannot admit that it is only religion, for it is obvious that other things have
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their roots there. What then separates religion from other views is not made 
clear by Luckmann. The same root could still be the root of magic.
Up to where Luckmann identifies the transcendence of the biological as the 
universal condition of religion, there is probably no disagreement with 
phenomenology. From what he has said, the transcendence of the biological 
is the self consciousness which we see in Feuerbach. It now follows that for 
the two men the root of religion is found in self consciousness. What then in 
this transcendence of the biological that makes the religious religious? It is 
here that Luckmann does not tell us exactly what would have amounted to 
the solution of the problem of the phenomenon of religion.
Luckmann is well aware that the root of religion is not to be found in the 
institutional form but in a thing basic to human beings. The root is in 
transcendence but he does not go further. Since he does not explain why 
certain things are religious and some not, we have to thank him for at least 
turning our attention away from searching for the root of religion in religious 
objects. In doing this, he has gone a step beyond the scholars already 
studied in the field of the general history of religion.
The question that comes to mind is this, at what stage or position in 
transcendence does religion begin? Where does the ontic transcendence of
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Luckmann meet ontological transcendence. How do we analyse 
transcendence to arrive at that which is religious? This will be a pointer to 
the way the phenomenology of religion should go.
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Peter Berger: The Persistence of Transcendence.
From the works of Ludwig Feuerbach and Thomas Luckmann, it is clear that 
the root of religion can be found in human consciousness. While Luckmann 
does not continue after arriving at the conclusion that the transcendence of 
the biological is religious, Feuerbach goes on to say that religion properly 
speaking is a projection of human ideals. The question that one tends to ask 
Feuerbach is this, where the ideals which are projected come from? If his 
answer is that they belong to the nature of man, we shall then be tempted 
to ask why there are present in man the demands and claims of his nature 
that do not seem to rise intellectually.
Feuerbach propounds projection. Can that be all there is to it? This is a 
question that is difficult to evade. As previously admitted, there is no 
disagreement with Feuerbach on the fact that projection cannot be ruled out 
in religion but the point that is at issue is what is projected and its 
relationship to both the projector and the screen upon which the projection 
is effected.
Could what Feuerbach sees as a projection be after all a reflection? Peter 
Berger’s work in the bid to tackle the problem of projection theory of 
Feuerbach seems to suggest this. Peter Ludwig Berger, son of George and
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Jelka Berger was born in Vienna, Austria in March 17 1929. He obtained a 
B.A. from Wagner College in 1949, M.A. from New School of Social Research 
in 1950 and Ph.D. in 1954. He served in the U.S. Army from 1953-55. From 
1956-58 he taught at Hartford Theological Seminary. From 1958-63 New 
School of Social Research, 1963-70 Rutgers University. From 1970-79 he 
lectured at Boston College. Since 1979 he has been professor of Social 
Research in Boston University.
He is author of many books including The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966) The Social Reality of Religion (1969) Pyramids of Sacrifice (1975) The 
Heretical Imperative (1979) and The Capitalist Revolution (1986). He is married 
with two children.34
In his work A Rumour of Angels35 Peter Berger tends to question the validity 
of the projection of theory of Feuerbach. In the opening chapter of the work 
Berger sees his contemporaries as allowing the divine to recede into the 
background of human consciousness. "If commentators on the contemporary 
situation of religion agree about anything, it is that the supernatural has 
departed from the modern world. This departure may be stated in such 
dramatic formulation as ’God is dead’ or ’the post Christian era’. Or it may 
be undramatically assumed as a global and probably irreversible trend".36 
Berger does not see the process of secularization as a phenomenon
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occurring only in the churches or in the social set up alone, but as a 
phenomenon affecting the processes inside the human mind. Just as 
Luckmann formed his view on religion in the process of treating secularization, 
so Berger in his treatment of the same secularization concedes the fact that 
traditional religious beliefs appear to have become empty of meaning for large 
segments of the general population whether they continue to attend church 
or not. The lack of meaning has however put believers into a difficult 
situation. Two harsh choices face them. They can adopt to what Berger 
calls the view of a ’cognitive minority’. By cognitive minority he means "a 
group of people whose view of the world differs significantly from the one 
generally taken for granted in their society. Put differently, a cognitive minority 
is a group formed around a body of deviant ’knowledge’".37
Berger stresses the fact that the term knowledge used with reference to the 
sociology of knowledge does not in any way attest the truth or falsity of the 
proposition. It is neutral. In this case they withdraw from the community and 
form an isolated subgroup.
An alternative choice of action on the other hand is the abandonment of their 
belief altogether. The midway however, is to reach a sort of compromise or 
a working accommodation between theistic commitments and the 
secularization attitude of the society. Berger sees the main problem of the
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traditional churches as being compounded by the sociology of knowledge 
which studies relationship between human thought and the social conditions 
under which it occurs. Because of their unusual origin and especially in 
terms of their continued affirmation, the plausibility of the things we believe 
depend in large upon the social support these receive. However, there can 
be exceptions to this. Here Berger refers to the notion that derives directly 
from our idea of experience. Still it can be seen that this experience can only 
be directed into meaningful views of reality by means of social process. The 
sociology of knowledge maintains that all our beliefs are conditioned by the 
societal structures of plausibility within which our thoughts are conceived and 
conducted. Thus the relativity of belief is not only a fact but a necessity of 
human condition.
Berger however, acknowledges the fact that while our beliefs must in some 
way be related to their societal contexts, the fact alone does not grant some 
special warrant to current structures of plausibility which is lacking in their 
counterparts of the previous era. Sociology of knowledge shows that all 
theological options are inevitably contextual and projective products of human 
history. Could what is regarded as projections not on the other hand be a 
reflection of a larger whole? As Corr puts it "to describe the historical, 
psychological, or sociological genesis of any phenomenon is simply to realise 
its inevitable context in human situation. To label a phenomenon a
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’projection’ is not to settle its ultimate status but to call for a further 
investigation of its remaining aspects which have yet to be considered".38 It 
is on this account that Berger request the reconsideration of the whole idea 
of religion as human product of projection. It is this that has led to his 
suggesting that religion may after all be a reflection. This questions the work 
of Feuerbach. "...I would like to go further, to suggest that the entire view of 
religion as a human product or projection may once again be inverted, and 
that in such an inversion lies a viable theological method in response to the 
challenge of sociology. If I am right in this, what could be in the making here 
is a gigantic joke on Feuerbach"39
Berger in his disagreement with the projection of Feuerbach gives example 
with projection in mathematics. This example is used because he sees it as 
the enterprise that appears to be a pure projection. Projection in mathematics 
is man projecting out of his consciousness and this projection somehow 
corresponds to a mathematical reality that is external to him. "Put crudely, the 
mathematics that man projects out of his own consciousness somehow 
corresponds to a mathematical reality that is external to him and which indeed 
his consciousness appears to reflect".40 He goes on to say how this is 
possible, which is the fact that man according to him is a part of overall 
reality. The implication is that "there is a fundamental affinity between the 
structures of his consciousness and the structures of the empirical world".41
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This is possible because "projection and reflection are movements within the 
same encompassing reality".41 The religious projection is to be seen in the 
same line as the mathematical projection. Berger thinks that any theological 
system that could be regarded as worthy of its name ought to be based on 
this possibility of projection. He however stresses the fact that that does not 
imply the search for religious phenomena that will manifest themselves as 
different from human projections. He is of the view that nothing is immune to 
the ’relativization of the socio-historical analysis’. "They will also be human 
projections, products of human history, social constructions undertaken by 
human beings. The meta-empirical cannot be conceived of as a kind of 
enclave within the empirical world, any more, incidentally, than freedom can 
be conceived as a hole in the fabric of causality".42 For Berger then the 
decision which he regards as a theological decision is that in the "immense 
array of human projections, there are indicators of a reality that is truly ’other’ 
and that the religious imagination of man ultimately reflect"43 Here one calls 
to mind Rudolf Otto’s ’Wholly Other’ and the ’Other’ of Van der Leeuw.
The evidence here so far points to man as the starting point of religion and 
it is in man that religion will be given the clearance it needs. If the starting 
point of religion is man, it is however, unlikely that projection is all there is to 
religion. Man on the other hand has a major role to play for "if the religious 
projections of man corresponds to a reality that is superhuman and
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supernatural, then it seems logical to look for traces of this reality in the 
projector himself'.44 Theology for Berger here has to have an anthropological 
basis. While not turning theology to anthropology, he intends to suggest a 
theology of a high empirical sensitivity that seeks to correlate its propositions 
with what can be known empirically.
For this reason, Berger calls for a renewed analysis of human experience, 
especially in its social form. He suggests that theological thought be reverted 
to anthropological starting point and for him "such an anchorage in 
fundamental human experience might offer some protection against the 
constantly changing winds of cultural moods".45 He suggests that for 
theology to be anthropologically based, it has to seek out what he calls 
signals of transcendence in the empirically given of the everyday human 
situation. He further suggests that there are what he calls ’prototype human 
gestures’ that may be available as signals of transcendence. About 
transcendence Berger says "I am not using transcendence here in a technical 
philosophical sense but literally, as the transcending of the normal, everyday 
world that I earlier identified with the notation of the ’supernatural’" and for 
him ’human gestures’ mean "certain reiterated acts and experiences that 
appear to express essential aspect of man’s being, of the human animal as 
such".46 Berger’s task is to determine if one can find, what in his term he 
calls angels, in other words, messengers or signals of transcendence in the
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data of social anthropology. These signals of transcendence according to 
him refer to "phenomena that are to be found within the domain of our 
’natural’ reality but appear to point beyond that reality".47 For him the 
existence of a transcendent or other worldly reality has become problematic 
and the signs of transcendence are weak and scattered. In the metaphor of 
Berger’s title, they have become only rumours of angels. By tracking down 
the rumours, Berger hopes to get to their roots and see the bases on which 
they stand. It is on this account that the sub title of the book is Modern 
Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural.
Berger’s search for angels is an attempt to justify a choice between the 
options of a naturalistic world view and one which involves transcendence. 
His argument is that such a choice should be made on the basis of available 
evidence. This demands a high sensitivity to the empirical data of human 
experience. The question of whether or not the projections of religious 
imaginations are to be recognised as reflections of transcendence, will have 
to begin by analyzing human projection. This requires that theology adopts 
a broadly conceived anthropological starting point. Moreover, to avoid the 
vagaries of what Berger calls ’mood theologies’, we must seek for that kind 
of anthropological starting point which looks to fundamental forms of human 
experience. For these reasons Berger’s quest for the signals of transcendence 
begins with ’prototypical human gestures’. Such acts are not confined to
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particular temporal situations. They are expressions of what Berger calls 
man’s fundamental ’humanities’. This for Berger does not mean a static 
’human nature’ outside of history. On the contrary, he argues that our 
understanding of humanitas which would seem roughly equivalent to what 
existentialists call the human attention, grows and changes in the course of 
history. The point is that prototypical human gestures have a certain 
timelessness and metaphysical quality which transcends the individual 
situation in which they appear. They are in other words, "experiences of 
ecstasy of ek-statis. A standing outside of the taken-for-granted routines of 
everyday life".47 Although these acts are to be found in the midst of normal 
human experience, Berger’s contention is that their ecstatic quality permits us 
to stand outside the ordinary course of events and to adopt a perspective 
from which these events are to be judged.
He offers such ecstatic gestures as the signals of transcendence. These are 
arguments from ordering, arguments from play, arguments from hope, 
arguments from damnation, and arguments from humour. We need not go 
into this detailed discussion of his treatment of these five arguments. It 
suffices to take note of them. These arguments are examples of what Berger 
calls an inductive faith as opposed to deductive faith. He describes inductive 
faith as "a religious process of thought that begins with facts of human 
experience"; for deductive faith, it "begins with certain assumptions (notably
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assumptions about divine revelation) that cannot be tested by experience. 
Put simply, inductive faith moves from human experience to statements about 
God, deductive faith from statements about God to interpretations of human 
experience".48 The need for detailed study of the whole of Berger’s thought 
in the work A Rumour of Angels does not arise here. All that concerns us is 
what it has to say about projection and reflection.
While Berger does not doubt the fact that in religion there could be projection 
as Feuerbach states, he doubts that that could be all there is to religion. If 
self consciousness is awareness of human projection, it can also be taken to 
be an awareness of that which is projected. Our problem can now be 
restated, if projection is as a result of reflection, what is the relationship 
between the self that reflects and projects and the reflection and projection? 
While Berger does not discard the idea of projection in religion, his view is 
that after all there may be reflection before the so called projection. What is 
it in transcendence that gives account of what can be regarded as religion? 
Berger is not interested in going further.
For us religion is not all transcendence and all transcendence is not religion. 
What is certain however, is that there are two sides to religion. How can we 
combine these two sides? The combination perhaps may throw some light 
on the phenomenology of religion.
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION
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Wilfred Cantwell Smith: The History of a Concept.
The last chapter raised doubts concerning the terminology of religion. Despite 
our best efforts, the problem of identifying the phenomenon of religion itself 
remains elusive. In the ex cursus after chapter two, there is an indication of 
the difficulties encountered in the bid to apply Husserl’s insights to the 
phenomenology of religion. In other human sciences, there are some sort of 
agreed procedures; for them Husserl’s insight into phenomenological 
principles have been applied with relative ease. Why has this not been the 
case with regard to religion? Could the obstacle be in the very conception 
of a phenomenology of religion? For this we shall examine the work of 
Cantwell Smith since he too in his own way has questioned the adequacy of 
the term ’religion’.
Born at Toronto in 1916, Wilfred Cantwell Smith spent a year as a school boy 
at Grenoble in France at the age of eleven, and at the age of seventeen, a 
year in Spain and in Egypt. He lived for eight years in Lahore from 1941 to 
1949. In 1943 he was ordained in the Presbyterian Church of Canada, and 
in 1961, became a minister of the United Church of Canada. He was 
appointed as W.M. Birks Professor of Comparative Religion at McGill 
University Montreal in 1949. Two years later, he founded the McGill Institute 
of Islamic Studies and in 1964 became the Director of the Harvard Centre for
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the Study of Islamic Studies and also the Director of the Harvard Centre for 
the Study of World Religions. This latter centre combined a rigorous 
academic programme in Comparative Religion with a residential setting 
wherein twenty-five students from different cultures and religions could share 
colloquia and discourse. At Harvard, his interest and expertise widened to 
include all major living religions.
From 1973-78, he was McCulloch Professor at Dalhousie University in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia after which he returned to Harvard to direct the religious 
Programme in the Faculty of Arts and Science which he had originally 
masterminded.1
Smith is a prolific writer. Among his works are: Islam in Modern History 
(1957), Some Similarities and Differences between Christianity and Islam 
(1959),2 The Meaning and End of Religion (1964), The Faith of Other Men 
(1965), Religious Diversity (1976), Questions of Religious Truth (1967), Belief 
and History (1977), Faith and Belief (1979), Towards a World Theology (1981).
Although the theme of religion runs throughout his works, we shall be 
concentrating on The Meaning and End of Religion and Towards a World 
Theology for what Smith has to say about the phenomenon of religion. 
References will be made to the other works as and when necessary.
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Smith sees the difficulties in the definition of religion as emanating from asking 
the wrong questions. The persistence of the difficulties in the definition 
prompted his suggesting that "one might argue that the sustained inability to 
clarify what the word ’religion’ signifies, in itself suggests that the term ought 
to be dropped; that it is a distorted concept not really corresponding to 
anything definite or distinctive in the objective world".3 Smith does not doubt 
the existence of religious phenomena, but whether they constitute some 
distinctive entity is problematic. However, he suspects that one other possible 
reason for the inability to define religion could lie in the fact that what one 
thinks of religion is central to what one thinks about life and the universe as 
a whole. Looking for an agreement on the definition of religion then is 
equivalent to looking for a consensus on the ultimate questions of man, truth 
and destiny. We know that expecting this is expecting the impossible. Smith 
is aware of the difficulties involved in such venture and states clearly his 
intention. He is not unaware of scholars who have spent the whole of their 
careers searching for the essence of religion. His intention is "to propose a 
way of looking at religious phenomena that does not attempt to locate their 
essence, and that seems to me consequently serviceable perhaps for the 
questions that arise".4
Smith now turns to the origin and meaning of the word ’religion’. The word
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’religion’ he says comes from the Latin reliqio. a form that eventually came to 
be used in a great variety of senses by different writers without precision. 
About the first century B.C. under the influence of Greece the meaning of 
reliqio came to be much more restricted than the meaning it acquired later. 
For Smith there is disparity of opinion among modern scholars as to what the 
word came to designate in the early stages. Was it power outside of man 
obligating him to a certain attitude or behaviour failing which he is threatened 
with "aweful retribution, a kind of tabu, or the feeling in man vis-a-vis such 
powers".5 Though the difference between the power outside of man 
obligating him to a certain attitude or behaviour and the feeling in man vis- 
a-vis such powers can become blurred on account of the fact that outsiders 
regard religious experiences as subjective, in spite of the fact that they were 
believed, or felt to reside in some objective thing or practice, it follows that 
both "that in which ’mana’ was felt to dwell, and the person whose 
scrupulousness towards it was vivid, were each termed reliqiosus. There were 
reliqiosae locae. sacred places; and viri reliqiosi. reverent or devout persons 
careful in the conscientious fulfilment of corollary prescriptions".6 Making 
room for the later development of the meaning of the word in later centuries, 
Smith finds that the adjectival use of the word has been employed more 
frequently that the substantive. He concludes that this supports the notion that 
in the early Christian period and before, the important thing was piety (or 
religious attitude) rather than religion.
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It is clear that Christianity introduced a certain we - they exclusivism which 
was also beginning to take shape among the New Testament Jews. This 
reification according to Smith had not taken place in the New Testament, a 
point made clear in the letter of James, "Religion that is pure and undefiled 
before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their 
affliction, and to keep oneself unstained from the world".7 Here it is clear 
what the author means by ’religion’: the quality of experience of the truly 
religious man. He is not contrasting ’our’ religion which is pure with ’theirs’ 
which is corrupt. In this case, and in many other cases, religion is to be 
thought of more "in terms of quality of men’s lives or a colouring of the world 
that they perceive, than in terms of some independent substance or entity".8 
Smith quotes Arnobius contrasting nostra reliqio with vestra reliqio to show 
the change that occurred in the conception of religion. Smith also cites 
Augustine and Calvin to make clear his point about reliqio. In the fourth 
Century Augustine 1430 undertook to explicate the notion of reliqio. Prior to 
that Smith traced the history of reliqio in the Christian Church, and how it 
came to be used. The history of martyrdom shows that the difference 
between pagans and Christians was their way of life. For Smith, Augustine’s 
work makes a clear the meaning of reliqio. De Vera Reliqione of Augustine 
Smith says, would today be translated On the True Religion. Since the writer 
was a Christian, one would suppose that by the True Religion he meant
Christianity. A close translation according to Smith should be On True 
Religion, which means on proper piety of genuine worship. Augustine argues 
at length that the Vera Reliqione is the worship of God. The book he says 
"hardly mentions Christianity’, and culminates in a warm, reverberating and 
sustained affirmation of a personal relation to the transcendent God ’from 
whom, through whom, and in whom are all things. To him be glory for ever 
and ever. Amen’".9 He contends that for this writer, religion is not a system 
of things to be done or to be believed, nor is it a historical tradition, 
institutionalized or susceptible of outside observation. It is instead, "vivid and 
personal confrontation with the splendour and the love of God. The Church, 
for him, exists in order to make this relationship possible".10 Religion then is 
the bond between God and man which ought to subsist and which was never 
absent from the beginning of mankind ’till now. Smith holds that the concern 
of the religious man is God, that of the observer of religion. He cites the work 
of Marsillo Ficino entitled De Christiana Reliqione published in 1471. The title 
would today be translated The Christian Religion. Ficino did not have that in 
mind when writing the book if by ’Christian religion’ one understand any 
system of doctrines, any institutional phenomenon or historical development. 
For Smith, what Ficino means by reliqio "is universal to man; it is, indeed, the 
fundamental distinguishing human characteristic, innate, natural and primary. 
It is the divinely provided instinct that makes man, by which he perceives and 
worships God".11
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For Smith when Calvin’s Christianae Reiiaionis Institutio first published in 1536 
is rendered Institutes of Christian Religion a similar misunderstanding of 
religion is created, for according to him, institutio means instruction, and 
reliqio refers to the same piety which prompts man to worship. For Calvin, 
the, the material described and discussed in his Institutio was not religion as 
institution but things that he hoped would guide men into a personal worship 
recognition of God. He called this Christiana reliqio.
In the first half of the seventh century inspired by Hugo de Groot’s De 
Veritate Reliqionis Christianae which led the way from ’the genuiness of 
Christian religiousness’ to ’the truth of Christian religion, "men were calling by 
this name not that personal vision but the matters such as he set forth to 
lead to it: the system of beliefs and practices, considered as a system, 
irrespective of whether or not they elicited in the human heart a genuine fear 
of and love of God".12 What a change. The system now becomes ’the 
Christian faith’ since there are other systems as well, one arrives at the 
position that there are different religions, which can be considered true or 
false in an intellectual sense. This according to Smith is a translation from a 
personal orientation to a de-personalized intellectual systematization. This is 
the beginning of the plural for ’religions’ which is not possible as long as 
reliqio is something which is in men’s heart. There is then the general
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concept of religion to designate the total system or "sum of all systems of 
beliefs, or simply the generalization that they are there".13
From the discussions so far, Smith’s conclusion is that the word ’reliqio’ has 
been used in four different ways. It has been used to point to a personal 
piety whereby a person has a warm or cold or narrow religion; it has been 
used to point to an overt system of beliefs, practices and values as seen as 
ideal, as in ’true Christianity’; it has been used to point to an overt system of 
beliefs, practices and values seen as sociological and historical phenomenon, 
as in ’true Christianity of history’.15 It has been used to point to Religion in 
general as ’a generic summation’.16
These four different ways contribute to the difficulties in the definition of 
religion. Smith suggests that, "the word, and the concepts, should be 
dropped - at least in all but the first, personalist, sense...I suggest that the 
term ’religion’ is confusing, unnecessary and distorting".17 Smith also 
analyses the use of the names of separate religious systems and traditions 
showing how inappropriate this has been in regard to Buddhism and 
Confucianism and more so in regard to ’the Religions’ in general. The term 
’Hindu’ was "developed by the Muslims".18 The problem of whether 
’Buddhism’ and ’Confucianism’ are ’religions’ is one "the West has never been 
able to answer, and China never able to ask".19 "If Tao as they conceived it
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is at all a valid concept, then it follows that Taoism is a false one".20 ’Shinto’ 
is not Japanese but Chinese; ’Judaism’ arose not in Hebrew but in Greek; 
Guru Nanak as ’the founder of Sikhism’ is rather a misconstruction. Smith 
points out that even the word ’Islam’ which is given by God in the Qur’an to 
Muslims who insist upon it has yet been reified in the ways that he suggests. 
Although the case of Islam seems at first sight to contradict Smith’s view, 
word study of Iman (faith) and others in the Qur’an show that though Islam 
has been verified, that it began like others "as a ringing personal summons 
to men and women to have faith in God and to commit themselves 
wholeheartedly to His commands, and that the instructions and 
conceptualized system of what is now called Islam have been the result of 
that faith and commitment".21 It then follows that the case of Islam "does not 
after all disprove, as it at first seemed calculated to do so, our general 
interpretation of religious reification as a mundane process - by which men 
come to substitute, for a vivid personal faith in direct commerce with 
transcendence, a human and limited conceptualization".22 Summarising the 
survey on the concept of religion, Smith says "In its contemporary form there 
would seem little question but that the concept of a religion is recent, 
Western-and-lslamic, and unstable."23 The process of naming the particular 
religions was bound up with the process of reifying religion in general, so that 
the change to individual names "Followed somewhat after the trend towards 
reification in the concept ’religion’ itself".24 Smith, however, sees this trend as
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a passing phase so that "As knowledge continues to grow, one may 
reasonably expect these alien labels to be more and more abandoned".25
Smith’s complaint however, is not merely against the use of the word religion, 
but against the very concept itself. His problem is not the meaninglessness 
of the old concept but that it was imprecise and could distort. He finds this 
reified meaning of religion irrelevant to the non-civilized peoples who simply 
perform their rites and relate their myths without constructing a system and 
naming it.
For Smith many thinkers around the world object to the use of the term to 
refer to their faith. He reacts against the idea that Islam or any other ’religion’ 
can guide, save, be known, or given allegiance to. It is an impediment which 
stands in the way of God. For Smith, God does not reveal religions, nor do 
religions reveal God. He goes on to show that no religious leader, with the 
exception of Mani, has consciously founded ’a religion’.
Religious leaders have rather called men to transcendent reality. In fact the 
concept of religion is "inadequate for the man of faith",26 for "fundamentally it 
is the outsider who names a religious system. It is the observer who 
conceptualizes a religion as a denotable existent".27 Even the sympathetic 
observer is liable to say that the term ’religion’ does not apply to his field
though it may apply to that of others. Other reasons Smith gives for the 
inadequacy of the notion of religion are those of God and history. For Smith, 
the notion of ’religion’ leaves out the transcendent element in religious life. 
This is because it is an observer’s concept which is constituted by what can 
be observed, notwithstanding the fact "the whole pith and substance of 
religious life lies in its relation to what cannot be observed".28 The observable 
phenomenon, the ’religion’, is not all there is. "Being a Muslim means living 
in a certain context, sociological, historical, ideological and transcendent. The 
significance of being a Muslim lies in this fact, not in some prolegomenon to 
it".29 God, the transcendent element is the point of it all, for "we must look 
not at their religion but at the universe, so far as possible through their 
eyes".30 Even as far as our own faith is concerned there is more than we can 
see or even formulate, and if it is so for ourselves this transcendent element 
is equally important for others. Smith also stresses history as a stumbling- 
block to the concept of religion, saying that if religious history is to be taken 
seriously, then we cannot take seriously the idea of the essence of religions. 
There is no such thing as the essence of a religion. "For essences do not 
have a history. Essences do not change. Yet it is an observable and 
important fact that what have been called religions do, in history change".31 
In history there is a process, flux, infinite variety and development, a richness 
too great to be defined, a future unknown; religion is a static and monolithic 
term which does not do justice to the rich variety in time and space of
religious history. This however is not to reduce religion to its history and 
nothing more. Smith rejects the ’nature and origin’ theory of religion; the idea 
that there is something common to all instances in a tradition that constitutes 
’religion’; ’religion’ as a transcendent ideal; ’religion’ as the ideal its followers 
hold concerning it; and also religion as its history. These terms are 
inadequate for "their faith is greater than its history, is above the sins and 
foibles and distractions of those who profess it".32 These words merely 
suggest the study of man in his religious dimension. It is not a study of 
religion. Any attempt to understand the religiousness of man must recognize 
the fact that life has of necessity and rightly so, looked different when viewed 
from outside than when seen from within. In history there is no such thing 
as ’Christianity’ or ’Buddhism’ or any other religion existing, for these 
concepts are static and history is change. "Neither the believer nor the 
observer can hold that there is anything on earth that can legitimately be 
called ’Christianity’ or ’Shintoism’ or ’religion’ without recognising that if such 
a thing existed yesterday, it existed in a somewhat different form the day 
before. If it exists in one country (or Village), it exists in somewhat different 
forms in the next. The concepts were formed before the ruthlessness of 
historical change was recognized, in all its disintegrating sweep...It is time now 
definitely to reject them theoretically, as inherently inept".33 For Smith the 
"history of what has been called religion in general and of each religion, is the 
history of man’s participation in an evolving context of observable actualities,
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and in something, not directly observable by historical scholarship".34 For 
Smith human history is rendered intelligible on account of the reference to the 
transcendence. History distorts reality if it omits either the mundane or the 
transcendent. The inadequacies in the study of religious life of man is due 
to the fact that the concept of religion has tended to neglect either the 
mundane or the transcendent.
Smith now suggests the replacement of terms ’religion’ and ’religions’ with his 
own terms ’faith’ and ’cumulative traditions’. Faith refers to the inner, 
existential, and experimental dimensions of religion. In this sense it is 
synonymous with ’piety’. It is essentially adjectival, a quality of persons, and 
refers to a subjective involvement with the transcendent value. "By ’faith’ he 
says, "I mean personal faith...For the moment let it stand for an inner religious 
experience or involvement of a particular person; the impingement on him of 
the transcendent, putative or real".35
In contrast to this, by ’cumulative tradition’ he means "the entire mass of overt 
objective data that constitute the historical deposit, as it were, of the past 
religious life of the community in question: temples, scriptures, theological 
systems, dance patterns, legal and other social institutions, conventions, moral 
codes, myths and so on; anything that can be and is transmitted from one 
person, one generation, to another, and that a historian can observe".36
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By dividing ’religion’ into two hemispheres of ’faith’ and ’tradition’, Smith wants 
to clarify the study of both the inward dimension of faith and the objective 
data of the traditions. For him these are all embracing terms.
He says "it is my suggestion that by the use of these two notions it is 
possible to conceptualize and to describe anything that has happened in the 
religious life of mankind".37 Smith rejects the view that religion has an 
essence - an unchanging core. Rather, religions as cumulative traditions may 
be seen as constantly shifting processes. The cumulative tradition is open to 
future redefinition. The life of a tradition occurs in its members. Just as a 
person is open to change until his or her death, so too is a tradition which 
is the creation of persons and cannot be fully defined until it has expired. 
Smith described how tradition is built up by reference to the writer of RG 
Veda. "He received external to himself, in the form of rites and practices, 
norms, ideas, group pressures, family influences, vocabulary, social institutions 
and what not, a religious tradition; and he changed the tradition by adding 
to it1'.38
Tradition is wholly historical but not at the mercy of history "since as agent 
within it stands man".39 It allows for variety, it allows for process, it allows for 
change, it allows for historical intelligibility. He suggests that it is even
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objective "in that Marxists, Muslims, and Mennonites should in principle have 
no difficulty in agreeing on what in fact the Christian cumulative tradition has 
so far been".40 Tradition so to say deals with the objective data, the texts, the 
words, the observables, the outward.
By resolving ’religion’ into faith and ’tradition’ we now recognise why faith is 
not equivalent to religion. Faith corresponds to the inward manner in which 
a person makes sense of the world. This explains Smith’s choice of wording 
the title of his early work The Faith of Other Men. In this work we see the 
world through the eyes of several types of faith.
If faith is not religion as a whole, because it excludes the cumulative tradition, 
it is also not belief. To understand why this is so, we must recognise that 
Smith also distinguishes several meanings in the terms ’belief’. We shall not 
go into details of Smith’s treatment of belief. It suffices that mention be made 
of it.
In his examination of the concept of ’faith’ Smith is concerned "to understand 
not the nature of the personal faith, but the role that it has played in the 
religious history of mankind".41 The expressions of ’faith’ have appeared in 
various forms, in prose and poetry, in patterns of deeds, both ritual and 
morality; in art, in institutions, in law, in community, in character; and in many
other ways. It then follows that tradition is the result of the past faith and the 
cause of present faith. Faith is not objective data like tradition. "What the 
words mean, what pattern of words suggest, what emotional implications for 
man they may have had...these are not objective data, but they are historical 
facts and are important. They must be, and they can be, studied and 
taught".42 ’Faith’ personal as it is, like other of man’s involvement in art, love, 
ambition, joy and sorrow though beyond comprehension, can be 
apprehended. It is clear that when Smith talks of faith he prefers it through 
an ideal, rather than jn ideal. This is probably because he understands ideals 
to have transcendent properties which are never comprehended. Ideals lure 
persons with the force of intrinsic attractiveness and demand. Through them, 
by means of them, by participating in them, persons are open for growth in 
the direction of infinity. In a similar way, Smith does not speak of the content 
of faith, since a container is larger than that which is contained. Persons of 
faith are unable to contain that which is limitless and greater than 
themselves.43 He is slow to speak of faith having a specific object, though 
he acknowledges the fact that the worshippers are naturally conditioned by 
a particular idea of reality. It then follows that for him, the idea is not the 
reality that the worshippers open to in faith, but rather Reality itself. It is on 
this account that he speaks of faith ’in shape of’ an idea, faith in an idea.44 
There is not generic faith of each tradition; there is not ideal faith that we 
ought to have; faith varies from person to person and from day to day. As
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Edward Hughes puts it, for Smith, "The locus of faith lies not in rituals, 
doctrines, or forms of organisation: these are public items. The locus is in 
individuals who both find and give meaning to their cultural inheritance and 
who in turn, are inspired by earlier generations. New generations turn to the 
inherited tradition but reinterpret its data and discover new meaning according 
to the psychological and historical demands of the situation. Through this 
ongoing interpretation a meaning world is constituted and kept vital. Yet it 
would not be correct to imply that persons seek the meaning of a tradition 
as their primary goal; instead, they seek the meaning of existence as 
illuminated by that tradition".45 This is because Smith’s concern is "with 
meaning: not only the meaning that a person’s tradition has for him or her, 
if they are involved, but more significantly the meaning that life and the 
universe have for them, in the light of that involvement".46
Though faith is a personal capacity for meaning, Smith does not conceive of 
faith in an individualistic manner. Though faith is personal, the person is not 
isolated. For Smith, the person is radically social. Faith enables persons to 
attain self-transcendence by surrendering to the ideals that they experience 
as making a claim upon them. In this case, it can be said that faith reveals 
the unique dignity of human freedom. Individuals reveal the ability either to 
embody value or to fall short of the mark. As an idea, true personhood 
exists in each religion as a dream to be attained. To have faith then is to be
truly human. "To think or feel that human behaviour may on occasion be 
inhuman, that people may be ’less than human’, that, unlike crocodiles, we 
persons may become or may fail to become our true selves, is to recognise 
’man’ as transcendent and not merely as an empirical concept".47 For Smith 
then a human being’s way to transcendence is through the anthropological 
ideals of their culture. Faith then can be said to be the capacity for 
authenticity. Persons have attained integrity by being involved in one or more 
of the earth’s major traditions. What has been called religions may be 
thought of as historically significant attempts to be excellently human. One is 
not first a human being who has Jewishness, Muslimness, Christianess, and 
so on, accidentally added to his or her humanity. Rather Smith argues: "one 
is human by being one or another of them".48 He sees human nature as not 
a fixed entity. Rather, what is called ’human nature’ is a potential for cultural 
definition. It is through culture that one awakens to the definition and 
possibility of authenticity.
Smith sees being a Muslim, a Christian, a Buddhist and so on as a 
participation in the traditions of Muslim, Christian or Buddhist. That is to say 
to be any is to interpret reality through their institutions or practice. "To be 
Christian, Muslim or Buddhist, to be religious, is a creative act, of participation 
in a community in motion".49 For Smith man as a historical being, has been 
in interaction with the mundane, and as a spiritual being, has been open to
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transcendence. Whatever religion is, it is the course traced out by this double 
involvement. Though faith is personal, it is not isolated and for this, "any 
person’s faith is what it is; in interaction with the particular religious context 
in which that person actually lives. The context during any given century is 
different from that during any other, historians can demonstrate for us; and 
of course, the religious context for any person living in the latter twentieth 
century is in turn different from those that went before".50
For Smith then context of faith is in a constant flux on account of historical 
development.
Smith sees the religious not only participating in his own religious movement, 
but that he does also participate in the remainder of the historical process in 
which they live, in other words its secular parts. "There is the bustling 
courtyard of the profane outside of the temple: pro fano".51 Smith here 
seems to indicate that both the sacred and the profane are religious but in 
different dimensions. This is in a way similar to Eliade’s view. For Smith then, 
taking part in the secular affairs is religious though he acknowledges the 
difficulties in using the same terms for both. Here he makes clear the point 
he has made about being religious which he sees as the individual 
participating in his universe which is made real by appropriating its 
transcendent dimension. Each religious person is seen as participating in the
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ongoing historical process of which the contemporary life of their community 
is a current phase. "As their community comes out of its inherited past and 
moves into an uncertain future, the present members constitute the present 
phase as each plays his or her part in the company of fellow members and 
in the constant presence, dimly or deeply perceived, of that transcendent 
power in whom we all live and move and have our being. It is the quality of 
their participation that gives their life its religious significance".52 It then follows 
that faith of any man does not lie in the data of that man’s tradition but in the 
heart, that is the human heart and what what tradition means to them, in the 
light of that tradition.
Smith now seems to substitute the word religion with his term faith or the 
word ’reliqio’ as he described elsewhere and that gives him the impetus to 
emphasise once more that "The study of religion is the study of persons, as 
I have long urges; and indeed of human lives at their most intimate, most 
profound, and most primary, most transcendent".53 Smith sees the source of 
the problem as Western man’s understanding of religion. His criticism of the 
Western critics is that they have "tended to perceive what they have thus 
labelled ’religion’ or ’the religions’ as a construct, an addendum that human 
beings ’have’ over and above their prime humanity".54 The reason for this 
way of thinking can readily be understood when one recalls that the sceptics 
only know one dimension of reality, which is the secular one. For them the
dimension that exists is the secular, the religious dimension only an extra. This 
is in contradiction to the Christian classical position in which the death of 
Christ is seen as making man to become what he was originally. What he 
was truly made to be. Taking the case of Christianity as a typical example, 
it can only be understood if one recognizes it "as envisioning not an overplus, 
additional to man’s essence, but the restoring of man’s essence, the removal 
of a subtraction from or distortion of it".55 For Smith religion is a way of living 
in transcendence. He sees the Western humanist position as a way of living 
in transcendence in the world and that is why it has had its martyrs and 
champions. The reasons versus faith debate has been to Smith nothing but 
a polarity between faith in reason and faith in God. All said and done, religion 
for Smith is a way of life and not the institutions as have been known. He 
sees history as evidence of the fact that man has been man by ’his and her 
being in one way or another transcendence-orientated’. "Men and women 
have not been human, and then Buddhists, Hindu, Muslim, rationalists- 
humanist, or whatever, in addition. Rather, there has been a Jewish way of 
being human, a Hindu way, a Greek-metaphysic way, a Christian way".56
On account of this Smith doubts the possibility of one way claiming to be the 
truest or the right way. For this then Smith sees all that has been called 
religion and ’the religions’ as inherently human.
It cannot be abstracted from the men and the women whose humanity it 
informs. "It is not an entity to be postulated, one that can be legitimately 
conceived in itself or considered analytically. It is not a thing, but a quality of 
personal life (both social and individual)".57 Smith sees the dichotomy 
between the secular and the religious as originating in the Enlightment period. 
He tries to explain the one time definition of religion as "peoples views about 
the supernatural, a distinct realm (many added distinct from reality)".58 This 
is because the Enlightenment period went along with the dualist view of the 
universe. At this time the concept of ’nature arose and was contrasted with 
the supernatural’. Attempts were made to avoid the dualism that resulted and 
this led to the denial of the ’existence of the supernatural’. However, whenever 
religion is mentioned, the peoples view was that it had to do with the 
supernatural. Although according to Smith the Church resisted this definition, 
it has its own definition inherited from the scholastics which is equally faulty. 
Ever since the definition of religion has been bogged down by these two 
conceptions.
For Smith the religious response is the response of the whole person. The 
life of faith involves everything in man. Being a Christian then means the 
participation in the full integrity of one’s personality in all that the Christians 
stand for in their relationship with God, Christ, and the Church, one’s 
neighbour and one’s cosmic reality. Smith once more emphasises the fact
that what makes the religiousness of any person is not the concept of religion 
or the group to which the one belongs, but the sum total of his world view 
and as it is appropriated by him. Giving example with the Buddhists he has 
this to say: "To understand the Buddhists I have insisted, we must not look 
at something called Buddhism but at the world; so far as possible, through 
Buddhist eyes. For this, we must among other matters learn to use the total 
system of Buddhist doctrine or world-view as Buddhists use it: as a pattern 
for ordering the data of observation not as a data to be ordered. A 
conceptual framework can be understood historically and accurately, insofar 
as it is appreciated as it has functioned, as a framework within which the 
universe is framed: the universe and the man;...all that man sees and 
knows".59 This can be seen as conferring meaning on his existence. As it is 
with Buddhism, so it is with the other religions. The history of religion then is 
the history of man in his meaning giving role to his existence. Religions then 
or the institutions as such can be seen as a symbol of participation in 
transcendence. A particular symbol then may be satisfactory to some and 
not to others, as a symbol of participation in transcendence. For Smith then 
religion is the history of the encounter of the community and the individual 
with transcendence. Since a community is created by shared values and 
symbols, it is easy to understand why different communities arise with their 
idea of participation in transcendence. "There are many ways of perceiving the 
world; and the history of religion makes clear, there are many ways, differing
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in place and time, of perceiving transcendence immanent within it".60 Though 
different communities exist and have their own means, one would say that 
they have something in common which is participation in transcendence and 
that for Smith is a uniting factor.
One cannot say all there is to be said in the work of Smith about the nature 
of religion. Having seen religion in his view as the history of the encounter of 
the community and the individual with transcendence, we shall go on to 
investigate the relationship between transcendence and the historical entities 
that are called religions. Meanwhile Smith has redirected our attention in the 
search for the phenomenon of religion. Although a lot is still left unsaid about 
his treatment of religion, we shall summarise our findings of his views of 
religion with the following: "What used to be the conceptual pattern, through 
which one looked has become ’a religion’, at which one looks. What used to 
be the context of transcendence, within which one responded, has become 
an empirical item among the several objects of one’s inquisitive scrutiny, 
which some people ’believe’ - while increasingly many do not: for what at that 
level are, quite apparently, almost good reasons".61 For Smith religion has 
moved from being a way of life to becoming an institution. It is his wish that 
it be returned to its rightful place, that of being seen as an encounter of the 
individual and the community with transcendence.
Smith’s suggestion has thus taken us forward in the examination of the 
phenomenon of religion. It can be seen that he has provided a basis for 
distinguishing religion and religious trappings from what religion is trying to 
express, that is the encounter with transcendence. If this is the case, it is not 
difficult to understand how in different places and cultures, men have 
responded in different ways.
Having said that the problem still remains concerning the relationship of 
religion to transcendence, we now look at the work of Karl Jaspers. This issue 
has been addressed by him.
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Karl Jaspers: Being as all Encompassing and its Relationship to 
Transcendence.
The conclusion to be drawn from the last chapter is that if the 
phenomenology of religion is to be attempted, the concept of religion must 
be returned to its position as a form of consciousness of transcendence. 
Taking this as our basis, we can look at the works of Karl Jaspers whose 
interest extends to both transcendence and religion. Though writing 
independantly, Smith and Jaspers seem to address the same issue. Could we 
find a clue as to the way phenomenology of religion could be approached in 
the works of Jaspers? It can rightfully be said that Jasper has a link with 
both the religionists and the phenomenologists. In addressing himself with the 
problem of transcendence and religion, he has a relationship with the 
religionist. Though he does not regard himself as a phenomenologist, a look 
at his work will show that he has connections with phenomenology and can 
rightly be called a phenomenologist.
Karl Jaspers was born on February 23rd 1883 at Oldenburn, Germany, about 
twenty-five miles West of Bremen.1 His father was a descendent of many 
generations of farmers and merchants, and studied law and, after serving for 
sometime as high constable of the district, became a bank director. After 
graduating from the Gymnasium, Jaspers was matriculated as a student of
jurisprudence for three semesters. He was then enroled as a student of 
medicine and passed the medical state examination in 1908. In 1909 he 
received his degree of Doctor of Medicine after which he became a research 
assistant at Heidelberg Psychiatric Hospital. In 1910, he married Gertrude 
Mayer whom he had known since 1907. In 1913 he became a Privatdozent 
in Psychology in the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Heidelberg. In 
1921 Jaspers became a full professor of philosophy in the University of 
Heidelberg despite the effort of Rickert to block it. In 1928 he was called to 
the University of Bonn but he declined. In 1933 Jaspers was excluded from 
all administrative duties in the University and in 1937, the Nationalist-Socialist 
regime denied him the right to teach though he was allowed to draw a 
modest pension.2 In 1945 he was reinstated by the Americans who were 
administering the Universities. In 1948 he was called to the University of 
Basel. There he was until his retirement in 1961. He died in Basel of a 
stroke on the 26th February, 1969. Among his works are Allaemeine 
Psvchopatholoaie (1913), three volumes of his Magnum opus Philosoohie 
1931 (Copyrighted for 1932) Vernunft und Existenz (1935) Von der Wahrheit 
(1947), Vernunft und Widervernunft in unswrer Zeit (1950) Nietzsche und das 
Christentum (1946).
Jaspers came into contact with phenomenology as a young doctor in 1909 
through reading some of the earlier work of Husserl. He took immediate liking
to Husserl’s method which he found uncommonly useful for the description 
of certain psycho-pathological phenomena the study of which occupied him 
at that time. More profoundly however, he was impressed by Husserl’s 
singularly disciplined way of thinking and by his tenacity in ferreting out 
hidden presuppositions everywhere. "In a world which at that time was full 
of prejudices, schematisms, and conventions, this felt like being liberated".3 
Though Jaspers preferred not to be included in the phenomenological 
movement, saying that his philosophy would be the same with or without 
Husserl, this can be understood in the light of his appraisal of Husserl’s 
method as an approach to psychology and psychiatry. At that time Jaspers 
was especially interested in research in psychopathology and Husserl and 
Dilthy were two philosophers whose works helped shape his views. Husserl’s 
method was fruitfully appropriated to describe the inner experience of patients 
as phenomena of consciousness, including hallucinations, delusions and 
emotions. This however, is not the limit of the method. "As a method, I 
adopted Husserl’s phenomenology, which, in its beginning he called 
descriptive psychology. I retained it, although I rejected its further 
development into essences (Wesensschau)".4 From this it is clear that even 
if at a later stage Jaspers pulls away from phenomenology as practised by 
Husserl, it is likely that he did not abandon the general method of approach.
Whatever else the work of Husserl is, it "can also be regarded as an attempt
to determine the nature of reason in relation to science. Philosophy, he 
insisted, must be strictly scientific and not merely a string of opinions which 
may or may not be true. In fact, philosophy must be universal science that 
lays the foundations and justifies all the other sciences and at the same time 
also carried its own immanent justification".5 This concept of philosophy can 
be said to combine the ideal of a Cartesian universal science and a Kantian 
sort of idealism. As Quentin Lauer puts it, "The synthesis of these two ideals, 
requires that Husserl admit nothing which cannot be the object of science 
and that he accepts no other source for the necessity which belongs to 
scientific knowledge than consciousness itself. With Kant...he will designate the 
subjective ’faculty’ in which necessity resides by the name of reason. Thus, 
the ultimate source of science in the strict sense must be reason; and if 
phenomenology is to be an investigation of consciousness, then 
phenomenology which is to be a universal science must be an investigation 
of reason, in the sense that it determines how and when reason is operative".6 
Reason he says signifies the necessary constitution of consciousness, and 
rational means scientific because, "to be scientific and to be constituted in 
reason are synonymous".7 Husserl’s originality however, consists in the fact 
that he seeks to determine this rationality not apart from lived experience 
itself, for he considers that the rational activity is only the explication of what 
is contained already in the experience of a Lebenswelt. For Lauer, "Husserl 
wanted to regulate the relationship of reason and experience according to a
law which is intrinsic to both".8 Husserl seeks to determine the nature of 
reason and rationality in the context of science and scientific necessity. 
Jaspers could be said to be in this tradition. He too institutes a radical 
investigation into the nature of science, and in connection with it, into the 
nature of reason. In a sense his thought can be looked upon as an immense 
contemporary critique of the sciences, providing him with the occasion to 
rouse philosophy to a new degree of awareness. This is evidenced by the 
very plan of his writings. In the Existenz Philosoohie for example, he 
introduces his treatment of truth by posing the problem of science and 
philosophy, and concludes it with a description of reason. However, he differs 
from Husserl and Kant in that he does not agree with the investigation of pure 
reason but insists that one must also investigate the persona sources of 
man’s thinking, his individual experience. Jaspers’ attitude to science and 
philosophy stems from his own personal experience. He moved from science 
to philosophy so what he has to say are those of a man at home with both 
science and philosophy.
Philosoohie Weltorientierunq is an attempt to investigate the domain of the 
phenomena or the objective beings which constitute the positive world, the 
world that the positive sciences investigate. It is in the effort to think 
philosophically about the whole objective being, the world, which in itself 
however, is not an object. The philosophical reflection, it is not even a
compact whole. Jaspers distinguishes at least four irreducible spheres or 
areas in it, matter, vegative life, sensitive life, and spirit.9 He considers these 
four areas to be discontinuous with each other. As Kurt Hollfman rightly points 
out, "Jaspers’ primary concern is to resist the tendency of making one of the 
spheres absolute and to subject the others to its logic and laws. Philosophy 
must avoid the pitfalls of materialism and biologism as well as those of 
panpsychism and radical existentialism. Physics, biology, psychology and the 
humanities have no common criteria and cannot be ordered according to any 
one standard. Each order fails if it pretends to be the one true order. The 
totality of the universe is neither a possible object of a universal science, nor 
can it become unified by systematic philosophy".10 The essential task of 
world orientation therefore is not for unitary theories about the world, but to 
seek out the definite limits of objective science in order to designate those 
points where philosophical rationality must take over from scientific rationality 
and transcend it in the explanation of reality. What then does Jaspers 
understand as science and philosophy?
Jaspers sees science as the only domain of strictly objective knowledge that 
is, of knowledge that can exhibit the notes of impersonal validity, univocity, 
and universality. These qualities derive from the nature of general 
consciousness, which is the cognitive subject of the scientific knowledge. It 
can be said that science is the clearest expression and the highest
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achievement of general consciousness. Though science is the highest 
achievement of general consciousness, it cannot be said to be synonymous 
with it. "Science adds something to the ordinary performance of 
consciousness in general: it introduces order and method into it".11 In 
contrast to mathematics and logic which study mere forms, the empirical 
sciences deal with reality. It is on this account that Jaspers call them real 
sciences. Since they deal with reality, they must introduce additional steps of 
procedure into their methods over and above purely deductive and 
combinatory steps of mathematics and logic. In the empirical sciences, the 
facts are first observed, this however implies a more subtle procedure than 
simply stating everything about a phenomenon. It implies the selection of 
relevant factors in the event under observation. The selection takes place 
according to some hypothesis which promises to explain the phenomenon in 
question. If a sufficient number of observations are verified by repeated 
experiences, science may begin to generalise by a complex way of induction 
and set up a model or a theory. This theory will be valid for all similar 
phenomena in such a way that science will be able to make reliable 
predictions of phenomena as yet unobserved. There is of course a curious 
circularity and endlessness in this procedure, which Jaspers dos not fail to 
note in his critique of the sciences. It looks as if the finding of facts depend 
on an anticipatory theory, called a hypothesis, while the verification of the 
theory or the hypothesis depend on the facts thus found.12 Put in another
way, a particular observation has no significance except within a theory, while 
the adoption of a theory is not justified except through the observational and 
experimental facts that led to it. This way, the cogency of empirical research 
is gravely relativised because, as a fact it is bound to a theory and as a 
theory to facts.13 Here we can distinguish the difference between the theories 
of the natural sciences and those of the intellectual sciences. The former are 
more readily expressible in exact mathematic formulae than the latter. The 
theories of the intellectual sciences consist largely of understanding. For this 
the method of verification or falsification are not entirely reducible to exact 
measurements. They are rather matter for intuitive sense reconstruction. 
Another field of cogency are the intuitions of the categories of objectivity in 
general. The objects of these intuitions are therefore not real but possible 
objects which constitute the material for an intuitive phenomenology.14 This 
type of phenomenology "describes, explicates, brings to consciousness 
certain identical and unmistakable elements and structures of world-orientation 
as that network in which the objective world exists for us. These structures 
cannot be defined but must be brought to light in an actively performed 
intuition".15 According to Dufrenne and Ricoeur, this is an allusion to 
Husserl’s Wesenschau.16 The implication here is that Jaspers seems to admit 
a kind of eidetic insight into the structures of objects in general which, ideally 
speaking, are identical for consciousness in general. These structures 
uncovered by phenomenology are the fundamental ones of conscious
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experience and constitute the very conditions of possibility for having contact 
with the objective world. However, with all that Jaspers brings to the 
possibility of phenomenology as a strict science, his conclusions have little 
real similarity to the Husserlian doctrine in this respect. Unlike Husserl, 
Jaspers does not believe that any single method of explicating the content of 
a phenomenological insight can be regarded as the method of 
phenomenology.
For Jaspers theory and contemplation are not considered as the end of 
knowledge. "Theoria is not desired for its own sake but it is integrated into 
a larger flow, which Jaspers calls praxis. By praxis, he simply means an 
original totality of thoughtful doing, denkendes Tun".17
This however, should not be construed to mean that science has a right to 
existence only if it points to practical applicability, or that the immediate 
concern of science is directly pragmatic. The chief concern of science is in 
fact theoretical, but Jaspers points out that theory itself is a necessary means 
to an end not an end in itself. For him the end is thoughtful doing or praxis. 
Praxis contains both theorizing and doing. Thus Jaspers claims "These are 
not two possibilities of equal worth, side by side; rather pure theorizing is only 
a phase or else the breakdown of the original whole, which is knowing as 
thoughtful doing".18 For him "The distinction between speculation and doing
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is too simple, for even in detached speculation there is a residue of doing, 
and in simple pottering a leftover of speculation".19 "Thinking, as a Being - 
centred reality, is thoughtful doing".20 "All genuine science consists of 
praxis".21
As it stands, Jaspers does not seem to deny the formal possibility or even 
the necessity of theory. He however denies that theory is the ultimate end of 
knowledge. It is however not surprising how Jaspers views science. "The end 
of all knowing activity, including that of the sciences, is somehow to recapture 
the unity of the rational appetite in which thought and reality originally 
coincide. Particular sciences are all manifestations of this unifying endeavour. 
Each in its own particular and partial way explores some empirical domain of 
object-being, thus preparing the way for a metempirical or philosophical 
exploration of Being itself. If this is the case, sciences can be taken as "the 
necessary ground and first stage of philosophy, but are not capable of 
achieving the unity and totality which reason cannot renounce".22 The 
sciences initiate a movement which points and find fulfilment beyond them. 
Thus they begin on an exploration of Being, but stop short in object-being. 
It is the task of philosophy to continue this exploration.23 We run into 
problems when the conclusion is drawn that which can be measured is worth 
examining. One would think that this is an unfair value judgement on the 
aspects of reality. For Jaspers, any one who philosophizes must be familiar
309
with the sciences. Science discovers objectifiable knowledge but that 
knowledge is not the goal of philosophy. It follows that philosophy begins 
where science ends and it is its duty to transcend science.
Jaspers maintains a sharp distinction between science and philosophy. He 
rejects the view which places philosophy with science and the scientific 
philosophy which accommodates itself to science. He also rejects mistrust of 
science by some philosophers. Against anti-science which dismisses 
objective knowledge, he insists on the necessity of a mutual alliance between 
science and philosophy. Jaspers’ theory of science is the continuation of his 
theory of objectivity. Science is for him the only domain of strictly objective 
knowledge that exhibits the notes of impersonal validity, stability, univocity and 
universality. For him, knowledge is the intentional grasp of a particular object 
which is apprehended in an objective and univocal way. As far as he is 
concerned, there might be all sorts of thoughts intuition, awareness, and total 
vision but there is only one kind of objective knowledge: objective, univocal, 
scientific knowledge.24 "Knowledge" says James Collins, "is not an 
indeterminate general term, covering every relation between the mind and 
things. Instead it connotes one definite sort of thought; that in which a polar 
relation is set up between the subject and the phenomenal object".25 This 
however, is only obtainable in science. Science alone is knowledge and if 
science alone is knowledge, it then follows that philosophy must be some sort
310
of non-knowledge, Nichtwissen. It is non-knowledge because its relation to 
reality is not the same objective relation that science has to its objects. It is 
from this that the distinction Jaspers makes of between science and 
philosophy follows. It might be said that philosophy is not a cogent science. 
One chief characteristic of science as we have seen is intellectual cogency. 
This is on account of the fact that it proceeds from the impersonal 
intentionality of general, and deals with determined object being and deals 
with deals with determined object being according to universally acceptable 
and controllable method. The same cannot be said of philosophy. "If we call 
science that which is cogently knowable for every understanding, and which 
for that reason has actually gained universal recognition, then neither 
philosophy nor theology can be called sciences".26
Measured against the cogency of science, philosophy is less than science, 
"for it does not open up any tangible result, nor any intellectually binding 
insight".27 This is so because, philosophy is not the act of an anonymous 
consciousness, but the act of a concrete Existence. It does not determine 
itself by logical rules and impersonally valid methods, but by the necessity of 
personal faith. One can say that philosophy is a passionate quest of 
Existence for a true and genuine Being. In it the individual seeks a more 
intimate relationship with reality than the distorted search of science can 
afford. "Scientific truth is one and the same for all - philosophical truth wears
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multiple historical cloaks; each of these is the manifestation of a unique reality, 
each has its justification, but they are not identically transmissible".28 But 
philosophy is not only less than science it is also more than it in the sense 
that it is the source of truth that is inaccessible to scientific compelling 
knowledge. It is this plus that is usually referred to by various definitions of 
philosophy. In these, philosophy is presented as a supreme science or as 
the knowledge of all being as being, or as the way to the good life. 
According to Jaspers, the meaning of such definitions is that "philosophical 
thought is inward action; that it appeals to freedom, that it is a summons to 
transcendence".29
It is not surprising that Jaspers begins his philosophy with the same question 
that has haunted philosophers all along. "What is Being?"30 What is 
surprising in the work of Jaspers is not the question, but the position it 
occupies. For him Being is not only basic but also first in the order of 
philosophical inquiry. Other philosophers who ask the question do so 
towards the end as the crowning theme of their reflection. Jaspers seems to 
begin with metaphysics whereas others gradually lead to it through a series 
of lesser consideration. If this looks unnatural, it is only apparent. His 
concern with the metaphysical problem of Being takes a more personal and 
existential turn in the questions that follow: What am I? What is my authentic 
purpose? This is an indication that the consciousness of being is inseparably
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bound up with the consciousness we have of our own existence in the world. 
Jaspers is interested in the question of Being from the beginning, but he 
implies that any possible treatment of it must constantly keep in mind the 
situation of the questions. In other words, he indicates that the basic question 
about Being is at the source of our philosophical inquiry, but not at the 
beginning of it.31 The beginning is in man’s situation from which he poses the 
question about Being. Consequently, a profitable meditation on the question 
of Being must at least have its start in the situation of the questionnaire, and 
a philosophy of Being must be accompanied by an analysis of this situation.32 
Man’s being is such that it raises the whole question of Being.
However, from time the answer to the question, what is Being? has frequently 
been reduced to some form of objectivity, that is, either as object being, self 
being, or being in itself. However, both object and self remain obscure. Both 
reveal and conceal something and therefore such universal formal concepts 
of being as object being, self being, or being in itself are deceptive when 
identified with Absolute Being. No one of these forms of being mentioned so 
far can be accepted as ultimate at the expense of the others. They are 
modes of being not the source of being. They can be differentiated from 
each other, but they also compliment each other and hence no mode of 
being can claim pre-eminence. According to Jaspers, what we experience is 
always the appearance of being and not being itself. Being cannot become
known through the universal structures because the universal structures 
themselves are modes of being which discloses itself and yet remains veiled, 
Jaspers gives it the name, ’the encompassing’ (das Umareifende). The 
encompassing is that which is encountered as the pre-logical and which 
remains in question after and in the midst of all logical, scientific and 
speculative endeavours. In other words to think the encompassing, it has 
to be conceptualized, but as it takes its place, it is also being distorted. The 
encompassing is being that is neither only a subject nor only object, rather 
it be on both sides of the subject-object dichotomy. It is never the horizon, 
for it pushes beyond it. It is the open ended totality as the ground for all 
beings, and as such, it is the basic philosophical ground. It follows that the 
encompassing can be seen in terms of totality. We need not go into a 
detailed study of the problem of the encompassing in the philosophy of Karl 
Jaspers. What we are really concerned with is what will eventually lead us to 
the solution of the problem of transcendence, which is our main objective in 
considering his work.
The encompassing is present in terms of totality. It could also be said to be 
the fundamental image of the unity of Being. Through the idea of the 
encompassing we endeavour to transcend not only the duality of subject 
and object but also all possible distinction and multiplicity of objects. Through 
it we touch upon the unity which makes distinction and multiplicity possible.
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If this is the case, is it not surprising that Jaspers speaks of various modes 
of encompassing. If in transcending the subject object dichotomy our 
intention is precisely to suspend all variations and separations. Why talk of the 
various modes of encompassing? One would think that the very idea of 
encompassing is one is not doubted. However as Knauss points out "from 
the manner of the transcending movement there arise for us various manners 
of the Encompassing. These manners are not the Encompassing itself, but 
the expression of our finite approach to the Encompassing".33 This is to say 
that multiplicity and variations are not the properties of the Encompassing in 
itself, but the expression of our finite approach to it. The idea of the 
Encompassing though developed fully in Jaspers’ Vernunft und Existens and 
in von der wahrheit has been present at least implicitly from the earliest of his 
works. However, from what has been said, the modes of Encompassing arise 
from the different manners of approaching it. Fundamentally our approach 
according to Jaspers can take two opposite directions. Our transcending 
effort may go towards either Being itself or ourselves. It is for this reason that 
Jaspers distinguishes two modes of the Encompassing. The Encompassing 
that we are and the Encompassing of Being itself. The Encompassing that the 
self is as immanence comprises empirical existence, consciousness as such, 
and spirit. The Encompassing the Being is as immanence, the world. The 
Encompassing that Self is as transcendent, Existenz and the Encompassing 
that Being is as transcendent, Transcendence. To use a familiar phrase, one
could call these the subjective and objective dimensions of the 
Encompassing. This of course is a misnomer. Added to this is reason which 
acts to bind the modes together.
Below is the Diagram that Jaspers uses to put across his point".34
Diagram
The Encompassing which we are. The Encompassing which Being is.
\K
Empirical
Existence
Immanent
------------- *
/
Consciousness 
as such
World
Spirit
The Transcendent Existenz Transcendence
REASON
T -----------------------------------
The bond of all the modes of Encompassing within us
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In the Encompassing that we are, we see ourselves as empirical existence, 
consciousness as such and the spirit, but the Encompassing that we are is 
transcended when the question is asked if this is the whole of being itself. If 
being itself is that in which everything that is for us must become present, 
then it might be thought that this appearance for us is in fact all being. It is 
this type of thinking that prompts Nietzsche to conceive all being as 
interpretation and our being as interpretative. But for Jaspers, "the question 
does not stop with the limits of our knowledge of things, nor in the 
inwardness of the limiting consciousness of the Encompassing which we are. 
Rather this Encompassing which I am and know as empirical existence, 
consciousness as such, and spirit, is not conceivable in itself but refers 
beyond itself".35
The Encompassing that we are, that is empirical existence, consciousness as 
such and spirit are all modes which indicate what we are in reality. However, 
we know that man is much more than reality. That mode which indicates that 
man is not only reality but also potentially, Jaspers calls Existenz. We are 
never Existenz in the mode of reality but in the mode of potentiality. As 
Existenz we never become objects to ourselves as compared to other modes 
of the Encompassing. Existenz does not become appearance for what 
appears, appears as reality. Existenz for that kind of thinking that knows only 
reality is nothing but a fabricated illusion. Existenz cannot be object while the
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other modes of the Encompassing can. Thus Jaspers says, "While more 
empirical existence, consciousness as such, and spirit all appear in the world 
and become scientifically investigable realities. Existenz is the object of no 
science1.36 Existenz then can be seen as the capacity of man to transcend 
that meets transcendence. This is to say that Existenz is the link between the 
Encompassing that we are and the Encompassing that Being itself is. The 
Encompassing that we are participates in the Encompassing that Being is and 
this participation is through Existenz. Existenz then becomes the base which 
relates immanence to transcendence.
Existenz is not transcendence but without transcendence there could be not 
Existenz or could we say there would be no meaning to Existenz. Existenz 
bring to real the being of transcendence.
Earlier in the work notably from the work of Smith, we had suggested that the 
root of religion could be in transcendence, can we now see anything in 
Jaspers’ treatment of transcendence that will aid the phenomenology of 
religion? Applying the same principles that makes the being of 
transcendence appear may help us discover the phenomenon of religion or 
at least adumbrate which way is the right way to proceed. Without going into 
details about Existenz. we can now proceed to ask the question that could 
bring us nearer to our reason for looking into the work of Jaspers. How does
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Existenz make known the being of transcendence? What is the relationship 
between existence, Existenz and transcendence?
While the Encompassing that we are as empirical existence, consciousness 
as such and spirit can be said to be static, Existenz can be seen as pure 
motion because of its movement towards potentialities. This means that 
conceptions which are pure motions can be said to be ’concepts of Existenz’. 
Jaspers’ scheme of these concepts is based on Kant’s categories of 
understanding. Both require the medium of time, but objective time is to be 
distinguished from existential time. We need not go into detail concerning the 
relationship between Kant and Jaspers at this point. Jaspers set forth the 
following concepts "The rules of reality are causal laws; whatever happens 
has its cause or effect in the course of time. Existential reality, on the other 
hand, is self originating as it appears to itself in time - in other words, it is 
free...Substantially? is temporal inertia, the quality of enduring, of being neither 
increased nor decreased, while Existenz begins and vanishes in the 
phenomenality of time...The mutual causality of substances, the Kantian 
reciprocity of community, confronts communication between self beings".37
For Jaspers, the concepts of Existenz. that is to say, Freedom, historicity, 
communication and so forth are not the formal conditions of objectivity or of 
the subject-object dichotomy itself. As Young-Bruehl Elizabeth puts it "The
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mysterious root of intuition and understanding which Kant sought in his 
mediating schematism of imagination is, so to speak, on a different level from 
the Existenz which Jaspers appealed to with his concepts - his existential 
schematism. The existential schematism mediates between the inexpressible 
self-certainty of Existenz (as opposed to the certainty of objective knowledge) 
and elucidative reason1.38 For Jaspers, reason without content would be 
mere understanding and since the concepts of understanding are empty 
without intuition, it can be said that reason is hollow without Existenz. 
"Reason is not itself as mere understanding, but only in the acts of possible 
Existenz...Existenz becomes clear through reason, reason only has content 
through Existenz".39
Jaspers uses the concept of boundary situation to explain what he means by 
non-objective thinking and says "To experience boundary situations is the 
same as Existenz".40
What then are the boundary situations which he sees as equal to Existenz? 
They are situations which can only be elucidated, "Situations like the following: 
that I am always in situations; that I cannot live without struggling and 
suffering; that I cannot avoid guilt, that I must die - these are what I call 
boundary situations".41
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Having said this much about Existenz. we now ask what its relationship is to 
transcendence. We have traced Existenz to what Jaspers calls a boundary 
situation. Boundary situation is equal to Existenz because it is in motion and 
points to transcendence. Elsewhere we have said that Existenz has meaning 
because of the being of transcendence. This is an indication that there is a 
movement from transcendence to Existenz and to empirical existence. If both 
Existenz and transcendence cannot be objectified, how then does Existenz. 
a non-objectifiable mode, make known the being of transcendence that is 
equally non-objectifiable? The solution to this problem might be a pointer 
to us as how to proceed with the phenomenology of religion.
To tackle this problem, Jaspers proposes transcendental metaphysics in place 
of an ontology. This metaphysics will preserve the original awareness of the 
fragmented character of reality and will not try to discuss being as if being 
too were structured in an objective system. It will recognise that objects are 
not justifiable by objective knowledge, that is, it cannot become the correlate 
of an intentional group.
Paradoxically however, it is the awareness of this limitation that permits us to 
go beyond boundary situation which tends towards transcendence. Existenz 
at the boundary situation meets transcendence. How does it gain access to 
transcendence?
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Existenz gains access to transcendence through taking as ciphers certain of 
the representations, images, and thoughts that appear as objects as 
understanding. While anything can be a cipher, the ciphers that we employ 
always derive in large part form our historical situation. Ciphers have a kind 
meaning, but they never mean any specific objects for what they refer to 
cannot be objectified. A similar account which Sartre gives of ’natural 
symbols’ illumines - though it could never confirm Jaspers account.
Put in the words of Mary Warnock, "It is not at all difficult to understand what 
Sartre means by a thing being a natural symbol. There are many things 
especially perhaps natural phenomena, like sea or trees, which seem to us 
immediately to signify something, and about which it would be very 
reasonable to say that the distinction between the thing and its meaning 
disappears".42 While facts are the same for all, ciphers like natural symbols, 
are personal and unstable, and only meaningful or transparent to those who 
have learnt to respond to them. In order to explain ciphers, Jaspers 
distinguishes symbolization from all the other means of indirect signification, 
such as signs, images, similes, comparison and allegories.
The basic different between symbolization and these other ways of indirect 
representation lies for him in the manner in which all of them relate to that 
which is signified through them. Whereas the latter group more or less
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translate Into pictures or gestures, something which can itself be grasped 
intellectually as an objective meaning, a symbol simply presents a dimension 
of reality which is inaccessible to any other mode of apprehension.43 A 
symbol is specifically an "objectification of the non-objectifiable".44 As such, 
it stands for a reality from which it is radically different yet inseparable in the 
sense that the reality symbolized is nowhere outside the symbol. It is the 
symbol alone that mediates its presence. In order to fill this mediatory role, 
the self-consistency of symbol must become transparent. It must vanish in 
its own right and become a pure medium. Since symbols stand for non­
objective meaning, it cannot be translated or interpreted except through other 
symbols.45 This idea is like Jaspers first principles of interpretation of 
symbols. It governs the whole of his hermeneutic doctrine. The fact that the 
interpretation of a symbol is itself symbolic has far reaching implications for 
Jaspers’ views on reason and rationality. Among other things, it already 
suggests that the aim of metaphysics is not to convey objective knowledge 
about ultimate realities, but to mediate the profoundly human experience of 
relatedness to transcendence.46 To put it another way, the primary purpose 
of metaphysics, and of philosophy in general, is not cognitive but 
experimental or existential. Metaphysical reflection is the work of reason, but 
reason understood in its infringible relationship to Existenz.
For Jaspers all metaphysical expressions are symbols rather than concepts.
They are not correlates of intentional consciousness. They speak only to 
absolute consciousness "In the disappearance of their objective character, 
they make authentic being manifest to Existenz".47 Symbolization in general 
is understood to be in indirect mode of signifying something. The reality 
symbol is usually something absent, complex, or abstract, so that it can be 
only in this indirect way. In this, symbol already differs from diagrams and 
models, whose reference is open to direct access (at least in principle) but 
for reason of style or convenience, it is presented indirectly. Diagrams and 
models are abbreviations and stand for the really signified. Symbols on the 
other hand incorporate in themselves the reality symbolized. Within the 
general class of symbols, Jaspers further distinguishes between symbols that 
can be converted through proper steps of interpretation into univocal 
designations and symbolism that can be interpreted only through the 
conveyance of other symbols. He calls them interpretative (deutber) and 
intuitive (schaubar) symbols respectively. It is important to note that ciphers 
belong to the latter group.48
The distinguishing factor between the two kinds of symbols is seen to consist 
in their different relationship to ultimate interpretation. On asking what a given 
symbol means ultimately, the first type of symbol names such as ultimate. 
Taking a general theory of myths for example, this would tell us that a given 
symbol in myths, re-enacts such a nature, or such a natural process, or such
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and such gestures. The common feature of these modes of symbol 
interpretation is found in the fact whatever they designate as the ultimate is 
no longer considered a symbol of something else; but reality itself.49 By 
making the complete tour of all the manifestations of this ultimate, they are 
able to show by what surveyable process this ultimate diversifies itself. 
Whatever its nature may be, the ultimate reality is univocably determined in 
the end.50 This kind of symbolism exists for general consciousness and 
serves the ends natural knowledge. It is objective and its meaning is univocal. 
Paradoxically though, at the end of the manifold interpretation these symbols 
remain polyvalent and indefinite, insorfar as they signify any and everything.51
In such a system of interpretation, there is nothing to which the symbol of 
ultimate reality would be inapplicable. The meaning of intuitive symbolism or 
cipher sign cannot be resolved into univocal meaning. In a cipher, sign and 
the signified are fused in such a way that their separation is impossible. 
"Since a cipher is always the unity of immanent and transcendent dimensions, 
it ceases to be a cipher whenever it is taken for a univocal symbolism of 
transcendence. The separation of symbol from what is symbolised is 
impossible in cipher-script. It renders transcendence present but it is not 
interpretable".52
Cipher is being which makes transcendence present without making the being
of transcendence object being and without making the being of Existenz 
subject being. The cipher and the cipher-script are inseparable. This is 
because they are more of meanings than a set of objects, and more of a 
movement of subjects than a knowledge of something. Ciphers keep alive 
the continuous suspended relationship between Existenz and transcendence. 
At a glance, cipher can be said to be that of symbolization which objects 
acquire when they become expressions of transcendence for us. Their 
symbolic character is such that ’symbol of...’ cannot be completed properly 
by designating an ultimate reality of meaning. The completion of the phrase 
can only be done by further symbols. Whereas in ordinary symbolization all 
the elements of interpretation converge towards a certain univocity. The 
elements of cipher reading leads towards an ’unknowable univocity’, "a cipher 
can always be read differently".53 The reading of ciphers have no final act 
even for the same person let along a universal conclusion for everyone.54 
There is nothing in the world which is not capable of becoming a cipher M  
ciphers point beyond themselves and this veiled language of cipher is cipher- 
script, the cryptography of ciphers, the language of transcendence. It is that 
which can no longer be interpreted in terms of another. If there were no 
ciphers, then there would also be no transcendence. For Jaspers, cipher is 
the only way through which transcendence opens for our existential 
consciousness. It is the sign that for existenz transcendence is veiled but not 
absent. It is true that everything in the world hides itself in transcendence,
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transcendence for him is a presence which would disclose itself through 
ciphers, making the ciphers a language of transcendence. Ciphers on the 
other hand, cannot be identified with that which appears to us. What appears 
to us can become an object of the empirical existence and consciousness as 
such. Ciphers according to him are rather the language of transcendence 
spoken through the appearance, not to consciousness as such, but to 
Existenz. What consciousness as such is to the empirical world, Existenz is 
to the world of ciphers. While consciousness as such is the mediator 
between our empirical existence and the world; the reading of cipher is the 
mediator between Existenz and transcendence. Cipher stands for meaning 
that every particular entity is more than we can experience about it and in 
that sense, it is always more than itself.
Cipher reading can only take place if there is an awareness of the different 
levels of language. For Jaspers, there are three such levels. Firstly, there is 
the immediate incommunicable language of transcendence, the experience of 
which cannot be verified. Any such attempt to verify it falsifies the original 
awareness. It is the metaphysical experience prior to its predication and 
formulation, an experience which becomes falsified when formulated in mere 
objectivity or mere subjectivity. Secondly, the mediated universal in the form 
of myth, revelation (religion) and the actual mythical. In this language, 
compared with the first, the metaphysical and the prelogical experience
becomes formulated, structured and mediated in the great classical myths 
especially the Greek myths, and in revelation encountered in great world 
religions. "Echoing the language of transcendence which is audible only in 
the immediacy of a fleeting moment, man produces other languages in the 
form of pictures and images, these languages try to communicate what has 
been heard. Next to the language of Being comes the language of man".55 
In this language, the immediate experience of Being passes into mythical 
transmission in a cipher form. For man to express this, he does it in terms of 
sublime and the sacred. For Jaspers this expression takes place on three 
levels corresponding to three cycles of mythology, religion and Art. Whereas 
the first language is immediate and personal, the second is perpetuated 
through the historical tradition and community. The myth is the will to 
communicate transcendence through specific forms which bring 
transcendence more close but at the same time falsifies it. Jaspers sees the 
typical characteristics of myth in Greek mythology. In this the transcendent 
and the natural elements are not yet separated. The Greek Gods for instance 
are still part of this world. Nevertheless, as social figures alongside the natural 
reality, they supplement and personify natural reality in order to indicate their 
transcendent dimensions for man. They add human accent to the language 
of nature. In the second kind of human language, the language of religion, 
the transcendent and the natural aspects of reality are strictly distinguished, 
or set apart. The latter is entirely overshadowed by the former.
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For the religious mind, the natural takes the second place to the supernatural. 
True reality, so to say is above the natural. It exists in another world. From 
this other dimension the supernatural or the divine reality enters into this 
world in the form of visible signs (revelations) and wonders as invisible grace. 
Throughout history, alleged revelations, mythical formulations and speculative 
constructs have been ways of knowing which attempted to give meaning to 
deity as personality. Religion in this case tries to listen to another - worldly 
reality which, so the claim goes, has disclosed itself in direct revelation. But 
whether revelation is regarded as accomplished or as a continuous process, 
the world drama is assumed to derive its real meaning not from within itself, 
but form this other world.
The actual mythical type, typical of art which can take the form of an aesthetic 
experience is neither mere empirical existence nor authentic transcendence. 
It is the merging of the actual and the transcendent. For Jaspers, this is 
illustrated in the work of Van Gogh. In his work landscapes, things, and 
persons in their actual presence at the same time become mythical. If the 
content of sensory experience does not give rise to transcendence, it is the 
case that under certain conditions, it awakens passionate desires or longings 
which must find a different form of response or expression. Its passion is not 
to transcend things into new dimensions or ciphers. The language of Art is
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said to be the highest form of mythical communication because, by an almost 
complete circle, it returns to the original language of Being, to all but 
absorbed in it.
In contrast to the immediate cipher language of Being, myth in general is 
mediated language of tradition and shared inheritance. As such, it possesses 
a greater degree of internal unity and universality than the first language. 
This universality nevertheless is not absolute. For Jaspers there are no 
universal myths, no prime religious patterns, no uniform vision in art. The 
multiplicity of intuitive ciphers is replaced here by a multiplicity of traditions; 
the first reply of man to the appeal of transcendence is already broken up 
into several languages.
Myths and religions are integral elements in the life of a cultural community. 
Each myth and religion is lodged in its own language and tradition. Inside 
each language there reigns a certain relative universality of belief which 
permits its adherents to comprehend the myth in or more or less the same 
way. Belonging to that community of belief is essential for the understanding 
of its myths.
Having discussed the first two ways of man’s response to transcendence that 
is the immediate and mediated language, we can mention at least in passing
what Jaspers calls the third language. This is the language of metaphysical 
speculation. For Jaspers the language of metaphysical speculation attempts 
to read and communicate the original cipher script through systematic 
formulations. The cipher script is transformed into a new cipher of 
speculative thought. In so doing it would think transcendence as analogous 
to the observable and the logical in empirical existence. Like the second 
language, it becomes the mediator of that which can be grasped in 
immediacy. It is motivated by the persistent urge to establish the cipher as 
a speculative thought. There is always the tendency or the propensity to turn 
cipher into being itself and cipher reading into knowledge of being. There 
may be no need to say more here, but all that is clear is that the three 
languages of immediacy, of myth and revelation (mediated) and of theoretical 
speculation are different ways of approaching the ciphers. The first language, 
the immediate giveness of transcendence, does not follow any method. The 
other two have complex and elaborate methods.
As stated earlier in the second language, man’s response to transcendence 
takes the form of myths, religion and art. It can however, be seen that the 
three languages examined can find expressions in religion. If in the second 
response, the mediate language passes into cipher, it then means that myth, 
religion and art are ciphers. From our studies we have come to see that all 
ciphers are ciphers of transcendence. Of the three in this language of
response, religion is the one that can accommodate at the same time myth 
and art. We can talk about both religious art and religious myth. Without 
prejudice to the definition of religion which we have not given anywhere in this 
work, we could say that religion in this context is a wav in which men have 
always given expressions both to their own transcendence and the 
transcendence of being beyond the natural world. Here being beyond the 
world should not be understood to mean the objectification of transcendence 
nor ’Supreme Being’ as is common in theistic conceptions. This is because 
reality as we have come to believe is more than an objective knowledge 
reveals it transcends all the immanent levels of conceptual thought which in 
turn may be viewed as appearances of transcendence.
From the work so far, we have come to the view that transcendence is 
grasped by man through ciphers which could take as their medium anything 
in the universe. If religion according to Jaspers is a cipher, and all ciphers 
are ciphers of transcendence. Could the understanding of ciphers not pave 
the way to the understanding of the nature of religion? If religion is a cipher 
and a cipher has all the characteristics we have indicated above, is it any 
wonder then that religion has existed as long as human beings and has 
varied as much as it has? This approach may aid us in the search for a way 
forward in the phenomenology of religion. What then has Jaspers to say 
about religion as it is today.
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Karl Jaspers and Religion.
We begin our discussions of Jaspers and religion with two quotations 
"Religion is no enemy of philosophy, but something that essentially concerns 
it and troubles it".56
Again, "Jaspers, this philosopher, scientist and social scientist is single- 
minded in exposing and denouncing all forms of objectification when they are 
applied to transcendence".57 The two quotations show what Jaspers thinks 
of religion and what is to be his treatment of it.
As we proceed in the work, we should bear in mind that both religion and 
philosophy of Karl Jaspers have to do with existential situations. One familiar 
with the philosophy of Jaspers can hardly be surprised at what he says about 
religion for the treatment of religion is an extension of his philosophy. As a 
philosopher, Jaspers cannot abstract himself from the position from which he 
addresses religion. His philosophy is not neutral because knowingly or 
unknowingly, every philosophy of Existenz is said to stand on the territory of 
what one would call religious inquiry. "What is referred to in mythical terms as 
soul and God and in philosophical language as Existenz and transcendence 
is not of this world".58 Both religion and philosophy share a common 
language.
333
Most of the confusions that have arisen between the traditional conception of 
transcendence and Jaspers’ understanding of transcendence can be 
attributed to the problem of communication. Jaspers, in a bid to make himself 
understood, uses language that seems purely theist. In many places, he 
identifies God with transcendence in order to make himself understood. The 
basis of Jaspers’ criticism of religion is his conception of freedom. "The man 
who attains true awareness of freedom gains certainty of God...The highest 
freedom is experienced in freedom from the world, and this freedom is a 
profound bond with transcendence".59 What then is transcendence? Jaspers 
answers "Transcendence beyond the world or before the world is called 
God".60
Any one reading the work of Jaspers superficially might be tempted to 
conclude that Jaspers uses the word transcendence in a religious sense.
It is however clear that he wants to reject immanence both as a view of man 
and a general world-view. If this is to be understood, he has to resort to 
religious language by speaking comprehensively about God, whose being is 
the rejection of immanence. It is then certain that Jaspers’ use of religious 
language is for the sake of communication. "Those who respond to the 
language about the soul of man or the being of God are not likely to fall into 
a purely immanentist view of reality".61 He is of the view that it is for this
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reason that Jaspers appears like "a defender of religion against its 
detractors".62 Though apparently Jaspers tended to be in agreement with the 
traditionalist who identify transcendence and God, the fact remains that for 
Jaspers transcendence is different.
Jaspers’ view of transcendence is neither the unknown x of the Kantian 
nouema nor the transcendence of traditional theology. For the latter, 
transcendence is inescapably related to revelation and associates it with the 
idea of movement from the unknown to the known, from God to man. 
Jaspers’ use of transcendence moves in the opposite direction, namely from 
experience to that which is unknown and concealed, yet makes itself present 
in everything and everywhere. Theology places the initiative of disclosure of 
the being of transcendence on transcendence. Jaspers on the other hand 
believes that the disclosure of the being of transcendence arises out of 
human impulse, initiative and achievement. At a certain level, both theology 
and the philosophy of Jaspers run in parallel but not for long.
Jaspers sees the chief defect of religion as the tendency to objectify 
transcendence. For Jaspers transcendence cannot become an object of 
thought. "Religion contrasted with philosophy reveals the following 
characteristics; Religion has its cults, is bound up with a peculiar community 
of men, arising from cult, and its is inseparable from myth. Religion always
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embodies man’s practical relation to the transcendent, in the shape of 
something holy in the world, as delimited from the profane or unholy".63 This 
localises transcendence, the absence of such localization implies the absence 
of religion. Philosophy on the other hand knows no cult, no community, no 
priesthood, no entity invested with a sacred character and set apart from 
other existent in the world.
A religion is of historical magnitude, a stable, continuous, authoritarian system. 
To really understand fully philosophy’s opposition to religion one must begin 
with the sociological wrappings of religion, the cult which makes 
transcendence into a sort of real presence. Through the cult, transcendence 
falls into the circle of objectivity, this of course is abhorrent to Jaspers. In 
calling religion the supreme objectivity. Jaspers criticism of religion becomes 
more severe than that of Hegel, who placed religion among the forms of 
objective spirit, but saw in it at least a moment of absolute spirit.
Jaspers does not doubt the importance of religion. "Almost the whole of 
mankind, as far as historical memory extends, has lived religiously, and this 
is an indication that can scarcely be ignored, of the truth and central 
importance of religion".64 For him both philosophy and religion have the 
same source by they arrive at different conclusions. For example "What 
religion localizes in a specific place, can for philosophy be present everywhere
and always...Philosophy has no rites, no roots in a primitive mythology. Men 
take it from a free tradition and transform it as they make it their own. 
Although pertaining to man as man, it remains the concern of individuals. 
Religion is intent upon embodying its truth in tangible symbols, philosophy 
pursues only effective objective certainty".65 The two however can be useful 
to each other. Referring to the work which philosophy can do for religion, 
Jaspers claims that "Philosophy should do its level best to bring reason into 
religions thinking of the churches, so that it may become believable to the 
informed masses".66 From this the usefulness of philosophy cannot be 
doubted. Though the manifestations of religion and philosophy seem to clash, 
there are many areas of contact, notwithstanding mutual suspicion. "To 
religion the God of the philosophers seem threadbare, pale, empty; it 
disparagingly calls the philosophical state of mind ’deism’; to philosophy the 
tangible symbols of religion seem like deceptive veils and misleading 
simplifications, religion denounces the God of philosophy as a mere 
abstraction, philosophy distrusts the religious images of God as seductive 
idols, magnificent as they may be".67 This notwithstanding, Jaspers sees the 
origin of the Western idea of God in both Greek philosophy and the Old 
Testament. Here a good deal of work of abstraction is done but in different 
ways.
The rise of monotheism in both Greek philosophy and the Old Testament is
337
seen thus "In Greek philosophy monotheism arose as an idea, it was 
postulated from ethical considerations, it imposed itself on the mind in an 
atmosphere of philosophic serenity. It did not set its imprint upon masses of 
men, but upon individuals".68 This resulted in men that have what he calls ’a 
high type of free philosophy’.
Contrasted with the Old Testament however "Monotheism grew up in the 
passion of battle for the pure, the true, the one God...This cult of the one, 
living God was won in the battle against the Baals, against immanent religion 
with it shallow optimism, its festivals and orgies, its self-complacency and 
moral indifference".69 The God meant here cannot be objectified hence "This 
true God suffers no image and likeness, sets no store by cult and sacrifice, 
by temp and rites and laws, but only by righteous actions and love of our 
fellow men (Micah, Isaiah, Jeremiah)".70 It follows that the God of the Old 
Testament is not based on the development of an idea "but upon the word 
of God, upon God himself, who was experienced in the word which the 
prophet imparted as the word of God".71 Here the difference between 
philosophy and religion can be seen in these modes of God’s presence that 
is to say, these two modes described.
For Jaspers it is the force of God’s reality in the mind of the prophet not the 
power of the idea that brought forth the monotheism of the Old Testament.
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The coincidence of the two monotheisms to Jaspers is ’miraculous’. The ’one’ 
of philosophy cannot be said to be the ’one’ of religion. However, for 
centuries these two ideas of monotheism have dominated the Western idea 
of God and they are seen to interpret each other. This interpretation "was 
possible because the faith of the prophets effected an abstraction that is 
analogous to philosophical abstraction".72 This notwithstanding, Jaspers sees 
prophetic faith as more powerful than the philosophical idea "because it arises 
from the direct experience of God. But in intellectual clarity it is inferior to 
philosophy hence it was lost in the subsequent religious development, even 
in the bible".73
Jaspers sees another area of contact between religion and philosophy in 
prayer. Contrasting cult with prayer, Jaspers views the cult as acts of the 
community and prayer an individual’s act. He sees cult as existing 
everywhere while prayer is here and there in history. In the bible it becomes 
distinct to Jeremiah. The liturgy in which the cult is embodied he sees as 
containing a number of texts called prayers because they "invoke, praise, and 
supplicate the godhead".74 Due to their long history, the texts become 
authoritative and permanent. This of course is not the same with prayer 
which is individual and existentially present. If it is as a subordinate element 
of the cult, "it is performed by the individual in a fixed form and then he 
remains entirely within the sphere of religion".75 However, if it is to be really
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personal and primal, it stands according to him in the frontier of philosophy. 
It becomes philosophy in the moment when it is divested of any pragmatic 
relation to the godhead or the desire to influence the godhead for practical 
ends. At the moment of contemplation prayer shares the same ground with 
philosophy.
The event of revelation which religion places at the centre of cult appears to 
Jaspers essentially as a way of localizing transcendence hence guaranteeing 
transcendence which subsequently persists among men by means of 
authoritarian instructions. The content of religion is derived from revelation. 
This implies that the content is not valid in itself but only with the community, 
the congregation, the church which becomes its guarantor. The word of God 
lends authority to certain human words which hence forth release the anguish 
of decision through objective consolation. "Revelation is a direct 
communication or act of God in space and time, definitely placed in history. 
It is regarded as a reality that has a profanely historic side but is essentially 
sacred history seen only by the believer. To the believer, the sacred and the 
profane history coincide".76 Elsewhere Jaspers sees revelation as "the 
immediate utterance of God, localized in time and place and valid for all men, 
through word, commandment, action and event".77 So for the believer "any 
attempt to arrive at God by thought is vain, and that man knows God and 
can know God only through revelation".78 So God gave the law, sent the
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prophets and he descended in the form of a servant to redeem us on the 
cross. Revelation seen this way however, has definitely a mundane form. 
Once the facts are stated it deteriorates into finiteness and man in the use of 
his reason and his understanding can make of it what it will in trying to bring 
it across in speech the meaning is perverted. What is said is not what is 
meant because the "word of man is not the word of God".79 The God man 
case of the Council of Nicea is a case in point but there are many examples 
in traditional theology. For Jaspers that part of revelation that concerns man 
as man becomes a content of philosophy and as such is valid without 
revelation. While Jaspers can accept revelation as a disclosure of 
transcendence somehow, he does not agree with the ’Almightly acts of God’. 
He sees similarities between ciphers80 and revelation, and takes time to 
distinguish between biblical faith and ecclesiastical religion. For him the 
elements of the biblical faith provide powerful ciphers of transcendence.
The embodiment of the commandments which Yahweh gave to Moses and 
the children of Israel is for Jaspers, one of the most awesome ciphers of 
biblical belief. "Now when all the people the thunderings and lightnings and 
the sound of the trumpet and the mountains smoking, the people were afraid 
and trembled; and they stood afar off, and said to Moses, ’You speak to us, 
and we will hear; but let not God speak to us, lest we die’. And Moses said 
to the people, ’Do not fear; for God has come to prove you, and that the fear
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of him may be before your eyes, that you may not sin’. And the people 
stood afar off, while Moses drew near to the thick darkness where God 
was".81 From what we know of Jaspers, transcendence can no longer be 
transcendence when captured in images, "we understand its language only 
as ciphers". However, transcendence itself is to be "beyond all ciphers".82 
Even though God does not permit the use of images, as human beings, 
certain things make his presence obvious. Though He is not embodied in 
anything, He is recognized as Jaspers says "Wondrous the happenings on 
Sinai. The commandment is: No image or likeness, therefore, no embodiment 
of God. Nevertheless bodily happenings take the place: volcanic phenomena, 
Moses’ entry into the thick of darkness of the cloud, his communication of the 
Ten Commandments. But God himself is not embodied. He assumes no 
shape. The People do not see and hear him".85 The cipher is said to remain 
when the embodiment drops away from us. Sinai is one example of ciphers. 
For Jaspers 'the science of religion and mythology collects ciphers and 
classifies them into types. It shows us the transformation of the gods. 
Yahweh the war God of the song of Deborah is not the God before Job 
appears as plaintiff, and not the God to whom Jesus prays".84 Against the 
background of comparable universals we see the always individual, 
incomparable figures of the past; besides those of the Bible, first of all the 
world of Greek gods, then of the Indian, Chinese, and the Nomadic myths. 
Ciphers like languages have their origin in tradition. They are appropriated
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not invented. This could be the possible explanation of the reason for every 
culture having its own cipher of transcendence which for that culture 
embodies what it regards as truth. When man in his freedom experiences 
transcendence as authentic reality, he needs ciphers to elucidate it. Perhaps 
this will bring us nearer to discovering the root of religion.
From what has been said, it is likely that what in the present day we regard 
as religion may be a cipher. And if all ciphers are ciphers of transcendence. 
How then should we approach the phenomenology of religion?
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CHAPTER SIX
SOME MODIFICATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF HUSSERLIAN METHOD 
IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION.
351
Modifications in the Application of the Method of Phenomenology to the 
Phenomenology of Religion.
As we draw near to the end of our investigations, it becomes increasingly 
clear that the phenomenological method which has been very useful in other 
fields of research has not been fruitful in the study of religion on account of 
the peculiar nature of religion. In this last chapter, we shall look at the 
possible modifications that can be carried out either in the concept of religion 
or that of phenomenology to make possible the application of the method in 
the phenomenology of religion.
In the first chapter, where the idea of phenomenology is discussed, it can be 
seen that though Husserl is responsible for the prominent place given to 
phenomenology, the works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others seem to 
be the natural development of his phenomenology. Though opinions vary as 
to the truth and falsity of this statement, nevertheless, in this work, we shall 
take the phenomenological method as seen by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
as a logical development of Husserl’s work. Seen in this light, it is assumed 
that any one claiming to apply the phenomenological method can either 
appropriate the method as developed by Husserl or as understood by his 
successors. That is what we expect when we see the title of works on the 
phenomenology of religion.
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It is however surprising that the works that hitherto go by that name seem to 
ignore this basic premise. The fact that phenomenology of religion as hitherto 
known has ignored the application of the phenomenological method has led 
to doubts as to the validity of its claim to be phenomenology. The excursus 
discusses this dilemma of the phenomenology of religion and comes up with 
a different historical background which might be responsible for the neglect. 
Without going into details that have been discussed in the excursus. The 
quotation below from Mircea Eliade can be helpful in establishing the fact that 
the phenomenology of religion as hitherto known does not set out to apply 
the phenomenological method as proposed by Husserl and other 
phenomenologists. In the Sacred and the Profane he says "The 
phenomenology of religion had its first authoritative representation in Gerardus 
van der Leeuw (1890-1950)".1 Although Eliade is writing about the 
phenomenology of religion, he does not mention Husserl at all and he seems 
to ignore the fact that phenomenology has anything to do with him. 
Elsewhere C.J. Bleeker eager to distance the phenomenology of religion from 
that of Husserl says that phenomenology of religion is "an investigation into 
the. structure and the significance of facts drawn from a vast field of the 
history of religion arranged in systematic order".2 Raffaele Pettazzoni on the 
other hand is of the view that pure phenomenology has nothing to do with 
the phenomenology of religion. For him the aim of phenomenology of religion
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is to "seek to co-ordinate religious data with one another, to establish 
relations and to group the facts according to these relations".3 These and 
other evidences described in the excursus indicate that the phenomenology 
of religion did not set put to appropriate the phenomenological method.
Since the phenomenology of religion, as hitherto known, does not use the 
phenomenological method as a way of approaching the religious issues, one 
comes to the conclusion that the phenomenology of religion that appropriates 
the principles of the phenomenological method is still to be done. If the 
phenomenology of religion is to be achieved, the essence of religion is to be 
established. This is because phenomenology as proposed by Husserl 
describes the essence-intuition of the phenomenon. In Husserl as stated in 
the first part of this work, the phenomenon which phenomenology describes 
is reached through the process of eooche and this is a state of 
consciousness. Since essence-intuition is necessary for phenomenology, 
discovering the nature of religion becomes necessary if our aim is to be 
achieved. The treatment of the phenomenologists of religion so far has not 
indicated the true nature of religion. THis might be one reason for the failure 
to construct a proper phenomenology of religion. To describe the essential 
structure is one of the basic demands of phenomenology. For this, help is 
sought from fields other than the field of the general history of religion. This 
is necessary because an outside view is important if an overall view of a
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subject is to be determined. As the works of Ludwig Feuerbach, Thomas 
Luckmann and Peter Berger show, religion is not identical with the 
institutionalized forms. It has a unique character and for that any attempt at 
the phenomenology of religion requires that the essential nature of religion be 
known. This is necessary because of Husserl’s advice to the 
phenomenologists "To claim nothing that we cannot make essentially 
transparent to ourselves by references to consciousness...".4 Knowing the 
nature or the essence of religion then is bound to put the phenomenological 
method in the right direction to tackle the phenomenology of religion.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s treatment of the history of the concept of religion 
soon makes it impossible to look for the essence of religion. He notes that 
the word religion has undergone certain transformation during the course of 
its history. This he says has led to the loss of the of the original meaning. 
Only by returning religion to its original meaning, according to him, are we 
able to make anything out of religion. Knowing that the work is looked at 
extensively in chapter four, we quote some part of his work to remind 
ourselves of his thoughts on the nature of religion. Of religion in general he 
says, "I mean rather that religion, and each of what used to be called ’the 
religions’, is inherently human; and integrally so...It is not an entity to be 
postulated, one that can be legitimately conceived in itself or considered 
analytically. It is not a thing, but a quality; of personal life (both social and
individual)".5 Referring to other people’s understanding of religion he says 
"...when one came to understand the data of other person’s religious life not 
objectively but humanely, as symbols, not as objects of nature or of 
observation, merely, but as symbols of transcendence..."6, he is indicating that 
one should not look for the essence, for no single essence can be 
determined. Concluding, he points the way in which the misconception of 
religion has progressed through history. "What used to be the conceptual 
pattern, through which one looked, has become ’a religion’, at which one 
looks. What used to be the context of transcendence, within which one 
responded, has become an empirical item among the several objects of one’s 
inquisitive scrutiny, which some people ’believe’ - while increasingly many do 
not: for what at that level are, quite apparently, almost good reasons".7 The 
indication here is that there has been a shift in the understanding of the word 
’religion’. It has shifted from being a form of consciousness of transcendence 
to being an object of consciousness with which one aims to identify. As an 
object of consciousness, it is not surprising that the phenomenologists of 
religion have given us nothing other than the manifestations of religion. This 
makes the phenomenology of religion that appropriates the phenomenological 
method impossible. As an object of consciousness, the need to get to the 
essence becomes necessary for the application of the phenomenological 
method. Since arriving at the essence is an impossibility as no essence 
exists, the application of Husserlian principle stalls on account of the fact that
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one cannot think of the essence - intuition where no essence exists. Seen as 
a form of consciousness of transcendence however, the phenomenology of 
religion can go further by-passing the manifestations which are inherent in 
religion as an object of consciousness. It is as a form of consciousness of 
transcendence that one can understand, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam for 
example being categorized as religion. Religion as a form of consciousness 
of transcendence makes its position unique and different from other fields 
where essences can be contemplated. Application of the phenomenological 
method in the description of the form of consciousness of transcendence 
which religion is becomes the beginning of the phenomenology of religion.
Having accepted religion as a form of consciousness of transcendence, the 
implication must be accepted that no one essence can be contemplated. 
Since this is the case, the phenomenological method advocated by Husserl 
has to be modified in order to approach the phenomenology of religion. 
Since we see modification or development of Husserl’s idea in the works of 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, we shall examine the way in which the 
phenomenological method as understood by these two scholars will be useful 
in the phenomenology of religion. Calling to mind what has been discussed 
about Heidegger and phenomenology, we can say that for Heidegger, 
phenomenology is a term which "expresses a maxim which can be formulated 
as ’To the things themselves’. It is opposed to all free-floating constructions
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and accidental findings..."8 For him, however, the phrase ’back to the things 
themselves’ does not mean to that stage in consciousness. If by advocating 
the need to go back the phenomenon he is in line with Husserl, he however 
has differed from him by not regarding the phenomenon at that stage in 
consciousness. Elsewhere Heidegger talks of phenomenology as not a 
’standpoint’ but as the way in which the research will be carried out. A 
phenomenon for him is that which shows itself or that which is manifested. 
It is also seen as an autonomous entity with power of its own prior to our 
thinking. It is the science of the phenomena. Phenomenology for him is our 
way to the ground, that is, to the phenomenon before being clouded by our 
natural conceptions. For Heidegger, the point of departure of this way to the 
ground which is phenomenology is the hermeneutic interpretation of Dasein. 
which is Being-there. For him it is phenomenology which seeks to delineate 
the structures and explicate the meaning of Being. As the interpretation of 
man in his historical existence is the point of departure of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, we shall see in what way this can be applied in the 
phenomenological description of the form of consciousness of transcendence 
which religion is. Before turning to the actual application of the Heideggerian 
modification of the phenomenological method, we shall once more recall the 
way Merleau-Ponty whose work is equally a development of Husserl is related 
to Husserl and Heidegger. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is the study 
of essences. "But phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences
back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of 
man and the world from any starting point other than that of their facticity".9 
By saying that phenomenology is "a transcendental philosophy which places 
in abeyance the assertions arising out of the natural attitude, the better to 
understand them",10 he is in agreement with Husserl who regards the 
bracketing of the natural world as a necessary condition for arriving at the 
phenomenon. In referring to phenomenology as "a philosophy for which the 
word is always ’already there’ before reflection begins as an inalienable 
presence",11 he is almost echoing Heidegger. Without going further into the 
agreement and the disagreement of the phenomenologists, for this has 
already been discussed, it is clear that inspite of the differences that seem to 
emerge on the way to the phenomenon, the basic stratum, to the phenomena 
themselves remain the same. Phenomenology whether seen from Husserl’s 
point of view or Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s point of view is 
phenomenology. If the phenomenology of religion is to be approached, one 
or the other of the methods has to be applied. Whichever is used however 
has relations to the other views. As said earlier, the phenomenology of 
religion as hitherto known has not appropriated either of these methods. In 
what way then can the phenomenological method be appropriated in the 
phenomenology of religion? This will be the beginning of our phenomenology 
of religion. Since the concept of religion which we have accepted as true for 
the purpose of this work does not arrive at any essence as a basis, our
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phenomenology of religion should not aim at the description of essence- 
intuition, this in effect implies that we are bound to look for the modification 
in the works of Husserl if we are to proceed. At the thought of this our mind 
goes back to the phenomenological method as modified by Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. We have already seen Heidegger’s phenomenology as a way 
of access to the ground whose point of departure is the hermeneutics of 
Dasein. Having said this, we now look for a way in which Dasein relates to 
the form of consciousness of transcendence which religion is. This will be the 
phenomenology of religion all be it as modified by Heidegger’s understanding. 
It is this relationship between Heidegger’s Dasein and Smith’s form of 
consciousness of transcendence that takes us to the works of Karl Jaspers. 
Jaspers’ works are chosen for reasons which are quite obvious. His interest 
in phenomenology as a method and in transcendence and religion makes his 
works important for consultation. Like a good number of philosophers, 
Jaspers’ starting point is the problem of Being which he sees as all 
Encompassing. Jaspers divides this all Encompassing which Being is into 
two, namely the encompassing which we are as empirical existence, 
consciousness as such and spirit and the encompassing which Being is. This 
has been fully discussed in chapter five. The sketch on that part of this work 
tells the story of Jaspers’ division of the Encompassing. As stated earlier, the 
point of departure of Heidegger’s phenomenology is Dasein. The ground as 
we can see here is the form of consciousness of transcendence and the point
of departure is Dasein. From the work of Jaspers, it can be seen that 
Heidegger’s Dasein is contained in the encompassing that we are. Taking this 
as another modification, we can now go on to see the way in which Dasein 
which is now seen in the encompassing that we are gains access to the 
ground. For Jaspers, the encompassing that we are is not all reality. 
Experience according to him shows this. There is something more than the 
reality which is seen in the encompassing that we are. That more in the 
encompassing that we are, that relates to it but is not part of it he calls 
Existenz. It relates the encompassing that we are to the encompassing that 
Being is as transcendence. It is not transcendence but cannot exist without 
transcendence. It relates the immanent to the transcendent. The qualities of 
Existenz have been fully discussed. It suffices however, to remind ourselves 
that we are never Existenz in the mode of reality but in the mode of 
potentiality. Existenz in the last analysis can be the capacity of man to 
transcend that meets transcendence. Existenz participates in transcendence, 
and transcendence is in a way present in Existenz. The implication of what 
we have been discussing is that the form of consciousness which religion is, 
is present in transcendence among other forms of consciousness. Since 
Existenz is potentiality, like transcendence it cannot be objectified. 
Acknowledging the present of Dasein in the encompassing that we are implies 
that it relates to both Existenz and transcendence. Since it is Existenz that 
relates the immanent to the transcendent, it implies that the description of
Existenz and its relationship to transcendence will pave the way to the 
description of that form of consciousness which religion is. It can be said that 
to do this is to do the phenomenology of religion. We already know that both 
transcendence and Existenz cannot be objectified. If Existenz makes real the 
presence of transcendence and both of them cannot be objectified, our 
problem now becomes how to objectify the non objectifiable. It is here that 
Jaspers comes up with an apparent solution. Existenz he says gains access 
to transcendence through taking as ciphers certain representations, images, 
and thoughts that appear as objects of understanding. While everything can 
be a cipher, most ciphers we employ derive from our historical situation. 
Continuing, it can be said that ciphers have a kind of meaning but they never 
mean any specific object for what they refer to cannot be objectified. Ciphers 
have been fully discussed in the work of Jaspers, but we should recall that 
while facts are the same for all, ciphers like natural symbols, are personal 
and unstable. They are only meaningful and transparent to those who have 
learnt to respond to them. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the form 
of consciousness which religion is fits well into the description of ciphers. It 
thus can be said that religion is a cipher of transcendence. The qualities of 
ciphers which we have already seen gives us the freedom to assert that only 
as a cipher of transcendence can religion be meaningful. Ciphers as said 
elsewhere do not exhaust transcendence. As a form of consciousness, 
individual interpretations and backgrounds can account for the varieties and
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diversities in what comes to be called religion. No one cipher can claim 
finality, nor can any claim to be the cipher of transcendence in perpetuity. In 
this way, sacred objects, sacred acts, sacred places can be understood. 
Further, it can be seen that only as ciphers of transcendence can Buddhism, 
Christianity and Islam all claim to be religion.
It is also on this account that one cannot talk of the truth or falsity of any 
religion for the truth or the falsity depends upon the conformity or the non­
conformity of the individual or the community to their interpretation of 
transcendence. From this our conclusion follows thus:
1) Phenomenology of religion has been inconclusive and inconsistent on 
account of the fact that it has never applied the phenomenological 
method as advocated by Husserl and expanded by his successors. 
This has left the phenomenology of religion on the level of yet another 
religious manifestation.
2) For a phenomenology of religion that appropriates the Husserlian 
principles to be possible as in other disciplines, certain modifications 
are necessary on account of the peculiar nature of religion.
The first is the redefinition of the concept of religion from being an object of
363
consciousness to being a form of consciousness of transcendence. This takes 
care of all that can at present be called religion.
Secondly, there is the need for the modification of Husserl idea of 
phenomenology. This is because, if religion is seen as a form of 
consciousness of transcendence, it therefore does not have and cannot have 
an essence which is necessary for the description of the essence-intuition 
which Husserl advocates. This leads to the natural modification of Husserl 
found in the works of Heidegger.
Thirdly, referring to the modification of the phenomenological method by 
Heidegger, a further modification is necessary if we are to arrive at the 
phenomenology of religion. This comes in relating the Dasein of Heidegger 
to the Encompassing that we are of Karl Jaspers. This enables us to relate 
Dasein to the form of consciousness of transcendence, the outcome becomes 
the beginning of the phenomenology of religion which is seen as the 
phenomenology of the cipher of transcendence.
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